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Summary 
1. Summary 
1.1. This study has examined the effectiveness and impact of Community measures taken 
over the past decade to liberalize air transport in the Community. The study analyses how the 
airlines concerned have been affected by and responded to the new regulatory and commercial 
environment. It also provides a detailed assessment of the changes that have taken place in 
market structure and behaviour. An analysis has been applied to developments since 1985 
(and in some cases since 1983), through desk research, the responses to questionnaires from 
18 EU airlines and seven civil aviation departments, and interviews with airlines and 
authorities in France, Germany and the UK. A detailed examination was made of five EU 
airlines, representing various sizes and types of operation (see case studies, Chapter 6 and 
Appendix F). 
1.2. From the review of EU measures, it is evident that the three packages of air transport 
measures have effectively liberalized air transport within the European Union (see Section 
3.4). Other sector-specific measures designed to improve the working of the single market 
have been less effective (see Section 3.5). It should be stressed that the most significant 
measures only came into force in January 1993, and only a limited number of years' data is 
available to evaluate any resulting changes. The degree to which the EU measures have had 
an impact on EU airline strategies, capacity, fares and economics has also been difficult to 
evaluate against the background of a major economic recession, and global industry changes. 
The large airlines, such as Air France, British Airways, KLM and Lufthansa, earning under 
50% of total revenues from intra-EU and domestic services, are clearly influenced more by 
world-wide developments than other EU carriers (see Section 2.2). 
1.3. Many of the airlines' strategic changes were more in response to developments in 
global rather than EU markets: more cross-border alliances and share stakes were made with 
non-EU carriers than with EU carriers. This was supported by case studies of Air France and 
British Airways (see Appendices F.l and F.2). Furthermore, some fairly ambitious alliances 
(such as Alcazar) were attempted within Europe, but failed through a conflict in desired US 
partner or the choice of principal European hub (see Section 4.2). 
1.4. In the largest EU countries, such as France, Germany and the UK, there was a trend 
towards the flag carriers acquiring other domestic airlines that might otherwise have been 
acquired by hostile interests (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2). Control was also exercised by larger 
carriers over small regional carriers through code sharing arrangements (e.g. Eurowings with 
Air France and KLM - see case study in Appendix F.5), or through franchising (see British 
Airways case study in Appendix F.2). It is difficult to conclude that these last developments 
should have been prevented by stricter national or EU control on mergers and related 
arrangements. EU airlines need domestic feed so as to benefit from hubbing at their main base 
and to compete with other world international carriers. Given the complex web of 
international alliances, it might be better to pursue a policy of global liberalization, with less 
control of non-EU investment in EU carriers (negotiated on a reciprocal basis). 
1.5. EU liberalization has not had the same impact on the charter airlines, which were 
already operating in highly competitive markets prior to the 1990s. Some of them had already 
attempted to enter scheduled markets, even before the first package, but these were not 
successful, less because of regulatory restrictions than overexpansion, poor market image and 
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higher than anticipated costs. One exception to this was Maersk Air (see case study in Section 
6.4 and Appendix F.4). More recently, a number of charter airlines have started operations in 
scheduled domestic markets in France, Italy and Spain, but it is too soon to judge how 
successful they will be (see Section 4.6). 
1.6. Total cross-border intra-EU scheduled service seat capacity offered increased by 3% a 
year between 1989 and 1992, rising to 7% a year between 1992 and 1994, a time of economic 
recession. This resulted in declining load factors and real yields, particularly in the early 
1990s (see Section 5.2.2). Capacity growth for a control group of non-EU countries was 
significantly lower. This was caused by a substantial growth in regional non-stop services, but 
redesignation of a number of charter services as scheduled somewhat distorted the picture (see 
Section 5.1). 
1.7. Excluding those airlines based outside the EU, there was a net increase of six in the 
number of airlines serving intra-EU cross-border scheduled routes between 1992 and 1995, 
compared to a net loss of four carriers between 1989 and 1992. The majority of these airlines 
served principally low density regional routes, although a small number of formerly charter 
airlines (such as EBA in Belgium and Air Liberté in France) started scheduled services in 
direct competition with EU flag (national) carriers (see Section 5.1). Competition has also 
increased significantly in French, Italian and Spanish domestic markets as a result of EU 
liberalization, in some cases accompanied by alleged predatory pricing from the former 
monopoly flag carrier. 
1.8. The first and third packages gave EU airlines more opportunity to carry traffic both 
between two other EU countries (Fifth Freedom) and within another EU country (consecutive 
cabotage), both operated as an extension of a cross-border service from their home country. 
Considerable use was made of these freedoms initially, especially by airlines based in 
peripheral EU countries (see TAP Air Portugal case study in Section 6.5 and Appendix F.3), 
but many of these services were subsequently discontinued due to poor economics (see 
Section 5.1.1). An alternative way of serving routes out of other EU countries is available 
through the right to establish an airline based in another country. Airlines such as British 
Airways (TAT in France and Deutsche BA), Lufthansa (Lauda Air in Austria and others) and 
KLM (Air UK) have done so, but only on a minority basis, the maximum stake being 49.9% 
(see Section 4.2.1). 
1.9. It was estimated that traffic growth during the recent recessionary period (over which 
the main EU liberalization measures were introduced) was markedly higher than predicted by 
a model calibrated on past GDP trends over a period of recession and industry regulation. 
Passenger traffic levels averaged 20% higher than predicted over the period 1992-94. The 
same model predicted that for every 1% boost to Community GDP that might be caused by 
single market measures (other studies have attempted to estimate this overall effect on the 
economies of EU countries), an additional million scheduled passengers would have been 
generated (see Section 5.2.3). 
1.10. Comprehensive data on air cargo carried on intra-EU routes is impossible to obtain. 
The situation is also complicated by the growing trend in cargo moving by truck between 
airports and treated in the same way as air cargo. There has been a rapid expansion both in air 
express and parcel traffic in the EU, and the intra-EU truck network offered by EU airlines. 
Summarv 
The removal of EU barriers is thought to have been a major factor in recent express cargo 
growth (see Section 5.3). 
1.11. It is important to note that without the benefits of the liberalization process, EU 
airlines would not have been able to make use of the dynamic pricing tactics made possible by 
revenue management techniques. However, airlines have continued to seek revenue increases 
from the business market segments by increasing these fares, and in this respect it can be 
concluded that the EU measures have produced an undesired effect. Similar price 
discriminatory strategies, though, have been pursued by airlines in both the US and Australia, 
following deregulation (see Section 5.7.1). 
There have been exceptions to this experience, for example where entry by carriers such as 
British Midland in the UK and Air One in Italy has occurred, as both have competed on price 
for the business market (see Section 5.7). This leads to the conclusion that policies that favour 
entry by these types of carrier (often one of three or four carriers competing on a dense route) 
would be desirable with regard to business fares. This last point is supported by the analysis 
of developments of capacity concentration on cross-border intra-EU routes, which shows, if 
anything, growing rather than reduced concentration on a city-pair route basis (see Section 
5.1.1). 
Consumers benefited considerably from deeper discounts from the fully flexible fare for 
scheduled flights and more widely publicized special offers. The number of passengers taking 
advantage of such discounts has increased between 1985 and 1994, this trend accelerating in 
the early 1990s (see Section 5.7.1). 
1.12. Cross-border air fares were generally found to be higher than domestic fares for routes 
of similar distance, especially for fully flexible and business fares. These differentials have 
been reduced in some countries, for example Germany. They would be expected to decline in 
the future, but this might take a number of years, given the nature of the causes of the 
differences (see Section 5.7.3). 
1.13. EU carriers have made some progress in reducing costs, although the gap between EU 
and US carriers is not narrowing. EU airlines have certainly reduced staff numbers (especially 
in the past few years) and increased labour productivity both in terms of available tonne-kms 
(ATK) per employee and labour costs per ATK. However, they have not been so successful 
in reducing the average labour costs per employee. It appears that the airlines are paying their 
staff on average slightly more in return for proportionately greater productivity increases. 
These changes were affected partly by EU liberalization measures, partly by international 
competition from carriers outside Europe and partly by the world and European economic 
climate. The relative importance of the EU measures would depend on the airline's focus of 
operations (see Section 5.5). 
1.14. It can be concluded that some of the expectations following the introduction of EU 
liberalization have not been met: there have been few serious challenges to the flag carrier 
duopolies, and business and fully flexible fares have continued to climb. On the other hand, 
consumers have benefited from greater competition in promotional fares, and more dynamic 
pricing tactics overall have led to higher intra-EU traffic growth in the early 1990s than would 
have been the case without liberalization. There was also a substantial growth in the number 
of EU cities connected by non-stop services, and some encouraging trends from new entrant 
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airlines in the UK, Belgium, Italy, France and Spain. On balance, it is argued that the net 
result has been disappointing; but this is hardly surprising given the timing of the final stage of 
liberalization in the middle of an economic recession, the concern of the larger airlines with 
more global events, and the time needed to change some of the more deep-seated structural 
barriers. 
1.15. The most important barrier remaining is access to airport slots, which inhibits 
competition on existing routes and the development of new routes (see Section 3.5.4 and 
survey results in Appendix B). This is currently being addressed by the Commission, but it is 
difficult to see a solution that does not involve either confiscation of slots or some form of 
auction. The latter has the advantage of not requiring procedures for confiscation, and may 
not be the barrier to new entrants that has often been claimed. Slot pricing may discourage 
operators of small aircraft, but this already happens under existing landing fee structures. 
1.16. The second most important problem is considered to have been state aid (see survey 
results in Appendix B), and it is argued that many of the conditions imposed in conjunction 
with the approval of state aid could have been more onerous, and accompanied by such 
requirements as giving up ground handling monopolies (see Section 3.5.3). Conditions should 
be strictly monitored and enforced, and, where necessary, modified to take into account 
changes in the market situation. 
1.17. Many of the other benefits that have yet to accrue from the single market are related to 
horizontal measures. These include the harmonization of indirect taxation and social policies 
in member countries (see Section 3.7). This would ensure that the key airline input markets 
such as labour, capital and goods and services were more competitive, a position that some of 
them do not yet approach. 
1.18. As with regulation in other industries, it is necessary to achieve a balance between the 
strict control of mergers and alliances in order to make Community markets work better, and 
allowing EU airlines to achieve the necessary economies of scale and scope to be able to 
compete globally. It is likely that the Commission have tipped the balance slightly in favour 
of the latter, which means that more intensified efforts should be made to ensure that air 
transport agreements between the major trading blocs of the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN are 
liberalized. This would reduce the scope first for EU airlines to cross-subsidize EU operations 
from lucrative (protected) long-haul markets through increased competition, and second to 
allow non-EU airlines to take majority stakes in EU airlines and vice versa. 
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2. Introduction 
2.1. Study objectives and approach 
In order to examine the impact and effectiveness of Community measures in the field of air 
transport, it is important to look back at the original aims and objectives of the process. 
Although the creation of a single market was an objective in itself, it was the benefits which 
would flow from this which lay behind the liberalization process. Most of the early debate, 
which led up to the publication of the so-called Memorandum No 1 of 19791 was concerned 
with the perceived need to develop the economic and social cohesion of the Community. This 
was particularly important for outlying regions. 
Given the importance that air transport was likely to play in the economic integration process, 
the Commission was concerned that the interests of the Community and its outlying regions 
might not be best served by US-style deregulation (which had taken place in 1978). A central 
purpose of the Memorandum was therefore to stimulate a policy debate to decide whether the 
existing system was in the interests of consumers or, in the long term, of the airlines 
themselves. It was not clear then, just as it is not entirely clear now, that total deregulation and 
the unconstrained effects of market forces would produce an optimum air transport system for 
the Community as a whole. 
In 1984, after a period of consultation, the Commission produced a second memorandum. 
This put forward the long-term goal of creating a common air transport market to be achieved 
by a gradual relaxation of existing controls. It was expected that this would result in lower 
prices, a stimulus to growth of the industry, lower costs, and profits for efficient airlines. In 
the longer term, this would create jobs and contribute towards a coherence of the single market 
which could not be achieved by states acting individually. On the other hand, it was 
emphasized that national social and economic objectives would be safeguarded, an aim that 
could work against the benefits of increased coherence and efficiency. 
The above background provides a useful starting point for the study in so far that the 
Memoranda set out objectives (i.e. variety and choice, profits, market stimulation, job 
creation, cohesion, retain existing benefits and safeguard national objectives). The method by 
which these were to be achieved in practice were essentially the three packages of air transport 
measures. An assessment of the progress made so far in achieving these objectives is the 
primary purpose for this study. 
In particular, the study: 
(a) examines any changes in market structure and behaviour which can be traced back to 
Community initiated or Community inspired changes in the regulatory framework for 
Community air transport; and 
ι Contribution of the European Communities to the Development of Air Transport Services - Memorandum of the 
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(b) assesses the extent to which these have been reflected in the performance and 
effectiveness of airline operations within the Community. 
To meet the study objectives, five discrete but interlinked steps of analysis were undertaken: 
(1) review of Community actions intended to create a single aviation market; 
(2) scheduled and charter carrier strategic responses to liberalization;3 
(3) operational changes and marketing innovations;3 
(4) financial and economic developments; 
(5) identification of barriers to the full exploitation of the potential of the single market. 
The logic of the approach and sequencing proposed for the study are based on the following 
analysis. 
Both the actual and the proposed changes to the regulatory environment in the period from 
1985 to 1995 (Step 1) forced airlines, both incumbents and new entrants, to change their 
strategies (Step 2) and to introduce new operating patterns and new marketing tools. The 
operational and marketing changes reflected both the more liberal market environment and the 
strategic options being taken. These changes also represent the responses (Step 3) to actions 
intended to create a Single Aviation Market and to the more general liberalization trends (see 
Figure 2.1). 
The strategic options adopted led to significant structural changes within the European airline 
industry through mergers, share purchases and various types of marketing alliances. This 
supply side restructuring has been aimed at achieving both marketing benefits and cost 
efficiencies. The various operational and marketing innovations and developments had 
similar objectives. The success of both strategic (Step 2) and operating/marketing decisions 
(Step 3) can be gauged by the medium-term changes (Step 4). These tend to be structural, 
organizational, economic or financial in character. 
A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the effects of liberalization (Steps 3 and 4) together 
with an assessment of airlines' strategic responses since 1985 (Step 2) enabled the consultants 
to identify both the progress towards the creation of a Single Aviation Market with pan-
European distribution networks and any barriers which still exist to the full exploitation of the 
opportunities created by a single market (Step 5). 
The above steps in the analysis required quantitative as well as qualitative measures, 
especially Steps 2 to 4. Such quantification tended to be either Community-wide or related to 
specific markets or groups of routes. It was supported by six detailed case studies of the 
behaviour and performance of individual Community airlines conducted in parallel with the 
preceding five steps in the analysis. 
Case studies of five Community airlines were undertaken to support these areas of work. 
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2.2. Distinguishing the impact of Community measures 
The gradual liberalization of intra­Community air services began when Europe's airlines were 
going through a profitable period (1983­89), but the more fundamental changes arising from 
the second (effective November 1990) and third (effective January 1993) liberalization 
packages occurred at a time when economic recession and a downturn in demand growth 
pushed many airlines into deficit and several into a loss­making spiral. Against that 
background airlines would in any case have taken a variety of actions to improve their 
worsening economic fortunes. How can one, in the present study, distinguish responses and 
actions which would have occurred anyway from those that arose directly as a result of the 
liberalization process and of the Community liberalization in particular? This poses a crucial 
methodological problem. 
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In some areas the distinction is relatively straightforward. For instance, many effects such as 
new Fifth Freedom services or entry of new airlines on major intra-Community routes could 
only have happened because of the liberalization measures. Others, such as code sharing or 
franchising, might have happened anyway. An examination of developments in yields and 
unit costs involves more intricate problems of causality. The case studies and interviews with 
key executives try to establish to what extent such changes were induced by the trend towards 
liberalization. 
There are significant problems with isolating the effects of EU measures from the other 
variables that explain changes in air traffic, fares, productivity, etc. These can be summarized 
as follows: 
(a) influence of global factors on EU airline operations (see Figure 2.2); 
(b) economic determinants (GDP, disposable income, etc.); 
(c) oil and fuel prices; 
(d) monopoly controlled airport and air navigation charges; 
(e) exchange rates and interest rates; 
(f) hotel and related holiday costs; 
(g) leads and lags in the aircraft ordering/delivery cycle, which has, in the past, led to excess 
capacity and downward pressures on air fares. 
In order to isolate these effects, a sample of routes (individually or grouped) were evaluated 
and compared with a control group of routes from countries which were not directly 
influenced by EU measures. In addition, five airlines were examined in detail as case studies, 
each one representing a different aspect of the Community's air transport industry: 
(a) British Airways; 
(b) Air France; 
(c) TAP Air Portugal; 
(d) Maersk Air (Denmark); 
(e) Eurowings (Germany). 
These complement the strategic, operational and marketing analyses, and provide more 
detailed information against which to check some of the study conclusions. 
Two of the five case studies involve large but contrasting national carriers. British Airways is 
included both because it was fully privatized in the mid-1980s and because it is a carrier which 
has apparently responded most rapidly since 1985 to the regulatory changes affecting 
European and world air transport. Air France, by contrast, is still state owned and has 
appeared slow to respond to the emergence of the single market. To represent smaller and 
peripheral national carriers, TAP-Air Portugal, again state owned, has been selected. 
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Figure 2.2. The importance of intra-European revenues for major EU airlines in 1992 
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It was important to include a new entrant airline among the case studies. Unfortunately, there 
are very few truly independent new airlines of significant size which have emerged since 1985 
and which are still surviving as truly independent carriers. Most surviving new entrants have 
become franchisees of larger incumbents or have sold shares to them. To fill this gap the 
Danish carrier Maersk Air was chosen. This airline operates charters (0.5 million passengers 
in 1994), but has launched several scheduled routes including some business sectors, and has a 
wholly owned subsidiary operating regional scheduled services. 
The German airline Eurowings was taken as representative of a smaller regional airline. This 
airline operated regional intra­EU services with turbo­prop aircraft, and has recently agreed to 
operate larger jet aircraft for charter operator Hapag Lloyd, as well as acquiring some jets for 
its own services. 
2.3. Scope of the study 
The analysis of data will covers the period 1985 to 1995 inclusive, but to facilitate 
understanding, some of the comparative analyses are focused on key years within this time­
frame, for example 1986 (before EU liberalization), 1989 (post­first and pre­second EU 
package), 1992 (post­second and pre­third package), and 1994 and 1995 (the period after the 
third package came into force). Where necessary, data and developments prior to 1985 have 
been analysed (for example, 1965­94 for European traffic and yield developments, and post­
1980 for employment trends). 
The study covers both scheduled and non­scheduled services. The latter are particularly 
important since around 60% of intra­Community passenger­kms in 1994 were generated on 
charter flights. 
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The geographical coverage includes the 15 EU Member States as well as the European 
Economic Area (EEA) States. Sweden (now part of the EU) and Norway (EEA) adopted the 
third package measures in August 1993, while Iceland (EEA) adopted them in July 1994. 
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3. Legal and administrative measures taken to complete 
the single market 
The regulatory developments and changes that have contributed towards the creation of a 
single aviation market within the European Community are summarized below. This 
summary takes into account the global nature of air transport, and is introduced by the 
background to air transport regulation and some of the more important world-wide 
developments in this area. 
3.1. History 
As a result of the 1944 Chicago Conference and the 1919 Paris Convention before it, the 
principle of sovereignty over air space has given countries the right to regulate air services to, 
from and within their countries. Historically, international air transport regulation developed 
on the basis of a network of restrictive bilateral agreements between individual states. The 
regulatory control of the bilateral air services agreements were often supported by inter-airline 
pooling agreements and the workings of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
tariff co-ordination system, which controlled the fares and rates that could be charged by 
airlines. 
Until the late 1970s most bilateral agreements defined explicitly the routes that could be 
flown, the number of airlines that could operate, the capacity and frequency that could be 
offered and the method by which the fares and rates would be agreed. Although similar in 
format, the precise terms of bilateral agreements varied considerably. Thus the regulatory 
constraints would vary from market to market, so that international air services between, say, 
four different countries, could be subject to six different regulatory regimes. 
Airlines generally did not compete vigorously against one another, with many being state 
owned and not subject to commercial realities. Thus the impact of different conditions 
applying in different markets was limited. 
3.2. Barriers to cross-border activity under previous regulatory systems 
Up to January 1993, scheduled air services between all EU countries were governed by air 
services agreements (ASAs), or 'bilaterals'. Such agreements still apply to services between 
EU and third countries. Bilaterals are in essence international trade agreements, which vary in 
their detailed clauses, but now tend to follow the basic format that was set out in the standard 
bilateral agreement proposed by the Chicago Conference. In the course of each agreement, the 
key issues of economic regulation are dealt with: 
(a) the routes that may be flown; 
(b) the number of airlines permitted to operate (designation); 
(c) the capacity allowed; 
(d) the system for determining the fares to be levied; 
(e) the required ownership of carriers. 
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3.2.1. Routes 
The most fundamental matter that is regulated is whether countries will allow other countries' 
aircraft into their airspace, whether and where they will allow them to land, and between 
which points aircraft may carry revenue traffic. The routes that may be flown are listed in a 
route schedule, which is attached to the bilateral agreement itself. At the most restrictive end 
of the scale comes an agreement that lists the specific pairs of points that may be operated. At 
the least restrictive end of the scale comes the provision that airlines may operate to any point 
in the territory of the state to and from any foreign point. 
3.2.2. Designation 
Once the routes have been described, there are often restrictions on the number of airlines 
from each side that may operate the routes. Most agreements up to the 1970s only allowed 
one airline from each side to operate each route (single designation). Some bilaterals allow 
routes to be flown by two carriers from each side (double designation), whilst liberal 
agreements permit operations by an unlimited number of carriers (multiple designation). For 
example, the US-UK bilateral, known as Bermuda II, originally allowed only one airline from 
each side on each route, except for two routes that were to be double designation: 
'...For the purpose of operating the agreed combination services ... each party shall have the 
right to designate not more than: (a) two airlines on each of two gateway route segments of its 
own choosing, (b) one airline on each gateway route segment other than those selected under 
subparagraph (a)...' (UK-US 1977) 
Since 1977, the bilateral has been amended to allow extra designations on further routes. 
The ECAC COMPAS report of 1982 indicated that around two-thirds of European bilaterals 
had no limitations on the number of airlines designated, with one-third restricted to single 
designation. At that time, however, in practice only 8% of total country-pairs and only 2% of 
city-pairs operated had more than one designated airline from each state. 
3.2.3. Capacity 
A key article in many bilaterals concerns capacity. Capacity can be regulated in a variety of 
ways - by direct limitation of the number of flights that each side's carriers may operate (e.g. 
Lebanon-UK), possibly in conjunction with a requirement on the aircraft size (e.g. the recent 
US-Germany interim agreement). Alternatively, the number of seats might be directly 
regulated. A restrictive form of regulation might require the capacity on offer between two 
countries to be split precisely 50:50 between the carriers of the two countries. A more flexible 
regime would allow one side to operate up to 60% of the capacity, a still more liberal 
agreement might allow one side to have up to 70%. The most liberal capacity regime would 
involve no controls on capacity whatsoever (e.g. US-Netherlands). Some agreements might 
apply the capacity splits on a route-by-route basis (e.g. US-UK), although most agreements 
apply them to the country-pair market. The extent to which carriers may increase capacity is 
also often regulated. 
3.2.4. Tariffs 
Another key article relates to tariffs, which concerns the approval procedure for passenger 
fares and cargo rates. The regulation of fares is particularly difficult for a number of reasons. 
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If a government decides which fare level it will permit, actually enforcing this fare level is not 
easy. If the fare is sold in foreign countries, it will be even more difficult for the government 
to enforce. Furthermore, the fact that various indirect routings are available between any two 
points makes fare regulation difficult, even when the two governments are co-operating. 
Typically, tariff articles in the 1950s included references to the IATA tariff conference 
procedures, committing carriers to using fares that were agreed at IATA conferences, with 
government approval largely automatic. This reference to the IATA tariff setting system was 
gradually removed from bilaterals, and is now no longer a feature, although modern bilaterals 
continue to commit carriers to establishing fares at a reasonable level, typically including the 
following clause: 
'The tariffs to be charged by the designated airlines of the Contracting Parties for carriage 
between their territories ... shall be established at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to 
all relevant factors, including the cost of operating the agreed services, the interests of users, 
reasonable profit and market considerations.' 
The regulation of fares and tariffs generally takes one of the following five forms, shown in 
order from the most restrictive to the most liberal: 
(a) Double Approval (both governments must approve the fare) 
(b) Country of Origin Approval (government at origin of flight must approve fare) 
(c) Home State Approval (government of airline's home state must approve 
fare) 
(d) Double Disapproval (fare in effect unless both governments disapprove) 
(e) No Government Intervention. 
3.2.5. Ownership and control 
All bilaterals generally give states the right to refuse to accept the designation of an airline that 
is not owned and controlled by nationals of the state designating it: 
'each Contracting Party shall have the right to withhold, suspend or revoke the operating 
permission ... in the event that .. that Contracting Party is not satisfied that substantial 
ownership and effective control of such airline are vested in the nationals of the other 
Contracting Party.' (US-Italy 1970) 
These clauses were introduced into air transport in order to prevent flags of convenience being 
used as a way of avoiding labour laws and technical regulations - as is apparent in the 
shipping sector. This will be referred to later in this study. 
In addition to the key economic issues, bilateral agreements also cover administrative issues 
such as the definition of terms used in the agreement, the mutual recognition of aircraft and air 
crew licences and certificates, the exemption from customs duties of aircraft parts brought into 
the country for use by foreign aircraft, the commitment to ensure that airport and navigational 
charges are set at a reasonable level, representation abroad (stationing of personnel), the right 
to transfer funds from ticket sales abroad, the taxation treatment of revenue (avoiding double 
taxation), entry into force of the agreement, and the procedure for amending and terminating 
the agreement. 
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3.2.6. Charters 
Non-scheduled air transport services have historically been subject to far lighter regulation 
than scheduled services. 
The reason for this is that prior to the Second World War, most commercial air transport was 
scheduled - flights operated to a regular timetable and were openly advertised and available to 
individual members of the public. The private chartering of aircraft and air taxi operations 
was very limited and the concept of inclusive tours involving air transport had not yet been 
created. 
At the time of the 1944 Chicago Conference, it was thought that non-scheduled operations 
would continue to be unimportant and so a more liberal approach was adopted towards them 
than towards scheduled services [Chataway, 1994]. Whereas Article 6 of the Chicago 
Convention, which governs scheduled operations, specifically required 'special permission or 
authorization' from the destination countries for flights to be operated, Article 5 left 
authorization for non-scheduled services to the discretion of individual states. 
This decision placed charter operations outside the scope of bilateral air service agreements 
and, consequently, in a potentially liberal environment. In practice, most countries have 
historically required prior authorization of charter flights, but attitudes have varied 
considerably. Some countries, such as India and until recently Australia, have been very 
restrictive in their approach, either refusing to allow charter services unless operated by their 
national carrier or unless it could be shown that it did not divert any traffic from scheduled 
services. Others allowed charter services, provided their carriers were allowed to tender for 
the contract. Until recently, Cyprus would permit tour operators to use the flights of charter 
airlines, provided they also bought a percentage of their total seats from Cyprus Airways. 
More liberal approaches have been taken by tourist destination countries such as Spain, 
Morocco and Tunisia, readily authorizing charter services that bring in business for their 
tourist industries. 
As the importance of non-scheduled services increased, charter services began to find their 
way into bilateral agreements: the UK signed non-scheduled bilaterals with France and 
Switzerland in 1950 and 1952, but these were superseded by the 1956 Paris Agreement, in 
which the members of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) agreed to adopt a 
more liberal approach to charter services. The states party to the Agreement agreed to freely 
admit aircraft engaged in non-scheduled commercial flights within Europe, provided the 
flights did not harm their scheduled services. 
In the light of this liberal approach, the member states essentially agreed to waive the right to 
raise regulations, conditions or limitations on non-scheduled services, the right that was 
granted in Article 5 of the Chicago Convention. This agreement has greatly facilitated the 
development of charter services within Europe, most particularly the inclusive tour charters. 
An interesting feature of the Paris Convention is that it did not include any mention of 
ownership and control requirements. This, in contrast to most bilateral agreements, has 
allowed charter carriers greater flexibility in their ownership structure than scheduled carriers. 
The UK carrier Monarch is ultimately Swiss owned, while the UK carrier Britannia is owned 
by the Canadian Thomson corporation. 
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In the 1960s many governments, under pressure from the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) to protect the scheduled carriers, introduced new constraints on the 
operations of charter airlines. However, through the 1970s these constraints withered away as 
public demand for cheap air travel increased. Although the charter market continued to be 
restricted in the extent to which it could compete with scheduled carriers and offer seat-only 
travel, the core market for inclusive tours was very competitive. By the end of the 1970s, 
consumers in most countries in northern Europe enjoyed a wide choice of tour operators and 
charter airlines. This contrasted with European scheduled markets, which, even in countries 
with clear multiple airline policies like the UK, continued to be dominated by the flag carrier. 
3.3. Bilateral liberalization 
From the late 1970s through the 1980s the trend towards increasing liberalization of the airline 
industry spread - unevenly - from the domestic United States industry to international 
markets. Liberal bilateral agreements were signed in 1978 between the US and various 
European countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium) and in the following two years 
between the US and various Asian countries (Thailand, Singapore, Korea). In 1984 the 
Netherlands and the UK effectively deregulated air transportation services between the two 
countries with the adoption of an ultra-liberal bilateral, and both countries subsequently 
endeavoured to sign relatively liberal agreements with other states in Europe. 
Such liberal bilaterals pre-dated the Community's first liberalization package of 1988 and, by 
going much further than this first package, had a more direct impact on air services between 
the countries concerned. Examples of these were: 
UK - Netherlands (June 1984) Liberal route access/capacity with consultations 
Country of Origin fare rules 
UK - FR of Germany (December 1984) Liberal route access/capacity 
Country of Origin rules only for discount fares 
Minimum conditions for special fares 
UK - Luxembourg (March 1985) Liberal route access/capacity 
Double Disapproval on fares 
UK - Netherlands (June 1985) Brought into line with Luxembourg agreement 
UK - France (September 1985) 55:45 on capacity (vs. previous 50:50); liberal access 
No change on fares 
UK - Belgium (October 1985) Same as Luxembourg 
UK - Switzerland (December 1985) Same as Luxembourg for capacity 
Same as FR of Germany for fares 
Over the same period, other bilaterals were revised with very limited moves towards 
liberalization: 
UK - Italy (March 1986) No change from traditional model, apart from freer 
access (additional UK carriers could be designated) 
France - FR of Germany (1986) Only greater freedom for route access 
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The effects of these bilateral changes, as well as the impact of measures introduced by the EU 
over this period (1984-90) - principally the first package - are examined later in this study. 
Broadly, the impact of the new bilaterals could be compared with the old style ones as follows: 
Routes flown 
Designation 
Capacity allowed 
Fares levied 
Traditional bilateral 
Only to specified points 
One per route from each state 
Shared 50:50 between airlines 
of each state 
Approval of both governments 
needed (negotiated through IATA) 
Ownership of carriers Nationals of designating state 
New style bilateral 
Open route access 
Multiple designation 
Double disapproval 
(only rejected if both 
governments disapprove) 
No change 
The impact of the liberalization of UK/Netherlands air services has been analysed in a number 
of studies. One study (OECD, 1988) suggested that air traffic on these routes was 3-5% 
higher as a result of the bilateral liberalization. The same study found that the effect on air 
fares was to increase the normal economy and business fares and to reduce significantly the 
lowest discount fare available. 
3.4. European Community measures 
Against this background the task of creating a liberal Single Aviation Market in Europe can be 
seen as a continuation of the liberalizing trend that had started with the UK-Netherlands 
agreement of 1984. It can also be seen as a significant challenge and as an essential step in 
creating fairer competition between existing EU airlines and in reducing the regulatory barriers 
to entry for new airlines. 
The final moves towards the Single European Aviation Market, which came into effect on 
1 January 1993 as a result of the third package, had been preceded by a lengthy gestation 
period. This dated back to the 1974 European Court of Justice ruling (Case 167/73 [1974] 
ECR 359) which judged that the Treaty of Rome competition rules applied to air transport and 
the 1975 recommendation by the Commission for the establishment of a European market in 
aviation. The Commission's Memorandum 1 of 1979 (COM(79) 311) called for a 
liberalization of the bilateral restrictions and a review of state subsidies. This led to the Inter-
regional Directive, which introduced free access on inter-regional routes over 400 kilometres 
operated by aircraft with less than 70 seats. In 1984 the Commission's Second Memorandum 
on Air Transport (COM(84) 72) recommended for further liberalization measures. 
The Nouvelles Frontières ruling of April 1986 (Case 209/84 [1986] ECR 1425), the entering 
into force of the Single European Act and action by the Competition Directorate of the 
Commission against airline pooling agreements together provided the catalyst which led to the 
first package in December 1987. This and the second package of 1990 loosened the 
constraints of bilaterals between European Community Member States by freeing capacity 
limitations, allowing additional airlines to be designated and creating additional route rights. 
e.g. UK - Netherlands. 
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These two packages left the fundamentals of the bilateral system in place. However, only 
those elements of individual bilaterais that were less restrictive than Community legislation 
were allowed to continue. In contrast, the third package of 1992 for the first time replaced the 
bilateral system with a multi-lateral system of air transport regulation. The setting of common 
rules for the award of an air operator's certificate, access to air transport routes within the 
Community, and the monitoring of air fares therefore replaced the bilateral system and 
designation of single national carriers. 
These rules moved away from the requirement of national ownership and control by creating 
the concept of a Community air carrier. They also removed the regulatory distinction between 
scheduled and charter airlines. These liberal rules open up traffic rights on all intra-
Community routes for all Community air carriers (with full cabotage from April 1997), with a 
few exceptions, and remove capacity restrictions. 
It is important to note that the three packages only apply to air transport within the Community 
and subsequently to the EEA countries. Air transport services between Member States and 
third countries continue to be regulated by traditional air service bilaterals. This, in some 
ways, places constraints on the effective working of the Single Aviation Market. 
3.4.1. The Regional Directive of 1983 
The 1983 Council Directive on Inter-regional air services was the first measure introduced by 
the EU related to air transport. While the Commission had proposed more radical changes, 
this was as far as the countries opposing air transport liberalization at that time were prepared 
to go. It categorized all EU airports (with the exception of the Greek Islands) into three 
groups: category 1 were all capital city airports (except Cologne-Bonn) plus Luton, 
Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Munich, Salonika and Milan. The second category included Hamburg, 
Stuttgart and Cologne-Bonn in Germany; Marseilles, Nice, Lyons and Basle/Mulhouse in 
France; Naples, Venice and Catania in Italy; Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow in the 
UK; and Luxembourg and Shannon. The third category covered all other international 
airports. 
The Directive authorized air services between category 2 and category 3 airports within the 
EU, subject to: 
(a) aircraft being operated of 70 seats or less; 
(b) over distances exceeding 400 km (or shorter if major time savings were offered); 
(c) states able to object if existing or neighbouring (< 50 km) services were adversely 
affected. 
The Directive had little impact on air transport services in Europe as a whole: it was estimated 
that only 14 new services were started between regional airports, and many of these would 
probably have been allowed under existing bilaterals [Wheatcroft & Lipman, 1986]. 
Amendments were proposed (which were subsequently incorporated into the first package) 
that would have allowed it to have had a greater impact, namely by the inclusion of services 
involving category 1 airports, and the removal of the conditions. As it stood, however, it was 
unlikely to have posed any threat to the major European airlines. 
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3.4.2. The first package (December 1987) 
A major step forward was taken in European air transport liberalization in 1987 with the 
adoption by the Council of a package of measures to apply from 1 January 1988: 
(a) a Regulation on the Application of the Competition Rules to Air Transport (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87); 
(b) a Regulation on the application of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87); 
(c) a Directive on Air Fares (Council Directive 87/601/EEC); 
(d) a Decision on Capacity Sharing and Market Access (Council Decision 87/602/EEC). 
The scope of these measures in terms of market access, capacity, fares and competition is 
summarized in Table 3.1. Following the Council's adoption of these measures, the 
Commission terminated proceedings it had begun against 13 European airlines and set out 
various conditions for allowing some co-operative activities to continue. These subsequently 
were approved. 
The Commission published a report in October 1989 which reviewed the implementation of 
the above measures (COM(89) 476 final). This was based on a questionnaire which was 
returned by every member country except Denmark. Broadly, they reported favourable 
developments in traffic, productivity and efficiency, against a background of stable economic 
growth, little change in both fuel prices and financial conditions. 
The level of the normal economy fare increased more or less in line with inflation, with some 
increases also in the lowest published fares. The flexibility allowed for fares below the deep 
discount fare was not requested in five Member States, with only a limited number of airlines 
using this in the other countries. The number of routes with multiple designation increased 
from 22 in 1987 to 33 in 1989, although these were concentrated in only five member 
countries. The capacity shares between bilateral state airlines remained fairly stable over the 
same period. 
A UK study [CAA, 1993] concluded that this first package allowed a number of smaller 
airlines to enter some of the most important intra-Community routes, offering the mix of 
capacity and fares that they wished. These included existing airlines such as British Midland 
and Hamburg Airlines, and new entrants such as Air Europe and Ryanair. However, the initial 
55:45 overall country-pair capacity limit was a constraint for UK airlines on French and 
Portuguese routes (although not Italy or Spain). A number of Fifth Freedom routes were 
started, notably by Aer Lingus via a Manchester hub [CAA, 1993], but some carriers thought 
that the 30% upper limit on the capacity offered to such traffic was too restrictive. 
Co-operation agreements involving Air France with Iberia, Alitalia, London City Airways, 
Brymon, and NFD were challenged by the Commission in 1989. While those with the 
regional carriers were allowed to continue, changes in the agreements were required for those 
involving major carriers. 
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3.4.3. The second package (July 1990) 
Further progress was made in European liberalization in 1990 with the adoption by the 
Council of a package of measures to apply from 1 November 1990: 
(a) market access (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2343/90); 
(b) air fares (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90); 
(c) a Regulation on the application of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2344/90). 
The main points in these regulations are summarized in Table 3.1. The regulations were based 
on a Commission proposal of July 1989, although significantly less liberal. In particular, the 
proposal on consecutive cabotage (limited to 33% of through capacity) was rejected, and the 
75:25 capacity safety net proposal was modified to 60:40. Other parts of the package were 
largely unchanged. 
The main changes from the first package were some reduction in the thresholds for multiple 
designation, and a further loosening of capacity share restrictions. Route access was also 
significantly improved, and a greater range of fares were to be subject to automatic approval. 
3.4.4. The Air Cargo Regulation (February 1991) 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 294/91 was introduced in February 1991 which almost 
completely liberalized flights carrying only freight and mail between EU countries. Complete 
freedom was given for EU airlines to operate freight aircraft between EU points on a 
Third/Fourth Freedom basis, and on a Fifth Freedom basis as an extension of these flights (but 
not cabotage). Prices could be freely established. The definition of EU carrier excluded 
international integrated carriers such as Fedex or DHL, although these foreign firms tended to 
contract flying out to EU companies (for example, DHL's air services are operated by their 
EU-controlled associate company E AL). 
3.4.5. The third package (July 1992) 
The third package, which largely deregulated intra-EU air services (and domestic services 
from 1997), consisted of the following three regulations which entered into force on 1 January 
1993 for the original 12 Member States, Sweden in August 1993, and Finland and Austria in 
July 1994 (of the EEA States, Norway adopted the package in August 1993 and Iceland in July 
1994): 
(a) licensing of air carriers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92); 
(b) market access (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92); 
(c) fares and rates (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92). 
These are summarized in Table 3.1. Licensing of air carriers was for the time being to be 
carried out by national governments, but applying uniform procedures laid down in the 
licensing regulation. Decisions by Member States to grant or revoke operating licences were 
to be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities with, to date, Denmark, 
Greece. Finland. Spain. France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden in the EU and 
Norway in the EEA having done so. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of intra-EU air transport packages 
Scope 
Fares 
Designation 
Capacity 
Route access 
Competition 
rules 
Licensing of 
air carriers 
Air cargo 
1st package 
From 1 January 1988 
International scheduled passenger 
transport 
Fare type % of Fares approved 
ref. fare by States 
Discount 66-90 Automatically 
Deep discount 45-65 Automatically 
All other Dbl approval 
Multiple designation by a State allowed if: 
- 250,000 pass (1st year after notification) 
- 200,000 pass or 1,200 rt flights (2nd year) 
- 180,000 pass or 1,000 rt flights (3rd year) 
Capacity shares between States 
45/55% (from Jan 88) 
40/60% (from Oct 89) 
• 3rd/4th Freedom region to hub routes 
permitted 
• 5th Freedom traffic allowed up to 30% of 
capacity 
• Additional 5th Freedom rights for Irish and 
Portuguese 
• Combination of points allowed 
• Some exemptions 
Group exemptions regarding 
• Some capacity coordinations 
• Tariff consultations 
• Slot allocation at airports 
• Common computer reservation systems 
• Ground handling of aircraft, freight, 
passengers and inflight catering 
• Some sharing of pool revenues 
Not provided for in th 
Largely deregulated under February 1991 Reg 
pricing 
2nd package 
From 1 November 1990 
International scheduled passenger 
transport 
Fare type % of Fares approved 
ref fare by States 
Fully flexible 106- Unless double 
disapproval 
Normal econ 95-105 Automatically 
Discount 80-94 Automatically 
Deep discount 30-79 Automatically 
All other If dbl approval 
Multiple designation by a State allowed if: 
-140,000 pass or 800 rt flight (from Jan 91) 
- 100,000 pass or 600 rt flight (from Jan 92) 
Capacity shares of a State of up to 60% 
Capacity can be increased by 7.5% per year 
• 3rd/4th Freedom between all airports 
• 5th Freedom traffic allowed up to 50% of 
capacity 
• Public service obligations and certain 
protection for new regional routes 
• A 3rd/4th Freedom service can be matched 
by an airline from the other State 
• Scope for traffic distribution rules and 
restrictions related to congestion and 
environmental protection 
Group exemptions regarding 
• Some capacity coordinations 
• Tariff consultations 
• Slot allocation at airports 
• Common computer reservation systems 
• Ground handling of aircraft, freight. 
passengers and inflight catering 
: 1st and 2nd packages 
ulation; free access (except cabotage) and free 
3rd package 
From 1 January 1993 
Intra-Community air transport 
Free pricing 
However, provisions made for States and/or 
the Commission to intervene against 
- excessive basic fares (in relation to long 
term fully allocated costs) 
- sustained downward development of 
fares 
No longer applicable 
Unrestricted 
• Full access to international and domestic 
routes within the EU including routes between 
states other than the base of the carrier 
Exemptions for Greek islands and Azores 
• Cabotage is allowed for up to 50% of 
capacity if the domestic sector is combined 
with a route to the home country 
Cabotage is unrestricted from April 1997 
• More developed public service obligations 
and certain protection for new thin regional 
routes 
• More developed scope for traffic 
distribution rules and restrictions related to 
congestion and environmental protection 
Group exemptions regarding 
• Some schedule coordinations 
• Tariff consultations 
• Slot allocation at airports 
• Common computer reservation systems 
• Joint operation of new thin routes 
Full freedom to start an airline 
Uniform conditions across EU 
Concept of Community ownership and control 
replaces national ownership and confrol 
Requirements for financial fitness specified 
Small carriers subject to looser regulatory 
requirements 
Replaces 1991 Regulation 
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There was to be some protection for single carriers operating small aircraft on thin routes, and 
states could impose a public service obligation on scheduled air services to an airport serving a 
peripheral or development region in its territory, or a thin route to a regional airport of vital 
economic importance to a region. 
This study examines the degree to which relevant Council Directives or Regulations have been 
implemented both in law {dejure) and in spirit {defacto) in Member States. It would appear 
that some states were slower than others fully to implement the spirit of the third package by 
creating administrative or other obstacles. The reluctance of the French government to open 
up Orly airport to competitive air services in 1994 is an example. Meetings and discussions 
with aviation authorities and airlines, as well as an examination of publicized cases or referrals 
to the Commission, are used to ascertain any problems arising with the implementation of the 
liberalization packages or the competition rules (Appendix B). 
3.5. Competition policy 
3.5.1. Community action 
The three European Community packages dealing with route access, capacity, fares and 
licences have been supplemented by a range of additional regulatory initiatives designed to 
foster fair and vigorous competition within the sector. As the basic regulatory constraints have 
been removed, the importance of protecting the competitive environment has increased. 
Community action in the field of competition is addressed in this section, while accompanying 
industry-specific measures on slot allocation and consumer protection are discussed in the next 
section. A fuller discussion and examination of EU competition policy in relation to the 
airline industry is to be found in the parallel study for the Commission, Competition issues. 
Starting in December 1987, a series of regulations were approved governing the procedures for 
the application of the competition rules to undertakings in the air transport sector. These 
provided for block exemptions to be made to various airline agreements or concerted practices 
from the application of the relevant parts of Article 85 of the Treaty. These were granted 
subject to various conditions and for a limited time period. Currently these cover: 
(a) joint planning and co-ordination of schedules; 
(b) joint operations on new thin routes by small airlines (limited to three years); 
(c) tariff consultations which give rise to interlining; 
(d) slot allocation and airport scheduling arrangements (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
95/93); 
(e) CRS operations (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2299/89 as amended). 
Thus revenue sharing and pooling, joint services operated by larger carriers, tariff fixing and 
schedules co-ordination in general are currently illegal with respect to intra-EU operations. 
The Commission has taken action to restrict the effects or creation of barriers to entry with 
regulatory initiatives concerning essential inputs, such as slot allocation (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 95/93), and essential means of distribution, such as computer reservations systems 
European Commission [1997]. Competition issues. Single Market Review Vol. V-3. Office for Official Publications of 
the EC. Luxembourg, and Kogan Page/Earthscan. London. 
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(Council Regulation (EEC) No 2299/89 amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3089/93). 
The Commission also studied the competitive consequences of frequent flyer programmes 
(FFPs) and whether they restricted the freedom of passengers to choose an airline or impede 
market access of competitive airlines, which arguably function as a barrier to entry. 
The Commission's actions to safeguard fair competition include responding to complaints that 
allege the abuse of a dominant position (Article 86). Complaints have arisen in a wide 
variety of contexts, including refusal to interline (British Midland/Aer Lingus Commission 
Decision 92/213), overflight charges (SAT/Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92 [1994] ECR 1-43), 
CRS charges (Air UK et al./Galileo, decision outstanding), ground handling monopolies 
(various complaints, decisions outstanding), and volume discounts for airport charges 
(Brussels Airport). 
3.5.2. Mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures 
The Commission's merger policy defined by the Merger Control Regulation (Regulation EEC 
No 4064/89) has also been an integral part of the establishment of the Single Aviation Market. 
A number of acquisitions have come before the Commission, the most important of which are 
outlined below. So far the Commission has not formally opposed any airline merger, and in 
certain cases (e.g. British Airways/British Caledonian) the Commission has approved a merger 
of operations which has resulted in high market shares on individual routes, or in individual 
airport markets. However, in various cases (e.g. Air France - Sabena) conditions, such as 
guaranteeing the availability of slots to new entrants on particular routes, have been applied to 
safeguard potential competition. Joint ventures not involving share purchases or exchanges, 
but with significant implications for competition, also need Commission approval, for 
example the recent Lufthansa/SAS agreement. 
British Airways/BCal: acquisition of 100% of British Caledonian in 1988. The Commission 
agreed to the take-over in return for various undertakings including a cap on the number of 
slots used at Gatwick, and an agreement not to appeal against the UK decision to require a 
number of route licences, including Gatwick to Paris and Brussels, to be returned. 
Air France/Air Inter/UTA: acquisition of 100% of UTA and UTA's holding in Air Inter 
(giving them control of the domestic airline). This was approved by the Commission on 
condition that Air France divested itself of any shares held in TAT, gave up slots at Paris CDG 
airport, and allowed at least one other French carrier to serve about half of all internal French 
routes. The latter did not in fact take place. 
British Airways/Dan Air: acquisition of 100% of Dan Air Services. The Commission 
decided that this did not require examination since Dan Air's turnover was less than ECU 250 
million a year. Air France challenged the decision unsuccessfully on the basis that Dan Air's 
charter revenues should have been taken into account. Its effect on the Brussels/London 
market were examined at the request of the Belgian government, but it was found not to have a 
significant effect on competition. 
British Airways/TAT: acquisition of 49.9% of TAT's shares by BA, with an option to 
increase this to 100% by January 1997. Approved on condition that slots are made available 
to new entrants on London/Paris and London/Lyon if required. 
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Lufthansa/SAS: this involves co-operation on route networks, schedules, ticketing, frequent 
flyer programmes, and ground and cargo services. Certain conditions were required to be met 
before this was approved, including a frequency freeze on a number of routes, slots to be 
provided for competing carriers at Oslo, Stockholm, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt, the termination 
of Lufthansa's co-operation with Transwede and Finnair on routes between Scandinavia and 
Germany, and a guarantee to enter into interline agreements with new entrants if requested. 
Sabena/Swissair: agreement signed in May 1995 which resulted in Swissair acquiring 49.5% 
of Sabena's shares for BFR 6 billion, and Swissair lending a further BFR 4 billion to enable 
Sabena to reimburse Air France. Approved on condition that slots are transferred in Zurich 
and Geneva (12) and Brussels (18) to enable (if required) new entrants to obtain sufficient 
slots to start new services. They must also not increase frequency by more than 25% of the 
existing level, and must be amenable to signing interline or FFP agreements with new entrants 
if required. Because Switzerland is not party to the third package, there are also requirements 
to introduce multiple designation (up to four EEA carriers on routes), country of origin tariffs 
and to abolish capacity restrictions. 
3.5.3. State aid to airlines 
The regulation of state aid is also a crucial area of Community regulation in the context of 
safeguarding competition. In its various decisions approving State aid summarized below, the 
Commission has imposed conditions to try to ensure that the aid is used to achieve airline 
restructuring rather than to provide a competitive advantage. Under the Treaty's Article 93 
and EEA Agreement Article 62 procedures, the airline requesting Commission approval of 
state aid was required to submit a recovery plan, which was then examined by Commission 
consultants. State aid was generally applied in a number of tranches, with Commission 
approval required for each tranche, subject to adequate progress being made and meeting the 
conditions. The procedures for the approval of aid are laid down in the December 1994 paper 
(94/C 350/07), where 'market economy investor' principles are defined. While these include 
such requirements that equity finance could be provided if the present value of the expected 
future cash flows from the intended project exceed the new outlay, the paper recognizes the 
difficulties in applying these principles, given the different accounting practices, cost of 
capital and other differences between countries. The Commission, in granting approval, has 
generally imposed the following conditions: 
(a) cost reduction or return to profitability; 
(b) capacity reduction or constraints on expansion; 
(c) no fleet expansion; 
(d) aid not used to acquire other airlines; 
(e) not allowed to act as price leader; 
(f) no government interference in the airline's management; 
(g) no further aid during restructuring plan. 
Sabena was the first major airline to get state aid approvals, most recently linked to an 
investment by Swissair and previously by Air France. Other flag carriers receiving aid have 
been: 
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Aer Lingus 
The Irish government wished to inject IR £200 million into its national carrier in spring 1994. 
The Commission approved aid of IR £175 million, while imposing most of the above 
conditions as well as a requirement that the airline legally separate its transatlantic, European 
and Express operations. This aid would have amounted to only 5% of their total past three 
years' revenues. 
Olympic Airways 
The Greek government originally proposed state aid to their national carrier in 1992, which 
was subsequently modified to total DR 545 billion (ECU 1.9 billion). This was divided into 
DR 427 billion for a reduction in the airline's debt, DR 64 billion for converting debt into 
equity and a capital injection of DR 54 billion. The Commission approved this in October 
1994, subject to most of the above conditions, with the following additional requirements: 
(a) removal of Olympic's monopoly on new domestic air services; 
(b) removal of any constraints on charter services, for example seat-only sales; 
(c) removal of Greek island airport exemptions from June 1998. 
However, the Olympic case has recently been re-opened, following management changes and 
problems in connection with the earlier requirements. The total aid of DR 545 billion, paid 
over three years, would amount to around 86% of the past three years' operating revenues. 
Air France 
Air France received capital injections of FF 1.25 billion and FF 1.5 billion between 1991 and 
1993, the first of which was considered by the Commission to be normal financial transactions 
and not state aid. The second, however, was required to be repaid. A further FF 5.1 billion 
was classified as debt. In early 1994, the French government wished to inject a further FF 20 
billion of capital into the airline, and this was approved by the Commission in July 1994. This 
would amount to around 12% of their total revenues over the past three years. The approval 
was subject to the French government complying with a total of 16 commitments which, in 
addition to those listed above, included some fairly modest staff productivity targets, that they 
should sell their shares in the Méridien hotel group, and that the Orly traffic distribution rules 
be modified. (See case study in Appendix F.) 
The Commission reviewed the progress made by Air France under its restructuring programme 
in November 1995, prior to the payment of the second tranche. They concluded that, although 
the productivity target for the first year had been exceeded and most of the conditions 
complied with, the financial results were worse than expected, principally because of a failure 
to implement the planned savings in labour costs and lower than forecast yields. A further 
progress report was required before payment of the third tranche in 1996. In the meantime, 
three airlines have complained to the Commission about Air France's use of subsidies to 
undercut leisure fares (by up to 40% on the Paris-Stockholm route, according to SAS). 
TAP Air Portugal 
At the beginning of 1994, the Portuguese government proposed to increase TAP's capital by a 
total of ESC 180 billion, to be paid in four tranches over 1994 to 1997 (this would amount to 
around 35% of their total past three years' operating revenues). Following submission of a 
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restructuring plan, the Commission approved the aid, subject to TAP achieving its forecast 
operating results, the abolition of the airline's tax exemptions, public service obligation open 
tenders for the routes from the mainland to the Azores and Madeira, and a commitment to 
liberalize charter services to the Azores (in addition to most of the above conditions). 
Approval of the third tranche has recently been given. (See case study in Appendix F.) 
Iberia 
At the end of 1994, the Spanish government submitted its plan to increase Iberia's capital by 
PTA 130 billion (this would amount to around 17% of their total past three years' operating 
revenues). The Commission's notice of May 1995 expressed serious doubts that the proposal 
was compatible with the relevant articles of the Treaty and EEA Agreement, and asked for 
further information. In January 1996, the Commission decided that the injection of PTA 87 
billion of capital did not amount to state aid, particularly in view of the undertakings given by 
the Spanish government (i.e. reduction of shareholdings in South American airlines). 
Other state aid cases examined by the Commission included a capital injection of FF 300 
million by Air Outre-Mer of France, and German capital allowances for taxation. 
3.6. Other industry-specific measures 
3.6.1. Airport slot allocation 
Access to congested airports by new entrants is clearly important to enable a competitive 
single market to emerge. The allocation of slots at congested Community airports is governed 
by a common framework and rules contained in Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93, which 
was approved in January 1993. This regulation designates EU airports as being either 'fully 
co-ordinated' (53 EU airports had this designation in October 1995), where congestion occurs 
for significant periods of time, or 'co-ordinated', where a co-ordinator is appointed to facilitate 
the allocation of slots. 
The regulation follows the basic principles of neutrality, transparency and non-discrimination. 
Airlines have 'grandfather rights' to slots, but slots can be taken away from them under 'use-
it-or-lose-it' provisions. After historic precedence, priority in allocation is given to 
commercial air services (whether scheduled or charter) over other new requests and ad hoc or 
general aviation requirements. New or withdrawn slots are put into a pool, of which 50% are 
allocated to new entrants. The definition of new entrant, however, is too narrow to help 
airlines such as British Midland to be treated with priority in the allocation of slots from the 
pool at airports such as Heathrow. 
Coopers and Lybrand [1995] were asked by the Commission to review the regulation and 
make proposals for improving it. Their report focuses firstly on identifying the effectiveness 
of the regulation across Member States and secondly on suggesting some improvements to the 
existing mechanism. Its main conclusions were that there appeared to be a degree of 
inconsistency across Member States as to the extent to which the EU slot regulation had been 
fully implemented. They proposed the following main changes in Regulation (EEC) No 
95/93: first, that the definition of new entrant should include those operators with up to 10% 
of the slots on the day in question; second, that new entrants should be given a stronger 
position concerning the distribution of slots from the slot pool (but that the percentage of slots 
reserved for them is reduced); and third, the need for a greater degree of transparency both in 
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determining capacity levels at congested airports and in the slot allocation process itself. The 
report also recommended that the co-ordinators should be fully independent of airport 
authorities, national governments and airlines. However, in general, the Coopers and Lybrand 
study falls short of endorsing any radical change in the method of allocating slots. 
It has been argued that the present mechanism for allocating slots represents a barrier to entry 
and as such is at variance with the basic thrust of EU competition policy. Indeed, of those 
airlines surveyed for this study, 83% identified lack of airport slots as a significant barrier to 
entry (see Appendix B). Over the last 10 years a number of alternatives have been suggested 
which could help remove this inconsistency. The UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) has 
carried out a number of in-depth investigations of the allocation of slots at congested airports 
(CAP 623 and CAP 644); its most recent proposals involve the husbanding of slots as they 
become available so that sufficient slots can be given to new entrants to enable them to 
compete on high density short/medium haul routes. One of the documents (CAP 644) 
suggested that 14 short-haul international duopoly routes from London Heathrow could 
theoretically accommodate a third carrier on the basis of assumed levels of new entrant service 
frequency and aircraft size. However, in order to accommodate third carrier competition, a 
mechanism would need to be introduced which, on the one hand, generated a sufficient 
number of slots at those times demanded by new entrant carriers and, on the other hand, 
minimized any potential disruption to incumbent carrier schedules. The CAA proposals are, 
however, largely ineffective in the sense that they do not advocate the confiscation of 
incumbent slots which would release the required quantity of slots to accommodate new 
entrant competition. 
Using London Heathrow as an example, Figure 3.1 illustrates the difficulties experienced by 
new entrant airlines in obtaining slots at congested airports, where only a small proportion of 
total slot requests were actually granted at their preferred time. These bids were either rejected 
completely by the scheduling committee or the new entrant was persuaded to shift its 
preference to less congested periods of the day, resulting in a high percentage of allocations 
before 06:00 and after 20:00. Amongst those airlines which failed to obtain its requested slots 
was Air Liberté which wanted to operate four daily services from London Heathrow to Orly. 
It received no slots at Heathrow and subsequently began services at Gatwick. Contiflug also 
applied for slots at London Heathrow in order to operate a twice daily service to Berlin. The 
scheduling committee granted Contiflug evening period slots later than requested and at 
varying times across the week. Unable to operate such a fragmented schedule, Contiflug's 
slots were subsequently returned to the co-ordinator. 
The problem facing many new entrant carriers is that they must first obtain the number and 
timing of slots that can match, as far as possible, passenger travel time preferences, and second 
ensure that the slots obtained are consistent with optimum schedule efficiency. The problems 
for new entrants could be resolved by a mechanism formulated along the lines proposed by the 
CAA [1993], where incumbent airlines holding a portfolio of slots above a threshold would be 
required to surrender a proportion to the scheduling committee. Table 3.2 outlines the number 
and percentage share of slots held by major carriers at London Heathrow between June 1992 
and June 1993. 
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Table 3.2. Slots held by carriers: London Heathrow 1992/93 
Number % of total 
British Airways 
British Midland 
Lufthansa 
SAS 
Aer Lingus 
Air France 
United Airlines 
KLM 
Alitalia 
Iberia 
Others 
Total 
157,929 
55,014 
19,452 
14,988 
14,658 
14,187 
11,023 
9,978 
8,892 
8,550 
95,534 
410,205 
38.5 
13.4 
4.7 
3.7 
3.6 
3.5 
2.7 
2.4 
2.2 
2.1 
23.2 
100 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority CAP 623, 1993. 
Figure 3.1. New entrant slots requested and granted: London Heathrow (summer 
1994) 
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The process could involve requiring those airlines holding more than 2% of slots at a fully co-
ordinated airport to surrender a fixed percentage in a one-off transfer to the scheduling 
committee or a phased transfer covering a two or three year period. This could theoretically 
generate a sufficient number of slots which could be made available to new entrant airlines. 
Priority rules could also be established where preference would be given to new entrants 
seeking to operate services on intra-EU monopoly and duopoly routes. However, this could 
clearly have serious repercussions on the incumbent carriers and their ability to compete 
world-wide. 
Money exchanges through an auctioning process have been suggested as an alternative to the 
problem of congestion. An example of slot pricing can be found in the United States where 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced a system of slot trading at four high-
density airports in 1986. The conclusion that can be drawn from the US experience is that 
barriers to entry, especially for small carriers or operators of small aircraft, may be reinforced. 
The UK CAA did recommend, however, that the current exchanges of slots, sometimes 
involving secret money payments, should be formally recognized, with the registration of such 
deals. 
The present system of allocating slots represents probably one of the most effective barriers to 
entry within European air transport. The only way to resolve is to expand capacity. 
3.6.2. Consumer protection measures 
These measures include establishing common standards of compensation for denied boarding 
(Regulation (EEC) No 295/91). The regulation of excessive pricing could also potentially 
serve as a consumer protection measure. The Commission initiatives on regulating 
computerized reservation system (CRS) displays can be regarded as consumer protection, as 
can the initiatives on tour operators (Directive 90/314/EEC). Any future initiative on a code of 
conduct for travel agencies would also fall into this category, as would the recent proposal for 
a Council regulation on air carrier liability in case of accidents (COM(95) 724). 
Thus, in assessing the impact of Community initiatives to create the single market in air 
transport, it proved essential to consider not only the effects of the three packages, but also the 
consequences of the European competition rules and other accompanying measures. The 
competition rules are also an essential part of the liberalization process and their method of 
application and effectiveness have therefore been analysed. 
3.7. Horizontal (non-industry-specific) EU measures 
Key non-industry-specific areas of policy which might have affected air transport were 
identified and the effects of EU policy initiatives and progress, or the lack thereof, in these 
areas were reviewed. The following areas, where EU measures have been taken (or in many 
cases are still required to be taken) were considered: 
(a) the removal of physical barriers and the control of goods; 
(b) indirect taxation; 
(c) public procurement; 
(d) free movement of labour and the professions; 
(e) access to capital; 
(f) company law and accounting legislation; 
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(g) corporate taxation. 
The areas summarized below are likely to be of most significance in their effect on air 
transport. 
3.7.1. Social legislation 
Social legislation, with regard to minimum wages, maximum hours and health and safety 
issues could have a significant effect on airlines' costs, particularly with regard to unskilled 
labour. The UK's opt-out from the Social Chapter might give UK airlines and service 
providers a competitive advantage. 
3.7.2. Indirect taxation (VAT) 
The Commission submitted a proposal for harmonizing indirect taxation (VAT) on passenger 
air transport sold in the EU. At the moment VAT levels are not harmonized throughout the 
Community. The application of VAT to domestic air travel is not uniform: Germany (15%), 
Italy (10%), Sweden (12%), Austria (10%) and Spain (7%) apply a standard rate, and Belgium 
(6%), France (5.5%), Finland (6%), Luxembourg (6%), the Netherlands (6%), Portugal (5%) 
and Greece (8%) a reduced rate. The UK is zero rated, while Ireland and Denmark are 
exempt. The proposal suggests that a reduced rate of no more than 5% may be applied at least 
until 1997. For cross-border air travel, all countries zero rate tickets, although VAT does 
apply to surface transport in some EU countries. This zero rate is to be maintained, and air 
transport to third countries will be exempt from VAT. EU legislation regarding duty free sales 
and excise duty on fuel will have significant effects on airlines. 
3.7.3. Immigration controls 
There has been a relaxation of immigration controls for travellers within the EU, with 
particular regard to the arrangements in place in the Schengen group of countries. The 
introduction of Schengen has led to a major reorganization of passenger flows at airports, and 
resulted in the different treatment of transfers between EU and non-EU flights, depending 
whether or not the airport followed Schengen rules: multi-sector flights from non-EU 
countries are cleared for immigration at the final destination for non-Schengen countries, and 
at the intermediate point for Schengen countries. This means that EU countries that do not 
apply Schengen rules, such as the UK, gain a competitive advantage for the airlines based 
there. For example, British Airways passengers travelling from New York to Frankfurt via 
London clear immigration at the final destination of Frankfurt. On the other hand, KLM's 
New York to Frankfurt passengers have the inconvenience of having to clear immigration in 
Amsterdam. 
3.7.4. Customs controls 
The relaxation of customs controls between EU states may have had a beneficial effect on the 
air cargo industry in particular. However, the abolition of duty-free concessions to intra-EU 
air travellers in 1999 is likely to have an adverse impact on airport charges. 
3.7.5. Consumer relations legislation 
Consumer relations legislation, including the Directives on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
(Directive 93/13/EEC), the code of conduct on electronic payment, and the protection of 
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personal data of individuals, may have implications for the way reservations and ticketing are 
organized. The proposed distance-selling Directive has caused substantial concern in the 
travel trade and transport is now scheduled to be exempted. If it is not exempted, there would 
be very serious cash flow implications, particularly for tour operators and charter airlines. 
3.7.6. Public procurement 
So far this has not been a significant problem, with cases in three countries of governments 
dictating travel on the national carrier. These distortions have generally been removed by 
informal Commission intervention. 
3.7.7. State aid 
State aid to competing modes of transport, especially the railways, is both a barrier to airline 
entry and a significant single market distortion. 
3.8. Structural implications 
There has now been a history of more than a decade of measures at a European Community 
level which have sought to modify the previously established framework within which air 
transport operated. However, it is widely recognized that the current structure of the industry 
is still heavily influenced by the former regulatory regime which had lasted for around four 
decades and still persists in most areas of international regulation. The effect has been to slow 
progress towards the Commission's ambition of creating a single market and the realization of 
the benefits it was anticipated would result. The current and future position is thus bound to 
be strongly influenced by the past. Any attempt to examine the effects of the various 
initiatives has to take this starting point into account, in addition to the increasingly global 
nature of the industry. 
While the identification of the remaining barriers to the full exploitation of the single market 
forms the basis for Chapter 7, it is important to recognize the structural implications which 
arise from the industry's history. These are: 
(a) Local concentration which results from the privileged position of national airlines and 
from the predominance of single designation bilaterals. 
(b) Public ownership of airlines and a public service outlook amongst management and 
staff. Senior appointments made from the political not the business establishment. 
(c) A significant charter sector which has tended to have been regulated more liberally than 
the scheduled sector. 
(d) A close relationship between the national airline and the local regulatory authority. 
(e) Networks which are dominated by a single hub for each state located at the national 
capital (for historical reasons Germany is an exception). 
(f) A philosophy of co-operation and co-ordination, not competition and confrontation, 
amongst airlines, resulting from the history of fares co-ordination and pooling 
agreements. 
(g) Slot allocation systems which are dominated by incumbents. 
(h) Fares which are directional and not easy for consumers to purchase in the optimum way 
(i.e. at the cheapest source). 
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(i) Terms and conditions for airline customers which are imposed by a strong trade 
association and which reflect those of public utilities rather than customer oriented 
enterprises (i.e. compensation for non-delivery). 
(j) Fleets of aircraft which have been acquired for reasons of national aerospace strategy, 
not simply on the basis of financial or economic justification. 
However, it is also necessary to recognize that it would not have been easy, nor is it likely that 
it would have been effective, for any individual Member State to address these issues 
individually. Acting together, sometimes with reluctance on the part of some Member States, 
the series of legal and administrative measures described above has been taken. Subsequent 
chapters of this report examine their effectiveness. 
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4. Airline strategic responses 
4.1. Introduction 
This second step in the study examined the strategies which airlines developed after 1985, 
both in response to the imminent prospect of liberalization, and following the three EU 
packages. The speed and extent of any strategic response depended on factors that varied by 
country: government treatment of airlines in terms of public utility or competitive enterprise; 
the social, political and cultural environment; and the geographical position of the country. 
Some scheduled airlines accepted the reality of liberalization and the need to restructure and 
change, and had the support of government and employees. Others had less support and 
strong opposition from unions. For airlines that did change, their strategic responses generally 
involved: 
(a) pre-emptive moves to block market entry by competitors, or to increase barriers to entry; 
(b) an attempt to achieve the marketing benefits of larger scope; 
(c) a more sharply focused competitive stance in European markets. 
For charter airlines, liberalization opened up the opportunity to enter hitherto inaccessible 
scheduled markets. Several adopted a strategy of launching into scheduled services with 
mixed results. 
Establishing the extent to which strategic responses were due to EU liberalization faces two 
significant problems: 
(a) Many of the large European Community airlines depend on air services between the EU 
and other parts of the world for more than half their total revenues (see Figure 2.2). 
These services are still governed by agreements between individual EU countries and 
third countries. The strategic actions of such airlines are therefore likely to be based 
more on global air transport developments. 
(b) Given the more competitive nature of air transport markets, airlines are now more 
reluctant to reveal details of their strategies. Data collection, especially related to 
revenues and costs for European operations, proved to be difficult. 
In order to understand the responses of both scheduled and charter airlines in all the above 
areas, the evolution of European airlines' strategies since 1985 has been examined. The 
strategies of the national carriers were assessed as well as those of the larger second and third 
level carriers and the key charter airlines. The aim is to identify when key strategic decisions 
were taken and, if possible, the degree to which they could be attributed to the growing 
liberalization. At a more detailed level this part of the study examines: 
(a) mergers, share purchases and sales (privatization), and alliances; 
(b) new marketing tools and initiatives; 
(c) the nature, timing and scope of cost-cutting measures; 
(d) charter airline strategies. 
The aim of this second step of the analysis is primarily to identify the changes being 
implemented as a result of airlines' strategic decisions. The quantification of such changes 
will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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4.2. A search for size 
The airlines' search for size was carried out principally through mergers and share purchases 
involving both domestic and foreign airlines as well as through marketing alliances and 
franchises (both involving code sharing). Three linked strategies were followed. The first was 
to dominate one's home market by buying out or buying into major domestic competitors as 
Air France did with UTA and Air Inter. The second was to gain a foothold in one or more of 
the three largest Community markets, those of the UK, Germany or France. An example was 
the SAS purchase of 24.9% of British Midland in 1988 (subsequently increased to 40%) and 
the British Airways acquisition in 1992 of 49% of Deutsche BA and 49.9% of TAT in France. 
The third strategic step was to establish a global presence as Iberia attempted to do by 
purchasing shares in Aerolíneas Argentinas (30%), VIASA (45%) and Ladeco (35%), all 
South American carriers. 
4.2.1. Equity investments in other airlines 
Any analysis of equity investments between airlines needs to be preceded by an examination 
of foreign ownership requirements in general and the requirements for airlines in particular. 
These need to be viewed both before and after the most significant set of industry-specific 
measures, namely the third package. Since airline ownership requirements were generally 
stricter than foreign ownership requirements, only the former are considered here. 
Pre-third package 
Scheduled intra-EU and other services: governed by national airline licensing regulations 
and air services agreements (ASAs), with ownership of airline(s) licensed or designated by an 
EU country to be controlled effectively by nationals of that country. This would have been 
subject to interpretation by individual countries, but it was generally thought that no more than 
around 25-30% of the airline's voting capital could be controlled by a foreign airline or other 
entity for the bilateral treaty to be valid. This would ensure that the supplier benefits from the 
exchange of air traffic rights would go largely to the countries that negotiated them. 
In the UK, the Civil Aviation Authority needed to be satisfied that any applicant for an air 
transport licence (for whatever type of air service) was a UK national or a corporation 
controlled by UK nationals. However, there is a procedure whereby the Secretary of State can 
grant an exemption, and this has been used in the case of two charter licence holders, Britannia 
(owned by Canadian interests) and Monarch (owned by Swiss interests). In both cases the 
regulatory authority takes note of the fact that, although owned by non-UK interests, they are 
both managed on a day-to-day basis by UK nationals. 
Privately-owned carriers such as British Airways have a mechanism for limiting the number of 
voting shares held by non-UK nationals in the event that they are denied operating rights under 
an Air Service Agreement as a result of becoming effectively controlled by foreign nationals. 
This is done by disallowing the registration of shares, the purchase of which causes such a 
situation, or forcing disposal of such purchases. This is only possible because all shares are 
registered. Airlines such as Lufthansa issue bearer shares, and thus are beginning to encounter 
problems in this respect, as their government's stake is reduced. 
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Post-third package 
Scheduled intra-EU services: no upper limit on ownership of the airline by nationals of 
another EU country (alternatively the airline must be effectively controlled by EU nationals), 
but if that airline also flies non-EU international routes, then the bilateral clause above applies 
and could be a problem. This is one of the reasons why British Airways has limited its 
shareholdings in TAT and Deutsche BA to 49.9% and 49.0% respectively. 
Other scheduled international air services: governed by licensing and air services 
agreements as described above. 
In most EU states, the competent authority now needs to be satisfied that any applicant for an 
air transport licence (for whatever type of air service) is an EU national or a corporation 
controlled by EU nationals. For example, the British Airways powers described above have 
been modified to include the monitoring of non-EU voting control. 
4.2.2. Alliances with other airlines 
Partnerships between European airlines and with airlines based in other regions of the world 
have existed ever since the airline industry began. Apart from the traditional interline 
agreements, technical co-operation occurred in the exchange, leasing and pooling of aircraft 
and aircraft parts and the maintenance of aircraft and engines (e.g. the KSSU and ATLAS 
maintenance groups). However, the main differentiating factor between previous types of 
agreement from today's airline alliances is that they have become increasingly strategic. In 
other words, the degree of commitment in and the importance carried by alliances in the 
corporate portfolio of European airlines has increased dramatically since the beginning of this 
decade. Attempts to gain benefits of synergy through arrangements such as code sharing, 
blockspacing, franchising and combined frequent flyer programmes (FFPs) are now 
widespread in the airline industry. 
Airline alliances can be classified as either market-orientated or cost-orientated. Market-
orientated alliances involve practices such as joint scheduling, hub co-ordination, code 
sharing, blockspacing and FFP combination. In the main they are geared towards increasing 
traffic flows and market share, but can also reduce price competition. Cost-orientated 
alliances, on the other hand, are designed to reduce costs via joint services, reciprocal sales, 
creating catering and maintenance joint ventures, and sharing assets. Figure 4.1 distinguishes 
between the two types of alliance. At first glance, one can conclude that most of the EU 
majors (with the exception of Air France and Lufthansa) use alliances mainly as marketing 
tools aimed at increasing the amount of passenger traffic on their networks. The number of 
marketing alliances is 117, or on average about 10 per airline, which is one and a half times 
that of cost-oriented alliances (78, or around seven per airline). In particular, Air France is 
geared to using cost-reducing alliances which is consistent with its current financial situation. 
An examination of the development of alliances and code sharing over the past 10 years, and 
an assessment of the impact of EU measures on such arrangements is to be found in Section 
5.4. 
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Figure 4.1. Breakdown of EU alliances by type in 1995 
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Strategic vs tactical alliances 
The alliances of EU airlines can be further classified into two broad categories ­ strategic and 
tactical ­ depending on the degree of co­operation existing between the airlines in the 
partnership. Strategic alliances are so termed because co­operation exists in a wide range of 
activities ranging from sales and marketing to purchasing and maintenance, and take a long­
term view. Most notable examples of strategic airline alliances which have been widely 
documented and commented upon are the European Quality Alliance (EQA) with SAS, 
Swissair and Austrian Airlines (recently dissolved because of the SAS/Lufthansa strategic 
alliance), the Alcazar project which intended to unite KLM with the European Quality 
Alliance but which never came to fruition, the Global Excellence consisting of Swissair, 
Singapore Airlines and Delta Air Lines, the alliances of British Airways, the KLM­Northwest 
Airlines and Lufthansa­United tie­ups and the Latin­American alliances of Iberia. Tactical 
alliances, on the other hand, are very narrow and focus on only one field of co­operation, for 
example, code sharing on one route (for example, between British Midland and Alitalia, or 
TAP and Delta Air Lines). These alliances are mainly designed to reap benefits in the short 
term though they could act as stepping stones to wider­ranging arrangements. 
The size of the strategic alliances of EU airlines in terms of numbers of passengers carried is 
given in Figure 4.2. (With the stepped up co­operation between SAS and Lufthansa, the EQA 
now seems to have been reduced to Swissair and Austrian Airlines, although Sabena might 
now join their major shareholder, Swissair, in EQA.) One can observe that the Lufthansa 
strategic alliance is the largest in terms of passengers carried (because of their link with 
United), followed by those of Swissair and British Airways. Though the KLM grouping is 
small relative to those three, it has been quite successful mainly because of the anti­trust 
immunity which the KLM­Northwest alliance enjoys (this allows more open and wide­ranging 
collaboration on air fares and capacity). The EQA alliance is also relatively small and this 
could be one of the reasons why SAS has preferred to opt out of it and consolidate its alliance 
with Lufthansa. 
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Figure 4.2. Total passengers carried by EU airline strategic alliances 
140000 
120000 
Airline grouping 
Source: IATA WATS, June 1995. 
One particular characteristic of modern strategic alliances, which could arguably be an 
indication of the commitment of European airlines to their alliances, is that of equity 
purchases. Proponents of equity purchases, namely British Airways, argue that such financial 
transactions are essential to cement the relationship. Commitment to the alliance's success is 
enhanced and, where the equity stake is substantial, a certain degree of control over the 
partners is possible. On the other hand, opponents to the involvement of equity purchases 
argue that they are signs of unhealthy agreements and are sometimes a symptom of airlines in 
distress. Regardless of these diverging opinions, there has been limited evidence to date of 
cross-border equity stakes between EU airlines, purchases tending to be confined to shoring up 
national markets. Minority equity stakes by EU airlines in airlines based in other continents 
have generally not been very successful to date. 
4.2.3. Code sharing and franchising 
Code sharing originated in the US, and, although first used by USAir and its Allegheny 
commuter airlines, was more widely introduced after deregulation. In its basic form, code 
sharing is the practice of one or more airlines putting their code on another airline's flight. 
That flight is then marketed as if it were operated by the other airline(s). It enables two 
airlines to offer connecting flights which appear as though the same airline were operating 
both flight segments as one through flight. It has the effect of upgrading an interline service to 
on-line status, offering substantial advantages in selling (especially in terms of CRS display). 
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To be effective it also involves schedule co-ordination and convenient gate positions, 
agreements on baggage handling, and one-stop check-in. 
Code sharing can be offered by itself ('naked code sharing'), together with the features 
described above, or even as part of a strategic alliance, franchise agreement, or equity 
exchange. It can be used on services connecting two alliance partners' hubs, where one airline 
operates the services and the other code shares sometimes involving a block seat purchase 
agreement (e.g. Virgin Atlantic services between Heathrow and the US, operating with both 
Virgin's and Delta Air Lines' code, and with Delta buying blocks of seats from Virgin). 
However, it is more often used on a feeder flight basis, with, for example, the transatlantic 
airline putting its code onto an intra-EU connecting service (e.g. Northwest putting its code 
onto a KLM intra-EU service). These arrangements have been a key part of many EU airlines' 
strategies over the past five or so years, and the impact of EU measures on such developments 
will be explored in Section 5.4. 
Franchising is a recent innovation in Europe, although so far it has largely been restricted to 
UK based airlines (e.g. British Airways and a number of UK regional airlines, such as 
CityFlyer Express). It has been common in the US for many years, allowing the major airlines 
to add their brand and code to small regional airlines, usually operating with turbo-prop rather 
than jet aircraft. More recently, some of these franchisees have been acquired by the 
franchisor, to form part of their commuter divisions. It has positive advantages in enlarging 
the effective network of the major airline which acts as the franchisor. On the other hand, it 
may neutralize a potential competitor. It also allows the franchisors to offer travel over the 
sector at lower cost (especially pilots) than they would be able to achieve with their own 
services. 
Franchising will usually involve code sharing, painting the aircraft in the franchisor's colours 
and having cabin staff wearing franchisor uniforms. It differs from arrangements common in 
France and Germany, where the small regional airline operates the service for the major airline 
(e.g. Air France and Lufthansa) on a wet-lease basis, possibly with aircraft and cabin staff 
wearing the colours of the flag carrier, but with the regional airline having no sales or 
marketing responsibility. 
4.3. New marketing strategies 
4.3.1. Route/network development strategies 
A key issue was whether and to what extent existing airlines, whether national or second-level 
carriers, would take advantage of the opportunities to enter new markets and launch new 
services or routes. An example was Aer Lingus's strategy of developing routes from Dublin 
via Manchester in the UK to various European destinations, following the first package. Other 
airlines based in countries on the periphery of Europe, such as TAP Air Portugal and SAS, 
also emphasized adding Fifth Freedom routes to build up traffic volumes. Also of relevance is 
the greater use of hubbing, notably by KLM. However, KLM's strategy was aimed more at 
increasing its market share on longer-haul routes to and from points outside Europe than 
developing point-to-point EU traffic, and had not previously been constrained by the bilateral 
system. Other airlines were also concerned about their competitive position on the more 
lucrative long-haul routes, and pursued similar goals through alliances and code sharing, not 
related to the EU liberalization process. 
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British Airways expanded inside Europe through associate airlines, and to a lesser extent 
through franchisee airlines. Lufthansa is more dependent on domestic feed to its Frankfurt 
hub than other major EU airlines, because of their more even population and economic 
distribution. This also makes it more vulnerable to other airlines attracting German 
originating traffic through foreign hubs. Thus, Lufthansa placed great emphasis on their 
domestic network in the late 1980s and early 1990s, re-launching the product as Lufthansa 
Express (later abandoned), and considering secondary hubs at Cologne-Bonn and Munich, of 
which only Munich is now belatedly being developed. This could be seen as a strategy aimed 
at pre-empting opportunities for non-German airlines to enter its home market. 
4.3.2. Product developments 
Few product initiatives were introduced as a direct result of the opportunities opened up by 
liberalization. The increased competition amongst European carriers has encouraged them to 
offer a more distinct and market-orientated service. Airlines such as BA have a more clear 
market segmentation policy in Europe with products such as Club Europe, relaunched in 1994, 
targeting the growing number of European business passengers. Another example is Lufthansa 
revamping its domestic services with extra flights, faster check-in and simpler fare structure. 
Other product innovations included merging first and business class, improving airport-related 
product features such as faster and more convenient check-in facilities, and franchising. 
Others are less directly dependent on liberalization but were reinforced by the more 
competitive regulatory regime. These include code sharing, branding, frequent flyer 
programmes and introducing in-flight entertainment technology. New entrants often introduce 
product innovations, for example Easy Jet's no frills, no agents and ticketless approach. 
Results from the questionnaire indicate that 50% of airlines claimed that EU measures had a 
significant effect on product development (see Appendix B). 
4.3.3. Pricing strategies 
Automatic approval of discount and deep discount fares within pre-defined limits was 
introduced in the first package in January 1988 (see Table 3.1). There is some evidence that 
this helped to stimulate the introduction of a wider range of discount fares, particularly to and 
from Germany and to a lesser degree to and from France. Later packages may have encouraged 
this trend. However, the expansion in demand during the economic upswing of the late 1980s 
arguably held back their development, while the recession and excess capacity of the early 
1990s encouraged their greater use at deeper levels. This is because airlines generally, and in 
particular during recession, have difficulties selling all their seats at official or published 
prices. As a consequence, they routinely remainder some of them through wholesalers. As 
competition in Europe and elsewhere has intensified, this grey market has increasingly become 
part of the official market. 
The tariff structure for cross-border routes has changed in the period since liberalization 
began, with first class now almost entirely withdrawn and most airlines offering club class 
services as their premium product. There have also been some pricing innovations, notably 
Sabena's Skypass, which offers a monthly season ticket that allows unlimited travel between 
London and Brussels. 
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Increased competition on domestic routes, following the third EU liberalization package, has 
encouraged some carriers such as Lufthansa, which faces competition from Deutsche BA, to 
adopt simpler and standardized pricing in their domestic markets. Lufthansa has recently 
reduced its current range of fares to just four booking classes, and divided its network into six 
fare zones offering low fares. Another example of intense domestic fare competition is 
Ryanair services on the Stansted-Prestwick route offering fares as low as UK £59 return. 
Results from the questionnaire indicate that over 60% of airlines claimed that EU measures 
had a significant effect on pricing (see Appendix B). 
4.3.4. Promotion 
It is hard to find evidence of changes to strategic promotional campaigns which can be 
ascribed to the EU liberalization process. The large European carriers like Lufthansa, British 
Airways and Air France have attempted to develop global rather than regional brand positions, 
but cultural differences still appear to be powerful influences - and the retention of the names 
TAT and Deutsche Β A by the British Airways partner airlines, the absence of KLM logos on 
Air UK aircraft, or SAS logos on BMA, bear witness to the sensitivities surrounding these 
issues. 
The move to a more dynamic pricing environment has, however, introduced a new layer to 
tactical promotional activity. It has been developments in revenue management and 
information technology which have made this possible, and market clearing offers are often 
promoted through electronic media rather than through traditional techniques. 
It is important to note that without progressive moves towards tariff freedom through the 
packages of reforms (i.e. freedom from filing and approval regulation), tactical pricing as now 
practised through revenue management and CRS displays would not have been (legally) 
possible. 
4.3.5. Distribution 
Market forces only indirectly connected with the three packages of liberalization measures 
have resulted in growing concentration in the travel agency business. This has been partly 
because agents have moved to increase their bargaining power in relation to the airlines, as the 
airlines themselves have attempted to gain the benefits of scale. It has also been a result of the 
airline industry's system of progressive commission payments which give bonuses for volume. 
However, following agent commission capping in the US, a number of European carriers such 
as British Airways, Air UK and Lufthansa are looking into ways of reducing agent 
commissions. In practice, some agents are now forced by corporate clients to book low cost 
carriers' flights despite the airlines' policy of not paying commission. 
The influence of new technology in this regard has been less clear and there is some debate 
whether it has provided a barrier to the entry and growth of smaller agencies, or whether it has 
given them cost-effective access to world-class distribution systems. 
One of the most significant moves has been the formation of two European CRS, Amadeus 
and Galileo. The motivation to develop these was global competition, not EU liberalization. It 
was caused by concern about the advance of the US systems lead by American Airline's 
Sabre. Most EU airlines were preoccupied with their own national systems developed in the 
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era of home-market focus. EU rules covering bias were developed as a reaction to the growth 
of global distribution systems and the danger to users and smaller airlines from biased displays 
and other abuses and not as a pre-emptive single market initiative. 
In terms of cross-border moves in the travel trade to exploit the single market the most 
noticeable has been the acquisition of Thomas Cook by the German bank, West LB, which 
also owns LTU. So far, this move does not appear to have brought any clear benefits of scale, 
scope or synergy. The slow pace of such moves is not unusual in other sectors of retailing (i.e. 
food, clothing). 
New entrant airlines have a very real problem in distribution, and this is explored in the two 
case studies involving such airlines. A new start-up in the UK, EasyJet, is hoping to rely 
almost entirely on direct telephone bookings by passengers, and is also using the Internet. 
The overall effect of the three EU packages on distribution appears marginal, given the results 
obtained from the airline questionnaire, with only 28% believing that EU measures had a 
significant impact on distribution policy, whereas 44% believed that these measures had little 
impact. 
4.4. Cost-cutting strategies 
While these were partly a response to worsening economic performance, the need to cut costs 
as a long-term strategy was reinforced by the competitive pressures arising from the liberalized 
market. The recession and greater competition meant that revenues could not be enhanced 
through significant price increases; cost-cutting strategies were therefore the preferred or even 
only method of improving financial results. To achieve long-term cost reductions European 
airlines undertook one or more of several measures. As the single largest controllable cost, 
labour was targeted by many airlines in pursuit of cost-cutting strategies. Staff numbers were 
reduced and existing wage rates and conditions of employment were renegotiated. Some 
discontinued unprofitable first class services; some set up low-cost or low-wage subsidiaries 
or contracted out flying to low-cost regionals; in a few cases, carriers began outsourcing key 
functions such as catering and engineering. More recent cost-cutting activities were aimed at 
reducing marketing and distribution costs, which represent between 18% and 26% of airlines' 
total operating expenses. Agent commission capping is now being considered by a number of 
European carriers. 
Whilst prevailing economic conditions would have been expected to have significantly 
influenced the nature of cost-cutting strategies, EU measures appear to have had some impact. 
According to the questionnaire results, 67% believed that these measures had at least some 
impact on their cost-cutting strategy (see Appendix B). 
4.5. Corporate developments 
There has been a general trend by EU airlines to focus more on core activities, and outsource 
non-essential or non-specialist tasks such as office and airport cleaning. Flight catering has 
been contracted out by some airlines such as British Airways, but others such as Lufthansa and 
SAS see this as part of the core business. 
Lufthansa, while retaining catering as a subsidiary, has moved to separate other activities like 
air cargo, maintenance and information technology into their own legal and operating entity. 
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The aim is to improve efficiency, with the parent company negotiating with these entities for 
cargo and maintenance services. Aer Lingus has traditionally cross-subsidized unprofitable 
airline operations with profits from maintenance, hotels and consulting. However, they have 
recently sold their hotel group, as a result of the conditions attached to EU approval of state 
aid. Air France also recently sold their Méridien hotel group, and Alitalia sold its stake in 
Rome Airport to another subsidiary of the state holding company, IRI. 
Some vertical integration has taken place, especially in Germany where Lufthansa has taken 
stakes in various travel agencies and tour operators. Charter airlines were already largely 
integrated with tour operators and hotel groups prior to EU liberalization, but some cross-
border acquisitions have taken place more recently, for example Airtours' purchase of a 
Swedish travel group which included the charter carrier Premiair, and the German 
WestLB/LTU grouping adding Thomas Cook and Owners Abroad in the UK. 
Horizontal integration was already discussed in Section 3.6, much of it driven by EU 
liberalization. Since 1993, EU airlines can take 100% stakes in other EU carriers without any 
risk of withdrawal of intra-EU route licences. However, if the airline that the EU carrier 
invested in operated non-EU routes, its designation under the Air Services Agreements of that 
country might be compromised. So far, airlines with minority stakes in other EU carriers, 
such as British Airways with its 49% share of TAT, have not increased this to a majority 
(although in the example given they have an option to do so). 
4.6. Charter airline strategies 
4.6.1. Introduction 
Although the regulatory distinction between charter and scheduled has been removed by the 
third package, the conceptual distinction, which is one of distribution methods, remains 
broadly in place. The key point is who takes responsibility for selling seats to the passenger. 
Where the seat is still sold in combination with hotel accommodation and ground transport, it 
is likely that seats will be distributed on a wholesale basis to tour operators. They will assume 
the risk on their block of seats, which may or may not amount to the entire capacity of the 
aircraft. On flights to leisure destinations in southern Europe, most seats are still sold in this 
way, but charter airlines are increasingly selling a proportion of seats on a seat-only basis. 
This is mostly done through the travel trade, but some airlines, such as LTU in Germany, sell 
direct to the public. In Germany, seat-only sales are estimated to account for about 20% of 
capacity on such flights, many of them now sold direct to the passenger by the carrier. 
The strategic issues faced by charter airlines as a result of EU liberalization were somewhat 
different from those facing scheduled airlines. The most critical was whether to take advantage 
of their much lower operating costs to enter the scheduled markets that were being opened up. 
Several charter airlines, most notably Air Europe and more recently EBA (Belgium), did so. 
Britannia and some other UK charter airlines changed a number of their Spanish flights from 
charter to scheduled, principally to avoid possible future bilateral restrictions on charters 
before these were dismantled by EU legislation (and to a lesser extent to avoid any future 
restrictions on charters at Gatwick Airport). Seat-only sales were also developed in particular 
leisure markets (not always in compliance with government regulations), especially from the 
UK and Germany. Another issue was whether to expand by developing outgoing traffic from 
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charter originating countries other than their own. Finally, the question of increasing size and 
vertical integration with tour operators also required a strategic response. 
The charter airline industry was very liberally regulated before the third package and the 
regulatory initiatives of the EU did not affect the sector until 1993. Thus, a review of strategic 
developments over the last ten years, which considered only innovations resulting exclusively 
from EU-based measures, would have limited relevance. Moreover, many of the developments 
affecting the charter airlines are driven by strategies adopted within the broader package travel 
holiday market, a competitive industry which is not directly governed by air transport 
regulation. For example, in recent years there has been a trend towards longer-haul holidays to 
destinations outside the EU, such as the US, the Caribbean and Asia. The broad range of 
strategic developments undertaken by charter airlines is described below. 
Some charter airline strategies relate to the liberalization of the scheduled sector which started 
with the first package, and were: 
(a) launching scheduled services; 
(b) redefined relationships between charter carriers and scheduled flag carriers. 
Other developments relate to the most recent EU legislation, which applied directly to the 
charter sector. After two years of application, the developments have generally been quite 
limited in scope: 
(a) entry into other countries' charter markets; 
(b) destination-based charter carriers; 
(c) carrying cargo on passenger charter flights. 
Other trends are more general strategic moves by companies operating in a competitive 
industry, such as vertical and horizontal integration, product enhancement and cost reduction. 
However, these latter moves can also be related to EU liberalization: the charter carriers were 
under pressure to defend their market positions from the scheduled carriers and from new 
charter entrants. The former are becoming more market orientated and profit driven as a result 
of European liberalization. Thus, the broader competitive developments in the charter sector 
might also be seen as results of EU measures. 
4.6.2. Developments arising from the liberalization of scheduled markets 
Going scheduled 
One of the most obvious strategies for charter carriers over the last ten years has been to 
launch scheduled services. In many European countries the charter sector comprised 
profitable low-cost airlines accustomed to operating in a highly competitive market. By 
contrast, many scheduled airlines were unprofitable, high-cost, low-productivity airlines 
operating in relatively uncompetitive markets. There appeared to be an attractive opportunity 
for charter carriers. As a result, some launched scheduled services in a variety of different 
forms, which are discussed individually below. 
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Going scheduled: head to head with the national flag carriers 
Some charter carriers have been attracted by the inefficiencies of the incumbent European flag 
carriers and have entered mainstream business markets in competition with the majors. These 
instances of significant market entry have often been facilitated by the EU's liberalization 
measures. 
In the UK, Dan Air and Air Europe tried to establish European networks from London 
Gatwick, encouraged by the moves towards dual designation and the removal of bilateral 
capacity clauses. Elsewhere in Europe charter entrants have included EuroBelgian Airlines 
(Brussels to Barcelona, Madrid, Nice, Rome and Vienna), Air Liberté (Paris-London and 
French domestic), AOM (French domestic and overseas territories), Norway Airlines (Oslo-
London), Maersk (Denmark-London), Transwede (Swedish domestic and Stockholm-
London), Aero Lloyd (German domestic), Lauda (centred on Vienna and Milan hubs, the latter 
recently discontinued) and Transavia (Amsterdam-London). 
Some carriers have succeeded - many have not. While this section does not seek to describe 
the general challenges facing new entrant carriers in Europe (such as access to slots), there are 
some specific issues which the charter carriers face in launching scheduled services. 
The charter carriers face particular problems with regard to marketing. Even in their home 
countries they often have a weak brand position and low levels of recognition among 
individual consumers. This makes it especially hard for them to attract high yield business 
passengers, as Dan Air found when it launched scheduled services. In foreign markets they 
struggle to gain market acceptance, as the retail travel agents and travelling public do not 
know who they are or where they fly to. 
Both these problems mean that charter carriers have to spend very substantial amounts of 
money on product development which may involve a change of seating configuration, interiors 
or the acquisition of different aircraft. Charter carriers, used to a very simple form of 
marketing, may underestimate the expense of promoting and distributing their services at both 
ends of their routes. This issue becomes particularly acute if the carriers try to launch a full 
network of routes to several different countries. 
Charter carriers may be tempted to utilize the same aircraft for scheduled and charter 
operations. However, the high density, single-class, configuration of charter aircraft is 
unattractive for passengers on scheduled services and inappropriate for routes hoping to attract 
high yield business class traffic. The large size of aircraft typically used for charter operations 
may also be inappropriate for business markets, which demand high frequency. Moreover, 
aircraft that operate charter flights have a higher tendency to suffer delays, as they operate, 
particularly in summer, at very high levels of utilization with limited back-up aircraft. They 
also suffer from air traffic controller disruption caused by industrial action. If aircraft are 
cross-utilized on charter and scheduled services, the delays that build up on the aircraft flying 
charter services can affect scheduled operations. 
Going scheduled on leisure routes 
Some established charter carriers converted existing charter services to scheduled mode, 
selling seats directly to passengers, in order to offer the passengers greater flexibility in their 
travel and accommodation arrangements. Often the airlines reduced the risk of operating these 
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services by continuing to sell a significant proportion of the seats in advance to tour operators. 
So although the airline faced greater risk than with a regular charter flight, it did not face the 
full risk of scheduled carriers. 
By adopting such a policy, charter carriers added to their costs in paying commission to travel 
agents, establishing reservations and ticketing departments and in advertising their services, 
although the difficulties and costs are less significant than those associated with launching 
business services. The leisure routes are marketed mainly in the home country of the carrier, 
where the company is already known. 
Compared to launching scheduled business routes, there is less need to alter the on-board 
product and to operate high frequencies, meaning that the existing fleet can be utilized. 
Some of the carriers that have most successfully introduced scheduled-style services on leisure 
routes include the Dutch carrier Transavia on routes like Amsterdam to Faro, Malaga, Palma, 
and Tenerife; and the German carrier LTU on both long-haul routes to the Caribbean and 
South-East Asia, as well as to the Mediterranean. The Lufthansa subsidiary Condor also 
operates a network of leisure routes on a scheduled basis, as does Hapag Lloyd Flug. 
Another successful charter carrier flying scheduled leisure routes was Viva, the low-cost 
charter subsidiary of Iberia and, originally, Lufthansa. Viva developed a network of scheduled 
leisure routes, which were operating profitably. However, in summer 1995, Iberia, in a move 
which is markedly out of line with current trends, took these low-yield routes back from its 
low-cost subsidiary as part of its corporate restructuring. Viva has reverted to being purely a 
charter carrier. 
While Monarch Airlines continues to operate a limited number of scheduled leisure services, 
other UK charter carriers have seen a different evolutionary process than their German 
counterparts. Britannia launched a range of scheduled routes to its leisure destinations in the 
1980s, but this experiment was at least in part motivated by the possible threat of traffic 
distribution rules that might exclude charter flights from London Gatwick. Britannia found it 
impossible to achieve satisfactory load factors and once the threat of traffic distribution rules 
at Gatwick had subsided, it withdrew its scheduled services to the Mediterranean altogether. 
The circumvention of regulatory constraints also underlies Air 2000's scheduled services from 
Gatwick, Manchester and Birmingham to Cyprus. The Cypriot authorities, in an effort to 
protect Cyprus Airways, restrict the proportion of seat-only passengers on charter flights from 
the UK to 20%. To get round this constraint, Air 2000 flies as a scheduled carrier on the 
route, albeit with a high proportion of part charter passengers on board. 
Going scheduled: part scheduled by selling some seats on a seat-only basis direct 
Some carriers have moved more cautiously to take advantage of the new opportunities by 
continuing to operate charter-style flights that are sold mainly as seat blocks to tour operators, 
but retaining some seats to be sold direct to the public. An example of this is the Hanover-
based Hapag Lloyd which sells around 15% of its capacity in this way. This is an attempt to 
gain higher revenues from the seat-only passengers, although the policy also generates costs in 
controlling reservations, issuing tickets and promoting the seats. 
These flights are hybrid charter/scheduled flights, closer to the original charter concept than 
the scheduled leisure flights described above. Carriers are utilizing the freedom of European 
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liberalization to serve passengers who require more flexibility and independence than the 
mainstream package holidaymaker, without directly launching scheduled services. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the types of scheduled service currently being supplied by 
EU-based charter carriers. 
Table 4.1. 
State 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Scheduled 
Carrier 
Lauda Air 
Virgin 
Express1 
Maersk 
Karair 
Air Liberté 
Air Toulouse 
AOM 
Aero Lloyd 
Condor 
Hapag Lloyd 
LTU 
Air Greece 
Venus 
Air One 
Noman 
Martinair 
Transavia 
Air Europa 
Centennial 
Spanair 
Nordic East 
Transwede 
Air 2000 
Monarch 
services operated by EU charter airlines 
Non-leisure routes 
Domestic 
* 
* 
* 
-> 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
·> 
* 
* 
* 
Intra-EU 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Long haul 
* 
·> 
* 
Leisure 
Intra-EU 
* 
>> 
* 
* 2 
routes 
Long haul 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
Formerly known as EBA. 
Scheduled service outside the EU (Cyprus). 
4.7. Summary of airline strategic responses 
At the beginning of this chapter three types of strategic response were given, which could be 
summarized as first, the blocking strategy; second, going for expansion and greater economies 
of scope; and third, aiming for a more focused competitive stance. Europe's flag carriers that 
have made a successful transition from state-owned public utility to market-orientated 
enterprise have proved to be the most adept at adopting measures designed both to protect 
their existing markets and to develop new ones. 
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British Airways is an example of an airline that has pursued a combination of all three types of 
response outlined above: the carrier, through its acquisition and franchising policies, has been 
able to secure its position in the UK market, as well as achieving greater scope by making 
better use of its Heathrow hub. Similarly Lufthansa, through its alliance with SAS, has been 
able to increase its presence in northern Europe, strengthen its links with the Baltic states, and 
shore up its southern flank through a shareholding in Lauda Air. It has also pursued the 
second type of response through alliances with United, Thai and South African. An airline 
making more use of the second and third types of response was KLM, which, as a result of its 
code sharing alliance with Northwest Airlines, has been able to enhance considerably its long 
haul route network, gaining economic benefits of scope in the process. 
Examples of less successful strategies have been Iberia's South American airline investments, 
and Air France's Sabena and CSA share purchases which were subsequently unwound. Air 
France, however, did undertake some fairly vigorous blocking strategies through its 
acquisition of UTA which gave it control of Air Inter, although this does not, so far, appear to 
have been very effective. 
Charter airlines have been somewhat cautious in entering scheduled markets in head to head 
competition with flag carriers, possibly because of some of the earlier experiences with this 
strategy, although recent experience in France, Italy and Spain has gone against this general 
trend. However, they have converted some of their charter routes to scheduled and put more 
emphasis on direct sales of seat­only products. There has also been some tendency for these 
markets to become dominated by vertically integrated travel groups. How far the strategies 
pursued by scheduled airlines have been influenced by EU measures is summarized in Figure 
4.3. 
Figure 4.3. Airline views on the importance of EU measures 
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While these changes have clearly resulted in increases in efficiency for many airlines, 
continued efforts are necessary if EU carriers are to match and keep abreast with global 
competitors. In securing and expanding their own markets, the larger scheduled airlines have 
made it that much more difficult for prospective entrants, whether they be other flag carriers, 
charter operators or start-up airlines, to achieve their objectives in providing the necessary 
competition. Ensuring that the entry barriers created by the more successful of Europe's 
carriers are not so great as to stifle innovative effort must continue to form a key focus of the 
Commission's work. 
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5. Impact of EU measures on EU airlines 
This step in the analysis is undertaken in parallel with, and feeds off, the analysis of airlines' 
strategic responses to liberalization discussed in the preceding chapter. The aim is to provide 
a detailed examination and measurement of changes in EU airline operations and efficiency, 
and to identify how far such changes have been caused by EU measures. It should be noted 
that the timing of carriers' responses to liberalization has varied according to the nature of the 
airline, with some reacting faster than others. Thus, some effects of the third package will not 
yet be evident (especially in terms of financial results where publication of data is often 
delayed). 
The first part of this chapter is concerned with capacity, and the second with traffic. 
Subsequent sections deal with marketing innovations, productivity and costs, pricing, 
profitability and the environment. 
5.1. Capacity and air services 
This section is concerned with capacity offered by scheduled carriers within the Community 
across the years 1989, 1992, 1994 and 1995. Extensive use has been made of the 
computerized database of flights supplied by Reed Travel Group. Data prior to 1989 are not 
held in a conveniently accessible form. 
The report addresses capacity in two ways. Analysis of replies from airlines and directorates 
of civil aviation to the questionnaire and subsequent face-to-face interviews gave some insight 
into strategic and tactical responses of carriers to Community initiatives, market growth and 
competition, while this section analysed published schedules. These capacity studies 
investigate the number of non-stop services linking city pairs, frequency of service, the 
number of seats offered on each route, and the number of carriers supplying seats. The 
reference period for each year is June, and throughout this section frequency, seats and routes 
should be read as referring to frequency, seats and routes offered per week in June of the 
relevant study year. As travellers are generally interested in reaching, say, Paris from London 
rather than flying from Paris Charles de Gaulle to London Stansted, a route refers to a city pair 
rather than an airport pair. Although it is recognized that passenger selection of specific 
airports under these circumstances occurs, the existence of high levels of transfer traffic at 
certain airports serving single catchments would distort the analysis of route traffic and 
capacity if considered on an airport to airport basis. Such distortion would be particularly 
evident in airport systems where air traffic distribution rules exist, such as between Milan 
Malpensa and Milan Linate. 
The analysis covers those Member States which have adopted single market legislation 
throughout the study period (i.e. the 12 states). Analysis has also been carried out of a control 
group of European states operating throughout the same period outside the Community's 
regulatory environment, which comprised Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Poland and Cyprus (the first four countries applied the regulations only in the last one 
or two years of the period). 
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5.1.1. Capacity concentration on cross-border services 
Within the Community in June 1995, 21,000 scheduled cross-border flights were made each 
week, serving 1,450 one-way routes, offering a total of 2.5 million seats and creating over 2.3 
billion available seat-kilometres (ASK). Table 5.1 shows the capacity offering by state. 
Table 5.1. Intra-Community cross-
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Total 
)order scheduled 
Total weekly capacity 
Routes 
63 
45 
183 
347 
46 
59 
137 
24 
66 
57 
233 
190 
1,450 
Seats 
(103) 
130 
82 
334 
441 
59 
100 
253 
15 
162 
71 
281 
520 
2,448 
Flights 
1,450 
755 
3,099 
3,570 
326 
980 
1,986 
231 
1,759 
449 
1,881 
4,664 
21,150 
ASK(106) 
90 
75 
232 
484 
105 
54 
242 
8 
103 
109 
429 
382 
2,313 
capacity, June 1995 
Routes producili 
% total 
routes 
13 
12 
6 
10 
11 
4 
9 
14 
12 
10 
9 
6 
7.8 
g 50% of seats 
Mean 
carriers/route 
2.8 
3.0 
4.5 
2.8 
3.0 
3.0 
3.3 
1.3 
4.1 
2.8 
3.0 
4.8 
3.2 
The concentration of the market is remarkable. For the Community of 12 as a whole, less than 
8% of total cross-border routes are supplied with over 50% of total seats. At the extreme, half 
of Ireland's available seats to other Community states are concentrated on services joining 
Dublin with the UK cities of London, Manchester and Birmingham. It also emerged from the 
analysis that a high number of routes were operated by only one carrier: over 60% of the 
Community total, with a further 30% served by two carriers (Figure 5.1). The data used in this 
analysis include Fifth Freedom services by non-EU carriers (under 2% of total seat capacity 
for the UK routes with the generous assumption that the full capacity of the aircraft is 
available for intra-EU traffic), and refer only to non-stop services. The single carrier routes 
are generally low density in terms of the number of seats offered, and the frequency of service: 
they link regional centres or operate from regional airports to major hubs. That the proportion 
of these single carrier routes has grown over the 1989-95 study period - a period of increasing 
expansion in total cross-border routes - is an indication of the fragile nature of the new 
markets served. 
In terms of capacity, measured in seats offered, routes served by two carriers offer around 37% 
of total capacity. This figure has not changed significantly over the study period 1989-95. 
Since 1989 a number of non-EU-based Fifth Freedom operators offering insignificant capacity 
on major trunk routes have left the routes (e.g. Kenya Airways weekly service between 
London and Athens on a London-Athens-Nairobi service): this has reduced the capacity 
offered on routes served by six or more carriers quite dramatically, from 25% of all seats to 
11% in 1995. A similar picture is recorded when the number of flights is used as a measure of 
capacity offered on a route, although here it becomes clear that single carrier routes are 
generally operated by low capacity aircraft (almost 30% of total flights supplying less than 
20% of seats). 
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Figure 5.1. The development of carriers per route by seats, flights and routes: 
intra-EU services in June 1989,1992,1994 and 1995' 
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A number of EU carriers introduced Fifth Freedom services within the EU, largely as a result 
of the first package. By December 1992 there were 19 such services operating between 16 EU 
countries. Only seven of these are still operated, and of the 22 services added in 1993, only 13 
remain [CAA, 1995]. Airlines generally find it difficult to market successfully such services, 
some of which are introduced merely as a way of employing aircraft that would otherwise 
remain idle (e.g. SAS's Stuttgart-Thessaloniki extension, subsequently discontinued). There 
were ten consecutive cabotage routes operated in December 1994, three of which were already 
operated in 1992. A further 12 routes were served since 1992, but later discontinued. 
The average frequencies offered on all intra-EU routes increased from 13.9 departures per 
week in 1989 to 15.5 in 1992, subsequently declining to 15.0 in 1994 and 14.5 in 1995. This 
indicates some frequency competition in the first period, with the fall since 1992 explained by 
the addition of new non-stop regional services (and some charters switching to scheduled) 
with below-average frequencies, rather than by any reduction in frequency on the denser 
routes. 
Between 1989 and 1995, capacity, measured in seats produced per week on each EU route, 
appears to have become more concentrated on key routes (Figure 5.5). For example, in Spain 
12% of EU routes consumed 50% of Spain's EU seat capacity in 1989, falling to 9% of routes 
for 50% capacity in 1995 (Table 5.1). This general increase in capacity concentration on a 
smaller proportion of routes appears to be a function of the growth of new EU services rather 
than a disproportionate increase in capacity on the densest routes (Figure 5.2). 
Market concentration appears to limit the scope for meaningful competition between carriers 
to routes with the potential for high capacities and frequencies. For this reason the 'Top 50' 
statistic was developed: the routes from each state offering 50% of total seat capacity. The 
weight of analysis of capacity evolution throughout the study period has fallen on this section 
of the air transport market. 
During this period there has been a growth in the number of city pairs joined by non-stop 
services. Between 1989 and 1992 the compound annual rate of growth in routes was around 
3%, increasing to 7% per annum between 1992 and 1994 (see Figure 5.2). In the final study 
year, June 1994 to June 1995, there has been a growth rate of 12% in city pair routes. When 
this is compared with services offered between the control group countries, and between the 
control group and EU countries, the rate of growth is significantly lower in each of the 
periods. Since there has been no direct benefit from any of the packages in the control group 
countries (air services still being governed by bilaterals), it can be concluded that the EU 
measures had some impact on the number of routes served. However, some caution is needed 
before drawing any inferences on net consumer air service benefits, since some new routes 
were merely redesignated scheduled routes (largely Germany/Spain). 
As noted previously, new routes are unlikely to support more than one carrier, at least in their 
initial stages of growth, and low levels of demand mean they are probably suited to low 
frequency operation of medium-sized aircraft or more frequent services by regional aircraft. 
This reasoning is supported by a slight fall in the average number of seats offered per flight 
over the period. The growth in regional routes is no doubt in part due to Community 
initiatives which have made it more straightforward to begin cross-border operations, but the 
increasing competition in the supply of aircraft of a size to match the requirements of thin 
routes should not be underestimated: it has allowed airlines to act on opportunities available to 
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them. Figure 5.3 focuses on the change in aircraft size on intra-Community routes, showing 
that as new routes have been developed aircraft of appropriate size have been employed. The 
1989 peak in aircraft with a capacity of between 40 and 50 seats had by 1995 split into two 
pronounced peaks at 30 seats, and 50 seats. Lufthansa's downsizing was completed by 1987, 
driven as much by the need to provide connections to a more decentralized German network 
(in contrast to British Airways and Air France who are more focused on their principal hubs of 
Heathrow and Charles de Gaulle respectively). Air France's move to smaller aircraft took 
place over two periods, 1985-87 and again since 1991. 
Figure 5.2. Route development: EU cross-border services vs control group services, 
1990-95 
14% 
DContol 
■ EU 
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The Top 50 routes are those where evidence of increasing competition in the form of route 
entry by new carriers might be expected. This is not the case. The average number of carriers 
on these densest of European routes has fallen within the Community of 12 from 4.5 per route 
in 1989 to 3.2 in 1995. For individual states the picture is more complicated: Portugal, Greece 
and Belgium saw increases in the average carriers per route while the remaining states showed 
a falling average, sometimes dramatic (Figure 5.4). On the densest routes, the presence of 
Fifth Freedom carriers operating at low frequencies such as Philippine Airlines between 
Frankfurt and Paris, and the US carrier TWA between Lisbon and Madrid, distorts the picture. 
In order to get a clearer picture of capacity split between carriers, a more sophisticated index 
of capacity share was required to weight carriers on a route by the proportion of capacity they 
offered. This was developed as a capacity index. 
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Figure 5.3. Distribution of seats per flight: cross-border intra-EU non-stop services, 
one week, June 1989 and 1995 
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Essentially the capacity index developed sums the square of percentage of total seats offered 
by each carrier on a route. Thus for a route with two carriers, each offering equal shares of the 
total seats, the capacity index would be (0.5)2+(0.5)2, or 50%. Similarly, if one of the carriers 
dominated the market with a 90% share of seat capacity, the index would be (0.9) +(0.1) , or 
82%. Thus, the higher the index, the higher the concentration of capacity. The capacity index 
was calculated for all Top 50 routes of all states for the four study years. Appendix C.2 shows 
the Top 50 routes for Spain in 1989, 1992 and 1995, as an example. A summary of the results 
of the capacity index analysis is presented in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.4. Average carriers on EU cross-border routes carrying 50% of total 
capacity from each state: June 1989,1992 and 1995 
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The average index has moved only a few percentage points for most states, although Belgium, 
Ireland and Portugal record a significant reduction in capacity concentration. In all three cases 
this is due to the entry of new carriers on established routes; for example, in the case of 
Portugal, the entry of Air Liberté on routes linking Paris to Lisbon and Porto, and Portugalia 
serving Brussels and Madrid from Lisbon. Germany, on the other hand, shows an increase in 
its capacity index from 42% to 50%. In part this is due to the loss of two carriers (Finnair and 
Hamburg Airlines) on the Hamburg to Amsterdam route, leaving KLM as the only carrier 
between the two cities. On the Frankfurt to Paris route the number of carriers has fallen as 
Fifth Freedom carriers Aeromexico, Avianca and Kuwait Airways have withdrawn. 
Luxembourg has its supply of capacity weighted strongly towards Luxair, sole operator to 
Frankfurt, and the only airline flying scheduled services between Luxembourg and Palma. 
Figure 5.5. Average capacity share index: services generating 50% of total seats 
offered: summer 1989,1992 and 1995 
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The average capacity indexes for the Top 50 routes of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Spain are higher than those of other Member States, and significantly higher than those of 
routes to and from the UK. This situation reflects the high index values of a number of routes 
operated between the states of the former group and the rest of the EU. Apart from this, routes 
between Germany and the rest of Europe have a much flatter distribution than those of the UK, 
whereas only a small number of very high density routes (such as London­Paris, London­
Dublin) dominate the UK's intra­EU capacity. For Germany, 50% of EU seat capacity is 
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produced on 9% of total EU routes; in the UK 50% capacity is employed on only 6% of 
routes. The result of this is that only four of Germany's 32 Top 50 routes produce more than 
10,000 seats per week, while in the UK all produce more than 10,000 seats: or put in another 
way, all the Top 50 routes from the UK support three or more carriers, but of the top German 
routes, almost two-thirds have less than three carriers. Indeed, as noted above, the route 
between Hamburg and Amsterdam, one of the German Top 50 group, was operated in June 
1995 by KLM alone, giving it a capacity index concentration of 100%. 
Designation as scheduled services of LTU's high density leisure routes between Germany and 
Spain further distorts the picture of capacity concentration in those two states. For example, 
the route between Düsseldorf and Palma de Majorca is ranked third in capacity of German and 
Spanish cross-border EU routes: over 75% of the capacity on this leisure dominated route is 
provided by LTU, which moved from charter into the scheduled market in the early 1990s. 
LTU also operates between Düsseldorf and Ibiza with a similar share of capacity, again 
distorting the distribution of capacity concentration within the Top 50 routes of Germany and 
Spain. EU routes from Belgium are dominated by the Brussels-London route, which in June 
1995 provided almost 20% of all seats leaving Brussels for destinations in other EU states. 
The route supported four carriers, but of the seven other routes only three had more than two 
carriers. 
Table 5.2 lists carriers operating cross-border services within the EU in June of one study year, 
but not in June of the following study year (leavers), or in June of the previous study year 
(entrants). Thus, an entry and exit taking place within one of the two three-year periods is not 
recorded. The table does not record entry to and exit from specific routes. Airlines operating 
international routes under codes of other carriers are not recorded, e.g. Lar Transregional (TAP 
Air Portugal) and SEEA (Virgin Atlantic). 
An explanation for each airline leaving the market is added: the exit of non-EU carriers from 
Fifth Freedom routes should be noted. These services were generally offered on dense intra-
EU routes as add-on sectors to intercontinental service, e.g. Ethiopian Airways flying to Rome 
then London from Addis Ababa. The rationalization of the schedules of these carriers on 
intra-EU routes contributed to the reduction in the number of routes with six or more carriers 
within the EU (Figure 5.1). If the non-EU Fifth Freedom carriers are excluded, the net 
increase in number of carriers operating intra-EU routes was six between 1992 and 1995, with 
a net loss of four airlines between 1989 and 1992. 
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Table 5.2. Carriers entering and leaving cross-border EU operations, 1989-92 and 
1992-95 
1989-92 1992-95 
Leavers 
Reason 
Air Gambia 
Air Zaire 
American Airlines 
Canadian 
Egyplair 
Gulf Air 
MEA 
Qantas 
Somali Airlines 
Syrian 
Yemenia 
Zambia Airways 
Air Bremen 
Air Europe 
Air Sardinia 
Business Flight 
Capital 
German Wings 
PanAm 
Region Airways 
Scottish European 
Templehof Airways 
Finnair 
Flandre 
North Flying 
TACV 
TAROM 
TAS Airways 
Transavia 
Virgin Atlantic 
Air Exel 
Alibu 
Brit World 
Britannia 
KLM City Hopper 
Netheriines 
Entrants 
Aeroflot 
Air Belgium 
Air Corbière 
Air Dolomiti 
Air Exel Netherlands 
Air Inter 
Air Lanka 
Air UK 
Al sair 
AOM 
ATI 
Aviaco 
Avianova 
Corse Méditerranée 
Delta 
Emirates 
Euralair 
Europe Aero-Service 
Flexair 
Ghana Airways 
Gill Aviation 
LAN Chile 
Newair 
OLT 
Portugalia 
Proteus 
SAL 
Key 
Leavers 
Aeromexjco 
Air Canada 
Air Lanka 
Air Mauritius 
Avianca 
Emirates 
Garuda 
Iran Air 
Japan Airlines 
SAA 
Sudan Airways 
TWA 
United Airlines 
Air Corbière 
BASE 
Dan-Air 
Flexair 
GB Airways 
Loganair 
Maersk UK 
TAT 
Air Jet 
Avianova 
Hamburg Airlines 
Aigle Azur 
Air Sicilia 
AOM 
Reason 
Entrants 
Aero Lloyd 
Air Liberte 
Air New Zealand 
Air Normandie 
Air Nostrum 
Air South West 
BASE 
CAE 
Cameroon 
Centennial 
China Eastern 
Condor 
Eastwest Airlines 
Euro City Line 
Eurobelgian 
Finnair 
Gulf Air 
Icelandair 
Interline 
Interot 
Karlog Air 
Love Air 
LTU 
Macai r 
Muk Air 
Royal Nepal 
Suckling Airways 
Venus Airlines 
Virgin Atlantic 
Fifth Freedom operator abandons intra-EU sectors 
Company no longer trading 
Changed to franchise operator for another carrier 
Network restructuring due to economic recession 
Airline restructuring or merger 
Abandoned intra-EU routes 
5.1.2. Capacity concentration on domestic services 
Appendix D.l shows the three densest domestic routes for all EU countries with domestic 
services, as well as the proportion of total EU domestic capacity produced within each 
country. The sum of seats offered on these routes approaches one-third of the total EU 
domestic output. The table also shows the number of airlines flying the 30 routes: of these, 15 
routes in 1995 had only one operator, and 11 had three or more. All three dense routes in the 
United Kingdom, France and Spain have three or more operators. Since the beginning of 
1996, Italy has also experienced a substantial increase in the level of competition on its most 
dense domestic routes. Further analysis of domestic capacity and air fares is described in 
Section 5.7.2. 
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5.2. Air passenger traffic 
5.2.1. Recent air traffic structure 
Obtaining a complete picture of origin/destination traffic in the Community is complicated by 
the difficulty in obtaining comprehensive data on charter flights. The UK Department of 
Transport attempted to give a complete picture for 1990, after obtaining data from the 12 
states that were then Community members (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3. Cross-border EU air passenger movements for 1990 and 1994 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Total 
Total 
passengers 
(Ό00) 
1990 
6,084 
4,408 
18,580 
25,303 
10,224 
5,882 
12,631 
730 
9,324 
5,444 
29,239 
42,843 
85,346 
Total 
passengers 
(Ό0Ο) 
1994 
n/a 
n/a 
13,707 
31,025 
n/a 
6,929 
n/a 
n/a 
12,265 
7,459 
41,852 
55,058 
n/a 
EU as % total 
international 
1990 
n/a 
44.3 
48.4 
51.4 
n/a 
n/a 
63.3 
72.6 
53.8 
n/a 
n/a 
56.5 
n/a 
Scheduled 
passengers as % 
total 
19901 
66 
n/a 
78 
65 
30 
67 
82 
n/a 
72 
49 
28 
54 
n/a 
1994 
n/a 
n/a 
88 
68 
n/a 
87 
n/a 
n/a 
82 
53 
31 
59 
n/a 
1 Based on AEA member airline 
Source: Transport Statistics GB 
traffic only. 
- 1992, September 1992, and civil aviation departments- 1994. 
Table 5.3 shows the importance of charter traffic for Spain and Greece, and to a lesser extent 
Portugal and the UK. In almost all the cases where data are available, the share of scheduled 
in total traffic has increased between 1990 and 1994. This could have been through the 
attraction of lower scheduled fares, or some switch of charter passengers to long-haul markets. 
Furthermore, European traffic has a somewhat higher weight in total international traffic for 
Denmark and France than the other countries which provided these data. To gain an idea of 
the largest scheduled and charter operators in EU markets, Table 5.4 shows recent annual 
traffic, although this refers to their system-wide operations, rather than solely intra-
Community traffic. 
The EU charter airline operations are almost entirely within geographical Europe and north 
Africa, while the scheduled airlines generate a large number of passengers on long-haul 
international routes (passengers rather than passenger-kms being chosen here to reduce the 
weight of the latter type of traffic). The largest two EU scheduled airlines in terms of 
European traffic are British Airways with 14.6 million and Lufthansa with 12.1 million. The 
next largest are SAS and Air France with 8.8 million and 8.0 million passengers respectively. 
This perhaps gives a better comparison of the relative sizes of scheduled and charter airlines 
within Europe (the latter are discussed in greater detail in Section 4.6). 
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Table 5.4. Passengers carried by the largest EU scheduled and charter airlines, 1994 
Scheduled airlines 
British Airways 
Lufthansa 
SAS 
Air France 
Alitalia 
Iberia 
Passengers (Ό00) 
30,201 
29,956 
18,775 
15,591 
14,536 
13,356 
Charter airlines 
Britannia 
LTU Group 
Condor 
Monarch 
Air 2000 
Hapag Lloyd 
Passengers ('000) 
7,913 
6,122 
5,500 
4,803 
4,201 
4,031 
Source: AEA and IACA. 
Recent traffic for the European regional airlines is shown in Table 5.5, with airlines wholly or 
majority owned by the major airlines clearly marked. 
Of the airlines in Table 5.5, only Air UK and Euro wings are independent of the large flag 
carriers, and of those, Air UK now has a large KLM minority (45%) holder of its shares, 
effectively reducing its independence. Otherwise, only Transwede (850,000) and Portugalia 
(516,000) remain as truly independent regional carriers with over 500,000 annual passengers. 
Table 5.5. Passengers carried by the largest EU regional airlines, 1994 
Airline 
Air UK 
Lufthansa City Line" 
Binter Canarias' 
Crossair1 
Deutsche BA' 
SAS Commuter1 
KLM Cityhopper1 
Olympic Aviation1 
Eurowings 
Delta Air Transport1 
TATC1993)1 
Passengers (Ό00) 
2,605 
2,260 
2,000 
1,970 
1,800 
1,500 
1,300 
1,300 
1,200 
919 
911 
1 Controlled by major scheduled airline. 
Source: IATA, ICAO and trade journals. 
5.2.2. Air traffic trends 
Because it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data on the European charter and regional 
airlines on a consistent basis, the analysis of traffic trends to identify the impact of EU 
measures focuses on the larger scheduled airlines. Association of European Airlines (AEA) 
members' scheduled traffic within the geographical Europe region has grown strongly over the 
past few years in terms of passenger numbers. The European traffic of AEA members covers 
a somewhat broader geographical area than intra-Community, and excludes the smaller 
regional airlines and airlines such as British Midland (who have only recently joined the 
AEA). 
In the past, traffic has been driven almost entirely by economic growth, the most commonly 
used measure of which is gross domestic product (GDP), with a smaller contribution from 
yields since around 1987. In the early 1990s, European scheduled traffic increased at a faster 
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rate than would be expected from the past relationship between real GDP and traffic, which is 
given by the following equation calibrated on 1965-90 data: 
Passengers (no) = -32,510 + 
(-19.0) 
68,973 Real GDP (Index) 
(+38.3) 
Both the t-statistics were significant at the 95% level, and adjusted r2 is 0.983. Forecasts of air 
traffic using 1990-94 actual European real GDP data can be seen in the next chart to fall well 
below the actual traffic outcome. 
One possible cause of the divergence is the early 1990s recession and its effect on traffic 
through overcapacity and lower air fares, rather than through GDP alone. A second model 
was therefore calibrated on 1965-79 data, and used to predict traffic over the previous 1980-
84 recession. For this model, real GDP variation again explained almost all traffic variation 
(adjusted r2 was 0.995 and significant t-statistics); it also provided reasonably accurate 
forecasts of traffic over the 1980-84 recession period, contrary to the 1990-94 situation. 
Over the previous recession European airlines managed to maintain real yields by limiting 
capacity increases, but over the latest recession capacity has not been restrained and real yields 
have had to fall to maintain seat factors. Overcapacity was also more serious in the early 
1990s with AEA carriers increasing available seat-kms by 12% between 1991 and 1992, 6% in 
1993 and 5% in 1994. This compares with broadly unchanged capacity offered by AEA 
carriers over the years 1981, 1982 and 1983, and only a 2% increase in 1984. Over both 
periods seat factors have been maintained at between 57% and 60%, and even increased 
somewhat overall in the 1990s recession (leaving aside the sharp fall immediately following 
the Gulf War). 
Figure 5.6. AEA European air passengers - actual vs predicted 
A. 1980-84 economic recession 
Predictions based on model calibrated on 1965-79 GDP data 
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Β. 1990-94 economic recession 
Predictions based on model calibrated on 1965-90 GDP data 
Passengers (million) 
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5.2.3. Impact of EU measures on air traffic 
The question still remains as to how far EU measures and increased intra-EU competition 
might have influenced this complex mixture of traffic, capacity, yield and load factor. Real 
yield has become a significant determinant of passengers travelling within Europe, and this is 
reflected in a model calibrated on 1980-94 data (yield was not a significant explanatory 
variable in regression models calibrated on periods ending before 1990): 
Log (passengers) 14.222 + log(realGDP) - log(real yield) 
(+24.1) (+20.2) (-6.4) 
All t-statistics (shown in brackets below the equation) are significant, and the adjusted r2 is 
0.990. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.56, from which it can be concluded that, at the 99% 
level of confidence, serial correlation was not present. This suggests that almost all passenger 
variations were explained by variations in real GDP and real yield. Frequency competition is 
likely to have had little effect on the overall market size, but would have been used to increase 
market shares of individual carriers. 
Attempts were also made to insert a competition or liberalization dummy variable into the 
equation from 1989 onwards, with poor results. This was hardly surprising given the gradual 
introduction of liberalization within Europe, starting as early as 1985 for some country pairs. 
The analysis of air fares in the next section suggests that levels have risen overall with some 
increase in the availability of deeper discount fares. It can thus be concluded that lower yields 
overall in real terms (unchanged or somewhat lower in current prices) were caused largely by a 
change in the mix of traffic in favour of passengers travelling on promotional and discount 
fares; it is this that has appeared to have played a very much stronger role in generating traffic 
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over the early 1990s, compared to the previous recession. The available evidence suggests 
that this came about through: 
(a) premium traffic (club and full economy fare passengers) trading down to lower available 
fares, possibly accepting some booking or travel time restrictions; and 
(b) more seats being available at the lower economy and discount fares. 
The first effect above was the result of the general business climate, and was not dependent on 
the degree of competition in EU air transport. The second, however, would indicate a more 
competitive response by airlines, only in so far that airlines were actively promoting these 
lower fares to maximize revenues and raise load factors, rather than merely reacting to altered 
booking patterns and the external economic environment. It is also possible that the more 
liberal regime covering fare filing and tariff approval made it easier to offer tactical discounts 
to generate additional demand. 
Figure 5.7. Recent trends in European traffic, GDP and yield, 1987-93 
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5.3. Air cargo traffic 
It has become increasingly difficult to obtain comprehensive data on intra-EU air cargo traffic. 
First, a large part of the fast growing air express market is carried by operators such as DHL, 
TNT and Fedex, who are not party to any regular exchanges of data such as through the 
Association of European Airlines. Second, a substantial part of the market is carried by 
trucks, even though it is treated as air cargo (i.e. is shipped between airports, under a flight 
number, and on an airway bill). 
Total freight tonne-kms flown within geographical Europe by AEA member airlines increased 
at an average annual rate of 5.1% a year between 1976 and 1994, or by 5.3% a year between 
1986 and 1994. The share ofthat total carried on freight-only flights within Europe declined 
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from 20% in 1986, to 19% in 1990, to 14% in 1994 (the 1994 share for long-haul freight 
traffic was 33% in 1994). This trend started in the early 1980s, as airlines moved freight onto 
trucks, and downsized to narrow-bodied aircraft with limited lower deck capacity. On the 
other hand, express integrated carriers started to establish air freighter feeder services within 
the EU, based on hubs such as Brussels and Stansted, often using turbo-prop aircraft. No data 
are available on the traffic carried on these services. 
According to Boeing research (based on the Official Airline Guide), the number of airport to 
airport truck destinations served in Europe increased from 38 in 1975 to 280 in 1990 and 386 
in 1995. Thus, there was a 38% expansion over the past five years. Boeing also reported a 
40% increase in frequencies offered on these routes during 1994. 
How far the trends outlined above, and developments in air cargo yields, have benefited from 
the single market legislation is difficult to estimate. Certainly, the rapidly growing air cargo 
express market, which was driven by the application of systems developed in the US, could 
only have happened as a result of the removal of many barriers within the EU. Some of the 
postal authorities also made greater use of night-time flights from airports without night 
curfews or movement limits. 
Pre-1993, most intra-EU shipments handled by express carriers such as DHL were door to 
door documents and dutiable parcels. Single market legislation to remove customs barriers 
meant that shipments no longer required customs clearance. This simplified procedures, and 
was reflected in a greater range of surface distribution by truck, greater punctuality and 
potentially lower costs to the consumer. This has resulted in a slight shift from air to road 
distribution within Europe. Although demand for package delivery has built up only gradually 
since customs regulations were relaxed, one express carrier estimates that the increase in 
business attributable to the wider and more reliable service developed because of the 
relaxation in EU customs barriers is in the order of 10%. The growth in package and larger 
shipments reflects the stock-keeping and warehousing strategy of international companies: for 
these a dependable, competitively priced overnight delivery service reduces the need for 
investment in regional storage centres. 
There has been a rationalization of express delivery services providers on an intra-state and 
intra-regional level, but no true pan-European express delivery carrier has yet developed. The 
current major centres for European distribution of shipments from outside the continent are in 
Belgium and north-west Germany: from here the onward delivery is by truck, where time 
permits, or by air to regional distribution centres. An alternative scenario would develop the 
existing regional distribution centres in the UK, Spain, southern Germany and Italy to receive 
shipments between Europe and the rest of the world. This second scenario would reduce the 
volume of air shipments between the European centres. 
The problem areas that still affect the air transport mode of operation are: 
(a) noise restrictions and night curfews at airports; 
(b) limited choice in ground handling agent; 
(c) air traffic control congestion (although this is minimized because most flying is by 
night); 
(d) slot availability (particularly London Heathrow). 
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5.4. Marketing innovations 
5.4.1. Alliances 
Some European airlines have tried to build up pan-European distribution networks through the 
opening up of new routes, franchise agreements, the use of hubbing, code sharing and share 
purchases. British Airways and more recently SAS/Lufthansa have done this, while a similar 
attempt by the partners in the Quality Alliance (SAS, Austrian, Swissair) failed. In examining 
the impact of EU measures on these and other developments, this analysis will first focus on 
the closest form of co-operation, namely cross-investment, before examining strategic and 
marketing alliances. 
Table 5.6 shows the stakes held by EU airlines in airlines in other EU countries in 1985, 1990 
and 1995. The main trends are as follows: 
(a) A tendency for national carriers to consolidate their position by increasing their stakes in 
domestic airlines, beginning in 1985-90 but intensifying during the second five-year 
period (e.g. Air France, KLM, SAS, Sabena). This was partly motivated by a desire to 
prevent foreign airlines entering the market. 
(b) Minority investments in existing regional scheduled airlines by major flag carriers in the 
past five years (e.g. British Airways, Lufthansa and KLM). 
(c) Some consolidation of holdings in Spanish charter airlines by EU national flag carriers 
between 1990 and 1995 (e.g. Aer Lingus and LTU), although the joint Iberia/Lufthansa 
charter airline has been discontinued. This was partly to take account of the Spanish 
government's concern about the low share of its airlines in the charter market, and partly 
because airlines elsewhere in the EU sought to take advantage of lower Spanish cost 
levels. 
These changes should be viewed against arguably more significant world-wide trends, the 
most important of which were: 
(a) EU carriers investing outside the EU: 
(i) Iberia's large stakes in South American airlines, including majority control of 
Aerolíneas Argentinas; 
(ii) British Airways' investments in US Air (24.6%), Qantas (25%) and Carib Express 
(20%); 
(iii) KLM's stake in Northwest (25%), and Kenya Airways (25%); 
(iv) Alitalia's stake in Malev (30%); 
(v) TAP Air Portugal's investment in Air Macao (25%); 
(vi) SAS's stakes in South American airlines, subsequently sold (Lan Chile 42%). 
(b) Non-EU carriers investing in EU airlines: 
(i) Swissair's stake in Sabena; 
(ii) Swissair's and ANA's stake in Austrian. 
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Table 5.6. EU airline cross-border 
(omitting subsidiaries which were 100% owned 
equity stakes 
throughout period) 
Airline stakeholder 
Aer Lingus 
Air Europe (ILG) 
Air France Group 
Alitalia 
British Airways Group 
KLM 
Lauda Air (Austria) 
LTU 
Lufthansa 
Luxair 
Maersk Air 
SAS 
Partner 
Futura (Spain) 
Air Europa (Spain) 
Air Europe (Italy) 
Austrian 
EuroBerlin 
Sabena 
Air Europe (Italy) 
Deutsche BA 
GB Airways 
TAT 
Air UK 
Air Littoral 
Lauda Air (Italy) 
LTE (Spain) 
Business Air 
Cargolux 
EuroBerlin 
Lauda Air 
Luxair 
Viva Air 
Cargolux 
Maersk Air 
(UK)/BEA 
Airlines of Britain 
Dan Air 
Groenlandsfly 
Linjeflyg 
Scanair/Premiair 
Spanair 
% stake 
1985 
0.0 
25.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
49.0 
0.0 
15.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
24.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
24.5 
40.0 
0.0 
57.0 
25.0 
0.0 
100.0 
49.0 
% stake 
1990 
25.0 
25.0 
100.0 
1.5 
51.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
49.0 
0.0 
14.9 
0.0 
0.0 
25.0 
0.0 
24.5 
49.0 
0.0 
0.0 
48.0 
24.5 
40.0 
24.9 
57.0 
37.5 
0.0 
100.0 
49.0 
% stake 
1995 
85.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
37.5 
27.5 
49.0 
49.0 
49.0 
45.0 
0.0 
33.0 
100.0 
38.0 
24.5 
0.0 
39.7 
13.0 
0.0 
24.5 
100.0 
40.0 
57.0 
37.5 
51.0 
0.0 
49.0 
Charter 
Acquired by Spanish 
interests 
Acquired by AZ/others 
Ceased operation in 1994 
Recently sold 
Recently sold 
Acquired 35% in 1991 
Recently sold 
Ceased operation in 1994 
Sold to Iberia 
Ceased operation in 1995 
Merged in 1995 
50% stake sold to Airtours 
(UK) 
Charter 
Source: Cranfield University research. 
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EU airlines also already held a number of minority stakes in non­EU airlines in 1985, many of 
them remaining from colonial times. These are largely still in place, for example Air France 
(Air Afrique, Air Comoros, Air Gabon, Air Madagascar, Air Mauritius, Air Tchad, Cameroon 
Airlines and Middle East Airlines), British Airways (Air Mauritius), and KLM (ALM 
Antillean). 
Finally, many EU airlines had established 100% owned subsidiaries to operate domestic 
services. Some, such as British Airways and Air France, consolidated this position by buying 
control (BA in Brymon, AF in Air Inter and Alitalia with Avianova). 
Figure 5.8. Evolution in number of EU airline alliances, 1985,1990,1995 
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Source: Airline Business and ABC World Airways Guide. 
Evidence that the desire to form alliances is gaining momentum can be found in the surveys 
undertaken by Airline Business (June 1994 and June 1995) which reveal partnerships in excess 
of 200 in the airline industry. These surveys reveal that European airlines had a total of 138 
marketing alliances in 1994, and this figure increased to 171 one year later. Prior to the start 
of the EU liberalization process (1985), only a few airlines, namely Air France, Finnair, Iberia, 
KLM, Lufthansa, Austrian and SAS, had formed alliances with other international airlines. It 
has to be noted, however, that before 1985 many airlines operated pooling agreements, and to 
a certain extent recent alliances (i.e. BA and Qantas) have many features of these now illegal 
pools. Taken together, the total number of alliances was 20. By 1990, the total number of 
alliances had risen to 59, and, by the time the third package had been introduced, the total 
number of alliances had increased to 171 in 1995. Clearly, these alliances varied considerably 
in their commitment and route coverage. Many of them were also with non­EU airlines. 
5.4.2. Code sharing and franchising 
Code sharing is another recent marketing change which in many cases is part of franchise 
agreements. But elsewhere code sharing agreements have replaced the more traditional joint 
ventures, such as revenue sharing pools, which have died out as a result of the first two 
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liberalization packages. It is important to establish how widespread code sharing has become 
within the single market and whether it has any anti-competitive implications. 
Over the past few years there has been a very rapid increase in code sharing alliances entered 
into by EU airlines. In 1990, the major European airlines had 20 such alliances, involving 
many more routes. By 1995, this number had risen to 71, of which 26 were with non-EU 
airlines (Figure 5.9). 
Figure 5.9. Number of code sharing partners of European airlines in 1995 
Source: Airline Business, June 1995 and ABC World Airways Guide, June 1995. 
A more dramatic increase can be seen in terms of routes that were included in these code 
sharing agreements: 32 intra-EU routes in 1990 increasing to 203 in 1995. However, it is 
difficult to conclude that these agreements actually resulted from EU liberalization. On the 
contrary, their main purpose was to increase EU airlines' competitiveness in the global rather 
than intra-EU marketplace. In some cases, their effect would have been to reduce the degree 
of competition on intra-EU routes (e.g. Lufthansa/SAS). 
Franchising has played a relatively minor role to date in cross-border air services in Europe. 
British Airways concluded their first franchise agreement in August 1993 with CityFlyer 
Express, followed by Brymon (which they also own) and Maersk Air, and Loganair in the 
following year. The latest with Manx Airlines (Europe) occurred in January 1995. 
These agreements allow British Airways to offer services in thinner (mostly domestic) markets 
at more appropriate cost levels. The franchisee airline remains under separate ownership (with 
the exception of Brymon), which allows it to operate at lower cost levels than could be 
achieved by British Airways. 
The only other airline to make similar agreements is Virgin Atlantic, which had a short-lived 
franchis^ agreement with SEEA (operating Athens-London) and Cityjet (still operating 
Dublin-London City). These franchises are very different from the BA ones in that no traffic 
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feed is available to Virgin's own services, whereas BA's franchises offer a large number of 
traffic feed opportunities. 
5.5. Productivity and competitiveness 
The analysis of the last ten years in Europe should reveal the effects of transition from tight 
regulation to more open competition on airline productivity. Since European liberalization, 
one of the major areas of airline operations which productivity improvements have been 
directed at is labour. Labour costs are the largest single airline cost category which is 
relatively controllable in comparison with other operating costs. Therefore the rest of this 
section will concentrate on labour productivity. The analysis of airline productivity will be 
based on the airlines' system-wide operations as data on employee numbers and costs, 
specifically for European operations, are not available. 
5.5.1. Trends in airline employment levels 
European airlines have been under tremendous pressure to reduce labour costs as part of a 
range of cost-cutting activities (as discussed in Section 4.4). Such pressure has come from 
three sources: first, increased competition amongst European carriers due to the EU 
liberalization measures; second, the intensified level of international competition from major 
carriers outside Europe, mainly US airlines; and third, the need to recover from economic 
recession which resulted in financial deficits. 
Amongst the many policies adopted by European carriers to reduce labour costs, one has been 
reduction in the number of staff. For example, Air France and its staff agreed a plan to reduce 
the workforce by 5,000 jobs by 1997 through early retirement and natural attrition. Alitalia 
also succeeded in reducing corporate (head office) staff from more than 2,300 to 300. SAS 
recently proposed to reduce its employee level by 3,000 through attrition, which is in addition 
to 3,500 jobs already eliminated since 1991. Some carriers have been more successful in 
reducing staff numbers than others, due partly to factors beyond management control such as 
cultural and social influences, the strength of labour unions and government attitudes to 
redundancies. For example, it has been more difficult for carriers such as Iberia to shed jobs 
operating from a country with over 20% unemployment. Iberia's restructuring proposal in 
December 1994, which included 2,120 layoffs, was met with two one-day strikes costing the 
carrier USD 16 million in loss of revenue. 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the development in the level of employment for a sample of major EU 
scheduled airlines4 from 1981 to 1994, in comparison with a group of major European 
scheduled carriers5 which were not subject to the same EU liberalization measures. 
It can be seen that from 1981 to 1983, the two groups of carriers had an opposing trend in their 
levels of employment. However, from 1983 they follow very much the same development 
pattern. It has been said that the 1990s were going to be characterized by staff reductions, and 
Aer Lingus, Air France, British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Olympic Airways. SAS, Sabena and TAP Air 
Portugal. 
Swissair, Finnair and Austrian Airlines. 
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the trend in the above chart supports such a view. From 1989 onwards, both groups of carriers 
continuously reduced staff numbers. 
It ought to be mentioned that the reduction in the number of employees has not always meant a 
worsening level of job losses to the industry as a whole. In some cases, labour moves from 
one organization to another. This happens when airlines outsource some of their activities, 
such as maintenance and catering. For example, Shannon Aerospace in Ireland carries out 
aircraft maintenance on behalf of a number of European carriers including its shareholders, 
Swissair and Lufthansa. Lufthansa has recently announced that it will transfer more 
maintenance work to this company, which is effectively transferring jobs to a lower wage rate 
country within the EU. However, in other cases airlines have moved their entire function, or 
part of it, to lower cost countries outside the EU, resulting in net job losses. For example, 
Lufthansa transferred part of the company's invoicing and revenue accounting to India. 
Figure 5.10. Trends in airline employment level (annual average number of staff), 
1981-93 
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Source: IATA. 
While it is difficult to quantify the impact of EU liberalization measures on the reduction in 
the airlines' staff levels, it is clear that the measures have encouraged such a trend. It is wrong 
to assume that the development in EU airlines' staff levels is entirely due to increased 
competition in the EU countries, as the control airlines have adopted similar strategies. While 
they were not subject to the same liberalization measures, they were based in states expecting 
to join the Community or planning a close association with it. The survey of 18 EU airlines 
revealed that almost two-thirds of the carriers surveyed believe that EU measures affected 
their staff numbers (see Appendix B). In conclusion, it could be said that EU carriers' 
reduction in number of staff were affected partly by EU liberalization measures, partly by 
international competition from carriers outside Europe and partly by the world and European 
economic climate, with EU liberalization measures playing the most important part. 
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5.5.2. Trends in labour productivity 
There are a number of ways by which labour productivity can be measured, such as available 
tonne-kms (ATK) per employee, average labour cost per ATK, revenue per employee, and 
passenger-kms per cabin crew or other disaggregate measures such as aircraft hours per pilot. 
However, ATK per employee is a more comprehensive measure for analysing airline labour 
productivity. 
Figure 5.11 illustrates employee productivity (ATK per employee) for a number of EU airlines 
from 1985 to 1994 (the airlines are ranked according to their 1994 performance). It can be 
seen that the majority of airlines has continued to increase their labour productivity over the 
years, with KLM, Lufthansa and BA at a higher rate than other carriers. The only carrier that 
has not achieved growth in employee productivity in recent years is Sabena, largely because of 
a radical reduction in capacity since 1991 (although this was largely confined to 
intercontinental routes). However, despite the decrease in Sabena's general employee 
productivity, previous research by Cranfield University shows that the airline's cockpit crew 
achieved the highest growth in productivity, during the period from 1983 to 1993 [Alamdari et 
al. 1995]. Based on the same report, EU carriers on average achieved increased productivity 
both in pilot and co-pilot flying hours and passenger-kms per cabin attendant in the period 
1983-93. 
The survey of EU airlines can show the extent to which the increase in airline labour 
productivity has been due to EU liberalization. 94% of the airlines surveyed believed that 
competition from EU airlines, which has been intensified by the adoption of EU measures, has 
affected airlines' improvement in efficiency (see Appendix E). It ought to be mentioned that 
while European carriers have increased labour productivity at a higher rate than their 
counterparts in the US between 1988 and 1992 [Comité des Sages, 1994], in absolute terms 
their productivity is still below that of the US carriers by around 28%. This gap further 
narrowed in 1993 [Alamdari et al. 1995]. 
5.5.3. Trends in labour costs 
Labour costs are a major driver of overall operating costs, and show major variations between 
airlines. 
To establish the success of carriers in reducing their labour costs, and to assess the impact of 
EU measures on such a strategy, a number of European carriers'6 expenses per employee are 
analysed. This analyses the period 1985 to 1994. 
Air France, British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, SAS, Sabena, TAP Air Portugal. 
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Figure 5.11. Available tonne­kms (ATKs) per employee, 1985/89/94 
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Figure 5.12. Average labour cost per employee (1994 prices), 1985/89/94, 
using purchasing power parity exchange rates 
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Figure 5.13. Average labour cost per ATK (1994 prices), 1985/89/94, 
using purchasing power parity exchange rates 
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Two approaches are adopted for analysing ELI carriers' labour costs. The first approach 
analyses labour costs per employee and labour costs per ATK in US dollars (USD) for the 
three years 1985, 1989 and 1994. This allows a comparison between the labour costs of 
different carriers, and establishes the changes in actual labour expenses. 
The second approach expresses each carrier's labour expense in its local currency over the 
period 1985-94. This eliminates the impact of the US dollar exchange rate on the changes in 
labour costs of individual airlines. 
Labour cost trends in US dollars 
The average cost per employee for the study carriers, in 1994 US dollars, is illustrated in 
Figure 5.12. To take into account the differences in the cost of living of different countries the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates were used to convert labour costs in national 
currencies to US dollars. Using this rather than market exchange rates removes the cost of 
living variations from the comparison. 
It can be seen that in most cases the airlines' average labour cost has increased, in real terms, 
especially in Iberia's case between 1989 and 1993. Iberia's labour costs declined in 1994 due 
to the wage freeze of 1993 and 1994 and reductions in number of staff as part of the airline's 
restructuring programme. Sabena was the only airline in the sample which experienced 
declining average labour costs. 
Another measure which links airlines' labour costs to their employee productivity is personnel 
costs per available tonne-km (ATK). This would establish how much it costs an airline, in 
terms of labour, to produce one ATK. It can be seen from Figure 5.14 that with the exception 
of Iberia and Sabena, the airlines' labour cost per ATK has declined. It is interesting to note 
that the two southern European carriers, TAP and Iberia, pay their employees much more than 
other airlines for producing one ATK. 
Labour cost trends in local currency 
To remove the impact of exchange rates, carriers' expenses per employee are expressed in 
local currency, and indexed on 1985 as the base year. To establish the changes in employee 
expenses in real terms all the figures are adjusted by local consumer price indices (CPI) and 
are expressed in 1994 prices. 
The airlines' expenses per employee are illustrated in Appendix E. There appears to be a 
mixed trend amongst the carriers with respect to their control of labour costs. While half of 
the eight study airlines - Air France, Lufthansa, KLM and Sabena - have maintained their 
labour costs around or below the 1985 level, the rest have experienced some increases. 
Air France has continuously reduced average labour costs until the merger with UTA in 1992, 
after which average labour costs rose. For example, cost-saving measures introduced by Air 
PPP exchange rates convert currencies on the basis of what money will buy. rather than on the basis of a market 
evaluation. Therefore they are the rates of currency conversion that equalize the purchasing power of different 
currencies. This means that a given sum of money, when converted into different currencies at the PPP rate, will buy 
the same basket of goods and services in all countries. Thus, PPPs are the rates of currency conversion which eliminate 
differences in price levels between countries. 
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France in September 1993 met with considerable hostility from its workforce. The resulting 
industrial action led to the government intervening to force the company to withdraw its 
proposed cuts. As the Air France case study (Appendix F.l) makes clear, this intervention led 
to the Chairman's resignation. Other airlines operating from countries experiencing high 
levels of unemployment also have found it difficult to lay off workers. Iberia experienced two 
days of industrial action in response to its proposed 2,120 reduction in staffing levels, leading 
to a revenue loss of USD 16 million. 
In the last two years Lufthansa has been successful in reducing its labour costs, the main 
inducement being an increase in the level of competition amongst airlines and pressures to 
improve results prior to future privatization. Sabena has also been successful in reducing 
labour costs in recent years. In general, KLM has managed to maintain its labour costs below 
the 1985 level throughout the past decade. BA, SAS, and TAP have experienced an increase 
in their average labour costs. As BA has the lowest unit labour cost, such an increase has a 
less detrimental effect on the company compared to TAP which has the third highest unit 
labour cost. Iberia is the only carrier which has been faced with a continuous increase in its 
labour costs throughout the period 1985­92. 
As mentioned earlier, the extent to which carriers are able to change working practices and 
expenses depends on a number of factors, such as the strength of labour unions and 
government and social attitudes towards redundancies and unemployment. 
To provide an overall picture for trends in labour expenses of EU airlines, the study airlines' 
labour expenses (in an index form) are weighted by their staff numbers and summed together. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5.14. It can be seen that carriers overall have experienced a rise in 
their labour costs in real terms, though by less than 10% only over the whole period. 
Figure 5.14. EU airlines' average expenses per employee (1994 prices) 
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In conclusion, EU airlines have certainly reduced staff numbers and increased labour 
productivity both in terms of ATK per employee and labour costs per ATK. However, they 
have not been so successful in reducing the average labour costs per employee. Therefore, it 
appears that the airlines are paying their staff, on average, slightly more in return for 
proportionately greater productivity increases. This is possibly because the increase in 
outsourcing, while reducing the number of lower paid employees (e.g. cleaning and catering) 
and boosting productivity, has a tendency to increase average unit labour costs. 
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Such trends are clearly affected by EU measures, international competition from carriers 
outside Europe, and by the world and European economic climate. However, from the survey 
of 18 EU carriers it has become clear that EU liberalization measures have certainly played an 
important role in accelerating the reduction in staff numbers and increased labour productivity 
and in controlling labour costs. 
5.5.4. Aircraft utilization 
A key variable under direct control by management is aircraft utilization, i.e. the hours flown 
by each aircraft per day. Changes in such utilization since 1985 have been examined for key 
EU airlines. 
Most airlines achieved improvements in utilization up to 1989, since when a levelling off has 
occurred, and in some cases a reduction. 
Table 5.7 shows varying trends for the selected airlines. 
Table 5.7. Aircraft utilization for European 
Air France 
British Airways 
Iberia 
Lufthansa 
Swissair 
TAP Air Portugal 
AEA average 
scheduled airlines 
Average daily aircraft utilization (hours) - geographic Europe' 
1985 
6.3 
4.6 
4.5 
6.1 
7.5 
3.8 
5.4 
1986 
6.4 
5.1 
4.2 
6.6 
7.7 
4.6 
5.5 
1987 
8.0 
5.1 
4.1 
7.0 
8.1 
5.3 
5.9 
1988 
8.4 
5.1 
4.5 
7.7 
9.6 
6.0 
6.1 
1989 
9.1 
4.9 
4.7 
7.7 
10.2 
6.6 
6.1 
1990 
8.8 
5.4 
5.0 
7.9 
10.8 
7.5 
6.5 
1991 
8.2 
5.0 
3.9 
6.9 
10.2 
7.5 
6.1 
1992 
7.7 
5.3 
3.5 
7.0 
10.3 
7.5 
6.6 
1993 
7.8 
6.0 
3.6 
7.3 
10.6 
6.6 
6.3 
1994 
8.8 
6.0 
3.4 
7.1 
10.8 
6.8 
7.1 
1 Combined data for those aircraft types considered to have been operated solely within Europe. 
Source: AEA. 
5.6. Operating costs 
As mentioned in Section 5.5, the ability for the EU airlines to control costs as a function of 
their marketing and competitive strategy has become crucial for their existence, especially 
since their unit costs are still well above their counterparts in the US and Asia/Pacific regions 
[Alamdari et al , 1995]. 
The overall cost impact depends partly on improvements in labour productivity (see Section 
5.5.2) but also on other factors, such as price of fuel, route restructuring and changes in 
aircraft size. 
Ideally, the cost analysis should be carried out for EU carriers on their intra-European routes 
rather than using their system-wide data. However, data in such a format are not available. 
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Also the carriers' cost structure and development are not only affected by their European 
operations, but also by competition from carriers of other regions. 
However, IATA [1991-95] provides cost information on carriers' operations on intra-
European routes in an aggregated form. The trend in European scheduled services costs in 
1994 prices is illustrated in Figure 5.15. It can be seen that the unit cost of carriers operating 
on intra-European routes, in real terms, has declined in recent years. 
Figure 5.15. IATA international scheduled services within Europe, 1989-94, unit costs 
in 1994 prices 
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Source: IATA, Airline Economic Results and Prospects. 
Figure 5.16 illustrates EU carriers' trends in unit costs, in real terms, for three intermediate 
years during the period 1983-93 (the carriers are ranked according to their 1993 performance). 
With the exception of Sabena and Air France, the EU airlines have been successful in 
reducing costs in recent years. 
However, the need to reduce costs further is still important as the European carriers' unit costs 
of operation are still higher than those of their counterparts in the US, and the gap in the 
carriers' unit costs, in real terms, between the two regions has increased slightly. While the 
US carriers reduced their unit costs on average by 15% in 1993 compared to the 1988 level, 
the European carriers' unit costs declined by 12% in the same period [Alamdari et al., 1995]. 
This trend is also confirmed by the findings of Comité des Sages [1994] which indicated that 
while the US carriers reduced costs on average by 2% from 1991 to 1992, the European 
airlines succeeded in reducing costs by an average of 1.7%. Of the European carriers, only 
British Airways' and KLM's costs are comparable with those of the US airlines, with others 
having unit costs well above those of the US airlines. Such differences in unit costs of 
European and US carriers are explained partially by differences in the two regions' input costs 
(e.g. labour costs and airport charges), both groups operating over broadly similar average 
stage lengths. 
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A comparison of unit costs between EU carriers indicates a small (10%) reduction in 
variations between them. This is measured by comparing the airlines' unit costs deviation 
from the average in 1988 (US cents 16.2) with that of 1993 (US cents 14.5). 
Figure 5.16. Total operating costs per ATK by EU airline (1993 prices), 1983/88/93 
Cost per ATK (US cents) 
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Source: ICAO, Financial Data (1983, 1988 and 1993). 
Clearly the pressure on EU carriers to reduce costs has come from various sources: 
liberalization of European air transport markets which has resulted in a higher level of 
competition, international competition from airlines of other regions, economic recession and 
the resulting poor financial performance of airlines. Of the 18 EU airlines surveyed (see 
Appendix B), 65% stated that EU measures have affected their cost-cutting strategies, with 
35% believing that the measures have had a significant impact on encouraging a lowering of 
their operating costs. Therefore, while it is not possible to quantify the impact of various 
factors on cost, it is clear that EU measures have had a significant effect on increasing efforts 
towards cost reduction. 
5.7. Pricing 
5.7.1. Cross-border air fares 
Liberalization has offered airlines the opportunity to be much more flexible and competitive in 
their pricing for passenger services (though competitive, open market freight tariffs, non-
scheduled arrangements and, in some cases, domestic deregulation pre-date the Community's 
three packages). It is important therefore to assess the extent to which they have used these 
freedoms and how fares and fare structures have actually developed. It is also important to 
investigate whether they offer greater variety and choice to users. 
To do this, extensive use was made of the database of fares held by Genesis Fares 
Distribution, part of the Reed Travel Group. This allowed not only the quantification of the 
trends in the level and range of fares on routes linking EU states, but also provided data on 
relative fares within individual Member States. In addition, it was used to examine 
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international fares on 72 intra-EU routes and 26 control group routes. The majority of the 
control group sample are fares from these countries (Austria, Switzerland and Norway) to 
states that have been in the EU throughout the period, the rest being between control group 
countries. However, it should be noted that Austria had recently adopted single market 
legislation whereas Switzerland had not. This control group was not ideal from a theoretical 
point of view, but practicalities meant that there is not a large potential population of suitable 
or comparable countries from which a sample could be chosen (see Appendix C.3.1 for 
sample size). 
When the data from Genesis was combined with authoritative research from other sources 
[CAA, 1993 and 1995], this allowed comparisons to be made amongst individual cities within 
the Community. 
The fares database was consistent with the database of routes used for the route and capacity 
studies of Section 5.1 above and this allowed other influences, like number of carriers in 
competition on a route and the level of concentration, to be explored. However, the published 
tariff is only a guide to what individual and corporate customers actually pay for their tickets. 
Tactical offers, special fares and discounts associated with limited seat availability are bound 
to be a feature of a liberalized price environment, even if this discriminates against users who 
do not have knowledge of and/or access to the full range of prices. The issue of special 
promotional fares will be analysed later. The work in this part of the report has to be read 
alongside the results of the study of airline yields in Section 5.6.3 which, at a macro level, 
does record what is paid by the average passenger. It is because of this that such results for 
individual airlines for individual routes are commercially confidential. 
As an initial step towards evaluating trends in fares, data covering the 72 busiest intra-
Community routes in each country were collected for four dates at intervals of three years 
(1986, 1989, 1992 and 1995). Similar data were also collected for 26 routes linking the 
control group of countries. These four dates were chosen because in the main they spanned the 
liberalization process resulting from the three packages of measures. These years also spanned 
an expansion period, a recession and a recovery, which in some ways made the isolation of 
effects resulting from the liberalization process difficult. It was felt that an examination of 
fares before and after the 1983 Regional Directive would not have been worthwhile because 
this directive was of a restricted nature and was unlikely to have had a significant influence on 
overall fare levels. 
The data for each of the full set of 92 routes for the coming summer season were taken to be 
those recorded in the Genesis database for 31 March of each year of study. Although the 
database included a large number of fare types, it was sorted and simplified to provide four 
basic sets ofinformation. These were: 
(a) the cheapest, readily available, fully flexible one-way Y class fare (calculated as half the 
return fare available at the origin, so that most international city pairs provided two 
different data entries because such fares are usually directional). In the text and figures 
this is called the fully flexible economy fare; 
(b) the average of all publicly available economy fares (fully flexible as well as 
conditioned), calculated as one-way from half the return, even if they could not be 
bought as one-way; 
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(c) the lowest publicly available fare, calculated as one-way from half the return, even if it 
could not be bought as one-way; 
(d) the percentage discount offered by the lowest publicly available fare compared with the 
cheapest fully flexible fare. 
Fares which discriminated on the basis of age were excluded from the analysis. In addition to 
the point that there are a large number of non-public fares (i.e. wholesale fares for tour 
operators, and market clearing fares only available through particular channels), it has to be 
recognized that in some markets there is a premium economy fare (C class) as well as a 
cheaper but still fully flexible fare (Y class). Where both existed, only the cheaper was 
included in the database if it was judged to be fully flexible and not severely capacity 
controlled. In cases where, at specific dates, no fare was reported for a given route, then these 
routes were excluded from the trend analysis. 
These data were first used to obtain a broad overview of changes in fares on routes linking the 
12 states which have been members of the Union throughout the liberalization period. To do 
this, the fares were adjusted to 1990 prices using the EU inflation rates as measured by the 
consumer price indices shown in Table 5.8 (the rates are based on those for the second quarter 
of each year). 
The results in Appendices C.5 to C.8 illustrate a dynamic marketplace with significant 
variations amongst Member States. More specifically, they show the following: 
(a) Referring to Appendix C.5, fully flexible fares generally fell in the period 1986-89 but 
rose in the two periods 1989-92 and 1992-95. As far as the impact of EU liberalization 
is concerned, there is little evidence from these trends that EU measures had any 
significant impact on fully flexible fares. The particularly large increases experienced by 
the majority of states during the period 1989-92 can probably be explained in terms of 
airline attempts to maintain revenues during a period of falling demand associated with 
the world economic downturn at the beginning of the 1990s. 
(b) The trends in average economy fares (Appendix C.6) were more mixed in each of the 
three-year periods, with some states recording reductions and others recording increases. 
It is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion regarding average fares since the statistical 
derivation of average fare was in some cases based on a very small sample. 
(c) Remembering that the general effects of inflation have been removed, Appendix C.5 
shows that fully flexible on-demand fares have risen over the nine years 1986-95 by a 
modest but significant level for the EU as a whole at around 2% per annum. As far as 
EU liberalization measures are concerned, the three packages have not had the effect of 
reducing fully flexible fares, as might have been anticipated. Liberalization has affected 
both the level of fares and fare structure in the discounted market. 
(d) Over the period 1986-95, average economy fares within the EU have hardly changed. 
Appendix C.6 shows significant reductions for Ireland and Austria, and a significant 
increase on UK and Belgian routes. The Irish trend can be explained by the degree of 
competition within the Dublin-London City pair market generated by UK-Irish bilateral 
deregulation which predates the first package. 
(e) With respect to control group trends over the period (Austria and Switzerland) there is 
little evidence of any significant divergence from the general EU trend. This suggests 
that whilst during most of the period none of the EU measures were adopted within the 
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control group states, pricing strategies within those states have not differed markedly 
from pricing within the EU. 
Table 5.8. EU consumer price index, 1986-95 
Year 
1986 
1989 
1992 
1995 
CPI (1990 = 100) 
83.9 
94.6 
109.5 
120.4 
Source: Financial Times I Datastream. 
The next step in examining overall trends was to examine changes in the range of fares on 
offer in Member States for international intra-EU travel, based on the sample. 
The level of the deepest discounts available from the on-demand Y fare provided a measure, 
albeit imperfect, of the choice and variety of product/price combinations on offer to users. The 
analysis confirmed that the level of discounts was often in the order of 40% of the cheapest 
fully flexible fare, but the study showed that there were significant changes in this level of 
discount over time. 
A review of the results illustrated in Appendix C.9 for EU states is given below: 
(a) Discounts were in general smaller in 1989 than in the other four years. Whilst EU 
measures may have encouraged new entry and reduced fares on some routes, the 1990-
93 economic downturn will also have led to significant fare discounting at the lower end 
of the market. 
(b) Discounts on routes out of Germany in 1986, 1989 and 1992 were noticeably smaller 
compared to other EU states. This was primarily because during those periods lowest 
economy fares were not reported in the ABC database. By 1995, however, it appears 
fares were being offered in the ABC at a level of discount comparable with the general 
EU trend. 
(c) The UK has been unusual in that discounts tended to decline from 1986 to 1995 despite 
a greater degree of competition on intra-EU markets. One would have expected the level 
of discounts to have increased. However, one possible explanation lies in the recent 
decision by British Airways, the main UK operator on intra-EU routes, to cease 
reporting some of its lowest promotional fares on the ABC database, preferring to offer 
these instead through selected wholesalers and its World Offers. 
(d) The discounts on the route out of Ireland reached over 70% in 1995. Since this route 
refers to the Dublin-London market, one would expect to observe a greater degree of 
discounting, firstly because of the scale of competition, and secondly because the route 
has a sizeable proportion of VFR (Visiting Friends and Relatives) passenger traffic. 
In order to take the analysis one step further and to allow direct comparisons to be made 
amongst individual routes and amongst Member States, fares had to be converted to a 
common currency. The ECU was chosen to be the basis for comparison and the exchange rates 
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used are those listed in Appendix C.l 1. While it is recognized that there have been a number 
of step changes in parities, it was judged that in the majority of cases the ECU provided the 
best basis for overall comparisons. The ECU was also used as the basis for comparison for the 
control group. 
The trend in the variation of fares with nominal distance in kilometres (converted from 
ticketed point mileages held in the Genesis database) was explored using both graphical and 
more mathematical techniques. In order to examine the relationship between fare and stage 
length, regression analysis was performed for each fare category at each time interval (1986, 
1989, 1992, 1995) in order to identify the extent to which variations in fares across the sample 
was explained in each year by variations in stage length, and to identify, where possible, the 
effects of additional factors such as market concentration (see Table 5.9). The equations for 
each fare type and year are given in Appendix C.3.2. 
The regression results indicate that: 
(a) Between 70 and 80% of the variation in fully flexible economy fare up to 1992 can be 
explained by stage length, whereas by 1995 it falls to 56%. This suggests that up to 1992 
other potential factors on these routes based on specific market conditions had only a 
marginal impact on fares. However, the reduction in the r statistic between 1992 and 
1995 suggests that other factors increased in importance. Regressing fare against market 
concentration, represented by a capacity share index, did not improve the r statistic. 
This is expected as, firstly, one would not expect significant price competition within 
the fully flexible fare market, and, secondly, there was insufficient variation in market 
concentration across routes to generate statistical significance. 
(b) Analysis of both average economy and lowest economy fares produced, as expected, a 
lower r statistic. Lower conditional fares are unlikely to be closely related to stage 
length given their restrictive nature in terms of availability. 
(c) In attempting to explain the decline in τ" with respect to fully flexible fares between 
1992 and 1995, one can conclude that market concentration based on the sample of 
routes did not have an effect on fare. However, inclusion of percentage change in 
exchange rate parity 1992-95 as an additional independent variable did improve the r 
statistic for 1995 by a considerable margin (from 0.56 to 0.75). This confirms the 
effects on intra-EU fares of exchange rate instability with respect to the ECU during the 
period 1992-95. The devaluation of the UK pound, the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese 
escudos and Italian lira and appreciation of the German mark, the Belgian franc, the 
Danish kroner against the ECU, distort the relationship between fare and stage length, 
producing a greater scatter of points. This can be illustrated in the more detailed scatter 
diagram for the 1995 fully flexible economy fare vs stage length graph (Appendix C.4). 
Table 5.9. Percentage variation in fares on intra-EU routes explained by stage 
length, 1986-95 
Fully flexible economy fare 
Average economy fare 
Lowest economy fare 
1986 
70 
42 
14 
1989 
80 
53 
19 
1992 
77 
61 
33 
1995 
56 
23 
14 
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Earlier studies of deregulation in the US (CAA publication CAP 654) revealed that regulated 
markets tend to demonstrate a clear correlation between fare and distance, while liberalized 
and deregulated markets show much more scatter as market-based fares become widespread. 
The data plotted in Appendices C.3 to C.5 show that the EU market has always had wide 
disparities in the fares charged. However, this has not been necessarily the result of 
competition. Rather, it has been the result of wide variations between the fares from 
individual states. Measured in terms of ECU, different national exchange rate parities distort 
fare differentials where one would expect on a specific route the fares set in both countries to 
be similar in scale. This can partly be seen from Appendix C.4 where fares of individual 
states can be identified. 
Under a common currency regime one would expect a reduction in the difference between 
directional fares as a result of the increased cross-border price transparency that monetary 
union would be expected to bring. When questioned on the likely impact of a common 
currency regime on air transport, the majority of airlines expected that it will at least have 
some impact. One example is the Düsseldorf-Palma de Mallorca market where the difference 
in directional fares during 1995 was around 15%. Whilst this may have been due partially to 
the distorting effect of exchange rates, under a common currency environment it is likely that 
directional fare differentials would have been maintained, given differences in price and 
income elasticities at both points. 
There is unlikely to be any significant convergence in directional fares over the medium term, 
given that airlines will continue to exploit variation in price and income elasticities at both 
ends of a cross-border route, and to place barriers in the way of cross-border ticketing. This 
practice, generally known as arbitrage, involves travel agents purchasing tickets for a specific 
cross-border route in the cheaper directional market. The Ahmed Saeed case (Case 66/86 
[1989] ECR 803, [1990] 4 CMLR 102) in the European Court of Justice in 1987 found this 
practice to be legal, but despite this ruling, the majority of airlines do not accept flight coupons 
obtained under this practice. 
The fact that the scatter is caused by variations between countries rather than variety from any 
one country, or on any one route, was confirmed by the recent study conducted by the UK 
CAA (CAP 654). The study used a different sample of routes in 1995 to make inter-country 
comparisons. Appendix CIO highlights the UK CAA's findings. 
In its report, the CAA notes: 
'On international routes the lowest fully flexible fares remain lower from London than from 
other EU capitals, with four fairly distinct country groupings being evident. London is the 
cheapest; then Athens, Lisbon and Madrid; next Copenhagen, Dublin, Paris, Rome and 
Stockholm; and, finally, Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Helsinki, Luxembourg and 
Vienna the most expensive. At most distances these fares range upwards from 25% above 
the London levels.' 
The question of choice and variety on any given route can only be addressed by a more micro-
level study. Examination of November 1995 promotional fares issued by British Airways, 
Lufthansa and British Midland can provide an example of pricing strategies used by airlines 
during off-peak periods. Tables 5.11 to 5.13 present the promotional fare as a percentage of 
the published lowest economy return fare {ABC 1995) using the British Airways 'World 
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Offers', Lufthansa 'Buy and Fly' and British Midland 'Diamond Deals' promotional return 
fares. 
From Table 5.10, it can be seen that the promotional fare offered by British Airways on the 
London to Paris and Amsterdam routes matches the lowest available economy return fare. 
This should be expected, since generally speaking both these city pair markets are associated 
with significant fare differentials due to first, higher levels of discretionary traffic and second, 
the relatively high levels of competition. On the other hand, the World Offers fare for 
London-Zurich represents a significant discount from the lowest published available economy 
fare. This suggests an attempt by the airline to attract additional leisure traffic on what is 
generally considered to be a predominantly business-orientated route. 
Analysis of Lufthansa's Buy and Fly promotion on selected routes out of Germany again 
appears to suggest that on services from Frankfurt and Düsseldorf to London, special offers 
are not much lower than the lowest published fare, because there is already considerable 
competition and attractive fare discounts. On those routes to Madrid and Athens which are 
generally low frequency markets, however, the Lufthansa promotional fare appears as a 
significant discount on what are generally considered to be non-fare discount routes. 
Table 5.10. British Airways' World Offers as a percentage of lowest published 
economy return fare 
Origin-Destination 
London-Amsterdam 
London-Paris 
London-Cologne 
London-Lyon 
London-Malaga 
London-Faro 
London-Düsseldorf 
London-Frankfurt 
London-Rome 
London-Berlin 
London-Hamburg 
London-Bremen 
London-Munich 
London-Barcelona 
London-Zurich 
London-Toulouse 
London-Venice 
London-Brussels 
London-Athens 
World Offers as a % of 
lowest economy fare 
100 
100 
87 
86 
84 
79 
76 
74 
64 
63 
62 
61 
61 
59 
59 
56 
49 
45 
41 
Number of 
operators 
6 
5 
2 
3 
2 
2 
4 
5 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
2 
2 
4 
3 
Source: BA World Offers leaflet. 
Table 5.12 refers to the promotional fares offered by UK carrier British Midland, an airline 
which tends to operate in highly competitive markets. One would expect therefore that the 
margin between its promotional fare and the lowest published economy fare would be 
relatively insignificant. This is indeed confirmed through observation of Table 5.13, 
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particularly with respect to its promotional fares on the London-Amsterdam, London-Paris and 
London-Dublin routes. On the other hand, the margin appears greater on the London-Prague 
and Zurich routes were traffic is predominately business related and, hence, generally 
characterized by the absence of a large number of discount fares. 
A very recent form of special offer related to air fares is the 20% reduction offered on British 
Airways World Offers (and 30% off other BA fares) to those paying with a NatWest Bank 
credit card. This offer has a limited duration of about one month. 
The above analysis was carried out using published fares, which in some countries are subject 
to travel taxes, security or airport charges, while in other countries they are included in the 
fare. As Table 5.13 shows, these have been increasing in importance over the period. 
Table 5.11. Lufthansa's promotional return fare as a percentage of lowest published 
economy return fare 
Origin-Destination 
Frankfurt-London 
Cologne-London 
Düsseldorf-London 
Berlin-London 
Hamburg-London 
Düsseldorf-Birmingham 
Frankfurt-Birmingham 
Munich-London 
Munich-Athens 
Berlin-Athens 
Düsseldorf-Athens 
Frankfurt-Athens 
Düsseldorf-Madrid 
Frankfurt-Madrid 
Munich-Madrid 
Buy and Fly as a % of 
lowest economy fare 
85 
79 
79 
73 
73 
72 
64 
63 
57 
50 
50 
50 
42 
42 
42 
Number of 
operators 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
' 2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
Source: Lufthansa Buy and Fly Promotion leaflet. 
Table 5.12. British Midland's promotional return fare as a percentage of lowest 
published economy return fare 
Origin-Destination 
London-Amsterdam 
London-Paris 
London-Dublin 
London-Frankfurt 
London-Prague 
London-Zurich 
Diamond Deal as a % of 
lowest economy fare 
100 
100 
100 
74 
62 
59 
Number of 
operators 
6 
5 
5 
5 
2 
4 
Source: British Midland Diamond Deal Promotion. Sunday Observer 26.11.95. 
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In conclusion, the analysis of pricing at this stage using fare data from a sample of routes 
suggests that no definitive conclusion can be drawn with respect to the impact of specific EU 
liberalization measures. However, the fares analysis can confirm that: 
(a) As expected, trends over the period 1986-95 in fully flexible fares appeared more 
responsive to airline yield requirements in that operators were seeking to maintain and 
recoup revenue in the aftermath of the world recession from the price inelastic business 
segments of the market. EU liberalization measures have not had a significant impact 
on fully flexible fares. 
(b) Analysis of lowest economy fare trends over the period indicates that the level of 
discounting has intensified after 1989. This was primarily because of prevailing 
economic circumstances where airlines were striving to fill excess capacity brought on 
by the deterioration in world economic conditions; this has tended to exaggerate any 
impact of the second and third EU packages. 
Overall, the results suggest that the impact of growing competition was observed in the lower 
economy fares, with deeper discounts and special offers pitched below the lowest available 
published fare. Airlines have continued to seek revenue increases from the business market 
segments by increasing these fares, and in this respect it can be concluded that the EU 
measures have not produced the desired effect. These findings are based only on published 
information, but were largely confirmed during the airline and aviation authority interviews 
(Appendix B). 
5.7.2. Domestic air fares 
Developments in air fares within EU countries do not have the same implications for the 
completion of the single market as cross-border fares. However, recently there have been 
some significant changes in domestic air services and air fares for certain countries which are 
closely related to sector-specific EU measures, in particular in France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. In all cases except perhaps Germany, the domestic airline networks of these countries 
have been regarded by their respective governments until very recently as essential public 
services that were best served on a monopolistic basis by their respective flag carriers (or their 
subsidiaries). In response to policy measures contained in the third package, however, this 
situation has been radically transformed. Over the past two years, new entrants, 
predominantly former charter carriers, have been allowed access to many domestic trunk 
routes, transforming them into highly competitive city-pair markets. 
In order to compare the domestic fares charged in different EU countries, the one-way fully 
flexible and lowest economy return fares charged on routes of varying stage length from a 
sample of five countries were taken and converted into a common currency. To assess the 
impact of increased competition, fare data were taken for three years spanning the period 
1989-95. The results of this analysis are contained in Appendix D.4. 
Reference to the six graphs (lines of best fit) contained in Appendix D.4 reveals that one-way 
fully flexible economy fares are most expensive in Germany and least expensive in Spain. 
This remains the case for each of the three years investigated. A very different picture 
emerges for the lowest return fares, with Spain having the most, and Italy the least, generous 
discount prices in 1989. France replaces Spain in having the lowest return fares by 1992, 
whilst Italy retains its earlier position. The situation changes again in 1995, with German 
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discounted fares being the most expensive and UK fares the least. It should be noted that 
French, Italian and Spanish domestic fares have until very recently been tightly controlled by 
their respective governments. (The above comparisons should be treated with caution given 
that no account has been taken of the different standards of living evident in the five 
countries.) 
Table 5.13. Passenger and airport taxes levied on fares (intra-EU and EU control 
group routes in ECU) 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
1986 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.22' 
4.45 
6.67 
0 
0 
0 
0.50%3 
0 
0 
0 
1989 
0 
0 
0 
0.71 
5.30' 
3.93 
6.42 
6.64 
0 
2.78 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1992 
0 
7.13 
8.24 
2.17 
2.94 
0 
6.51 
6.47 
0 
2.82 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
3.08 
13.31 
9.00 
2.63 
3.52 
10.02/20.05 2 
6.17 
6.50 
3.16 
3.14 
7.86 
0 
9.24 
5.99/11.99" 
Passenger tax levied on fares from West Berlin. 
1 Lower rate applicable on flights associated with sector distance between 100 km and 750 km. Higher rate refers to 
flights over 750 km distance. 
Stamp duty levied as a % of fare. 
' 5.99 applies to UK domestic routes and services to EU states, Iceland, Norway, Basel and Geneva; 11.99 applies to all 
other international routes. 
Source: ABC World Airways Guide. 
A further comparative analysis contrasts the fares charged on French, German, Italian, Spanish 
and UK domestic routes with the prices levied in each country for intra-EU journeys of 
similar distance routes in 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1995. As for the above analysis, two fare 
categories have been selected (one-way fully flexible and lowest return economy fares). 
Appendix D.5 contains eight graphs (lines of best fit) contrasting French domestic fares with 
their intra-EU equivalents for routes of varying sector length. It is apparent that intra-EU fares 
for journeys originating in France are considerably more expensive than domestic trips of an 
equivalent length. This situation has not changed to any significant degree over the past ten 
years. Appendix D.6 contains a similar set of graphs for German domestic and intra-EU 
routes. A very different pattern is revealed, with the margin between the two sets of fares 
being very much less. German intra-EU fares are shown to rise more sharply with sector 
length than their French equivalents. 
Appendix D.7 provides a similar graphical analysis for Italian domestic and intra-EU fares. 
Whilst there is a marked difference between the two markets for one-way fully flexible 
economy fares, there is little separation between the lowest return fares in 1986 and 1989. An 
increasing gap does, however, begin to emerge in 1992. 
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Spanish domestic and intra-EU fares are contrasted in Appendix D.8. A wide gap is seen to 
have existed throughout the study period between the two fare groups. Increased competition 
in both markets would appear to have had a strong impact in 1995, as is evident from the 
graph showing the one-way fully flexible fares. The final appendix, D.9, contains information 
on UK fares. Whilst there is a clear margin between the one-way fully flexible fares in the two 
markets throughout the ten-year period, there has been little difference between the lowest 
return fares. The high degree of competition on UK domestic trunk routes would go some 
way to explaining this outcome. 
The above analysis has been enhanced by a more detailed examination of three countries 
where notable changes have occurred over the past year, namely France, Germany and Italy. 
In France, Air Inter was authorized by the government in 1985 to continue operating its 
domestic route network on an exclusive basis for a further 15 years. Air France's acquisition 
of UTA in 1990, however, had the effect of amending this arrangement. To gain the approval 
of the European Commission for the take-over, the French government had to concede the 
opening up of eight major domestic routes to competition. In reality though, only one of the 
routes identified became subject to any significant degree of entry. Minerve, renamed AOM 
after its merger with Air Outre Mer, began operating between Orly and Nice in 1991. This 
particular carrier's policy has been to compete with Air Inter on in-flight service and ground 
handling, but not on price. Air Inter's response has been to increase frequency on the route, 
whilst maintaining its policy of providing a no frills, single class service utilizing aircraft 
configured with a high density seating layout. Interestingly, the entry of AOM did not lead to 
a large increase in capacity on the route. Whilst Air France (operating Paris CDG-Nice) and 
Air Inter increased the number of flights they operated between 1990 and 1994 by some 12%, 
the total number of seats supplied by them fell by 6%. This was achieved by reducing the size 
of aircraft employed on the route. 
The French government had intended that its domestic routes should be opened to competition 
only gradually, but pressure from the Commission and a ruling by the European Court ensured 
that other trunk routes became available at the beginning of 1995. (Appendix D.2 provides 
details of entry dates and the number of seats supplied by the respective carriers.) Air Liberté, 
unlike AOM, has actively engaged in fare competition with Air Inter. A good example of this 
competitive activity is provided by the Paris-Toulouse route, on which, after some initial 
aggressive discounting of the lowest fares available, prices have stabilized with Air Liberté 
undercutting Air Inter by some 21% for a fully flexible Y class return journey, and claiming a 
30% share of the market and profits. (Appendix D.3 provides a summary of fares charged by 
the four carriers operating the route during the first year of competition.) On this particular 
route, consumers have benefited from both lower fares and a wider choice of fares, in-flight 
meals and drinks, a substantial increase in service frequency, and the introduction of business 
class by the new entrants. 
Competition on domestic routes in Germany, the second largest home market in Europe, 
remains confined to the five trunks served by Deutsche BA and Lufthansa. At present, only 
DBA and Eurowings have the potential to provide any serious challenge to Lufthansa. 
Eurowings, however, has assiduously avoided challenging the flag carrier, seeking instead to 
act in a complementary manner. Earlier incursions into the domestic sector by charter carriers 
(Aero Lloyd (1988-92) and German Wings (1989-90)) have not been repeated, although LTU 
does provide low frequency services at unattractive departure times on a number of routes. 
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DBA has competed with Lufthansa on four trunk routes since 1992, having taken over the 
Internal German Services of British Airways. Its further expansion into the domestic market 
has so far been limited to the Düsseldorf-Munich route which it entered in April 1994. 
Lufthansa's response to DBA was to introduce a differentiated product on seven of its 
domestic trunk routes in the autumn of 1994 under the name Lufthansa Express. Aside from 
improved in-flight service and reduced check-in times, the carrier adopted a uniform peak/off-
peak pricing structure for its Express operations. The effect of this innovation was to reduce 
Lufthansa's one-way business class fare on the Düsseldorf-Munich route by as much as 38% 
at off-peak times. DBA by comparison did not distinguish between peak and off-peak periods. 
Its equivalent fare was set some 29% lower than Lufthansa's peak price, but slightly more than 
its off-peak rate. By February 1995 however, Lufthansa had raised its off-peak fare to DM 
299, some 15% higher than that charged by DBA. 
Lufthansa abandoned its Express product in October 1995, citing difficulties in attracting 
sufficient passengers at off-peak times and problems associated with a confused branding 
image. The price war between DBA and Lufthansa had the effect of depressing yields by 
around 20% on the contested routes, whilst increasing the volume of traffic. It would appear 
that neither carrier has generated profits from these operations, but it would seem likely that 
Lufthansa is profitable on its monopolistic trunk routes, on which it charges higher fares. 
Table 5.15 contrasts the fares charged on the contested Düsseldorf-Munich route with those 
levied on the monopolistic Berlin-Frankfurt sector. The UK Civil Aviation Authority 
identified four such monopolistic trunk routes in Germany as presenting amongst the best 
opportunities for entry in Europe [CAA, 1995]. Difficulties in gaining access to sufficient 
slots at Frankfurt would appear to be a key factor in preventing competition. 
Table 5.14. Düsseldorf-Munich and Berlin-Frankfurt one-way fares (DM), 1994-95 
July 1994 
Sept 1994 
Feb 1995 
Jun 1995 
Düsseldorf-Munich 
Lufthansa 
C class 
peak off-
401 401 
369 249 
369 299 
369 319 
Y class 
peak off-
401 401 
299 199 
259 199 
259 229 
Deutsche BA 
C class Y class 
-
260 180 
260 180 
290 220 
Berlin-Frankfurt 
Lufthansa 
C class Y class 
381 381 
381 381 
381 381 
381 381 
Source: ABC World Airlines Guide and CAA CAP 654. 
Prior to 1995, Italian domestic services were operated on a concession basis, with Alitalia 
contracted to provide the vast majority. Given that the flag carrier had this arrangement 
renewed in 1991 for a ten-year period, it would follow that its termination in 1995 was as a 
direct result of the third package. Domestic fares have been regulated throughout by the 
government and were capped at 1985 levels for over five years. Overall profits on domestic 
services have been small, partly as a consequence of the contractual requirement placed on 
Alitalia and its subsidiary ATI to operate loss-making services. Alitalia absorbed its domestic 
subsidiary ATI in 1994. Avianova, a regional formed in 1986 and jointly owned by ATI and 
Meridiana (known as Alisarda until 1991), became a wholly owned subsidiary of Alitalia in 
1995. 
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The Milan-Rome route, the fifth busiest city-pair in Europe, has recently been transformed as a 
result of the entry of two new carriers. Since the early 1990s, Alitalia and Meridiana have 
operated on the route charging identical fares. It would appear that Meridiana had provided 
services using Alitalia's concession. In March 1991, Alitalia operated 23 services each 
weekday between Fiumicino and Linate and Meridiana three per weekday between Fiumicino 
and Malpensa. By November 1995, Alitalia was operating 30 flights each weekday and 
Meridiana four. 
In November 1995, Air One began operating six daily flights between Fiumicino and Linate. 
Frequency was increased to 13 services per day from January 1996. Air One operates a single 
class cabin configuration on the route providing a 'quality service including meals and free 
drinks'. Noman Charter began operating six flights daily between Linate and Ciampino in 
December 1995. By mid-January 1996, capacity on the Rome-Milan city-pair had increased 
by over 50% in less than three months. Air One's one-way fully flexible fare is 24% lower 
than the equivalent tariff with Alitalia and Meridiana. Noman provides an even greater 
discount of 37% with its fully flexible single fare. At present, all operators would appear to be 
offering a single class of service. A listing of the fares currently charged by the four carriers 
operating between Milan and Rome is given in Table 5.16. The prices levied by Alitalia and 
Meridiana in 1991 are also included in this table. 
Table 5.15. Rome-Milan fare development, 1991 and 1996 
Alitalia / Meridiana 
Air One 
Noman 
Y one-way 
Y return (Mon-Fri) 
Y return (Sat-Sun) 
Y day return (Sat-Sun) 
Y excursion return 
Y one-way (Mon-Fri) 
Y one-way (Sat-Sun) 
Y one-way 
Y weekend return 
Y day return (Sun) 
March 1991 
(LIT) 
196,000 
392,000 
392,000 
275,000 
-
-
-
-
-
-
January 1996 
(LIT) 
230,000 
460,000 
230,000 (AZ only) 
230,000 
322,000 (IG only) 
174,000 
130,000 
144,000 
225,000 
225,000 
Source: ABC World Airlines Guide and airlines. 
5.7.3. Domestic vs cross-border air fares 
Overall, it is apparent that cross-border fares are more expensive than those levied on 
domestic routes of a similar distance. This is particularly the case for fully flexible fares and 
less so for those that are conditional. There are three key factors which explain these 
disparities. First, differences in the nature and extent of regulatory control between intra-EU 
and domestic markets, second, the effects of rail competition on domestic air services, and 
third, carriers operating on intra-EU routes incur higher costs. 
It has been only very recently that measures designed to liberalize air transport have affected 
domestic services. For most of the past 12 years, the focus of attention has been on cross-
border routes. Until recently, with the exception of the UK, domestic air services in the 
Member States have been subject to a greater degree of economic control than intra-EU 
operations. A key feature of this domestic regulatory regime has involved the control of air 
fares. In many countries, governments have used price controls on domestic air services in 
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furtherance of various social and regional economic development policy objectives. Cross-
subsidization has been an intrinsic element of this strategy, with the profits earned on domestic 
trunk routes and international services being used to cover losses incurred on thinner regional 
operations. In the cases of Air Inter. Alitalia and Iberia, a condition of their monopoly status 
has been the requirement to operate loss-making, low density inter-regional services. 
Significant differences exist, therefore, between fully flexible fares levied on domestic and 
intra-EU routes in both Italy and Spain. Disparities between domestic and intra-EU fares are, 
on the other hand, less significant in the UK where there has been a longer experience of 
domestic deregulation. In light of the UK experience and the removal of cabotage restrictions 
in 1997, one would anticipate a general reduction in the divergence between domestic and 
intra-EU fares in other Member States over the medium term. 
The effect of competition from rail will also have had an impact on the level of domestic air 
fares relative to those fares levied on comparable intra-EU routes. In Germany and France, for 
example, subsidized rail services are generally considered to be both modestly priced and 
highly efficient, hence functioning as an effective substitute to air travel. On the other hand, 
cross-border EU air services, with the exception of some routes between France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Germany have not been subject to the same degree of competitive pressure 
from surface transport. This is primarily because of the fact that air transport continues to 
maintain a relative speed and service convenience advantage over rail arising from the 
relatively poor cross-border integration of many national rail networks. The development of a 
fully integrated city centre to city centre cross-border high speed rail network therefore can be 
expected to exert a significant degree of competitive pressure on intra-EU air services. One 
recent example has been the reduction in passenger traffic on air services between London and 
Paris because of the Channel tunnel. 
The third explanation for the disparity in fares is the higher costs incurred by carriers operating 
intra-EU services. Additional costs are incurred by cross-border operators in offering superior 
levels of service such as catering and airline lounge facilities which are generally not supplied 
on domestic flights. Furthermore, cross-border services are also subject to higher airport user 
charges. At many major airports, there is a significant difference between passenger charges 
levied on domestic and cross-border traffic. For example, the current passenger charges levied 
on EU cross-border passengers at London Heathrow and Paris Charles de Gaulle are 
respectively 195% and 267% higher than those levied on domestic traffic. These differentials 
have been justified in order to cover the additional costs to the airport operator associated with 
the provision of passport control and customs facilities for cross-border traffic. They have 
been reduced in some countries like Germany, and would be expected to narrow further in the 
future. Indeed, the Commission is currently drafting a policy designed to regulate airport 
charges. 
5.7.4. EU air fares vs other world regions 
The average local European economy class normal air fare increased from USD 462 in 
September 1992 to USD 500 in September 1994 [ICAO, 1992 and 1995]. Using these ICAO 
data from a large sample of routes, the 1994 level was compared to international fares in 16 
other world regions, adjusting for variations in average city-pair distance by a simple 
regression of fare against distance. This gave a good fit (r2 of 0.91), with the actual 1994 local 
European fare being 42% above the level predicted by the regression equation. By contrast, 
air fares between Canada, the US and Mexico were 14% below their predicted levels. The 
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September 1992 actual local European fare level was 45% above the level predicted by a 
similar regression equation. Thus, the local European normal economy fare levels, when 
adjusted for sector distance, have fallen somewhat in relation to international air fares in other 
world regions. Over the same period, air fares between Canada, the US and Mexico, a region 
that was also recently liberalized, moved higher in relation to their predicted levels. 
Local European normal economy air fares in September 1985 were only 8% above the level 
predicted by the fare vs distance model for that year [ICAO, 1985]. The apparent deterioration 
in European fares between 1985 and 1992 was caused largely by a strengthening of the ECU 
against the USD (by 41%), which did not reflect changes in differential growth rates in 
consumer prices in the US and Europe. After allowing for this distortion, European air fares 
would be significantly higher than those of comparable sector length in North America. 
The conclusion from this analysis is that European fare levels appear significantly higher in 
recent years than would be expected given their average sector distance and international 
nature, but this is largely due to the overvalued European exchange rates. Other reasons for 
the differences could be variations in traffic density, which would determine the potential for 
competition, and variations in costs such as airport charges or fuel prices. 
5.7.5. Airline yields 
The trend in average total yield (passengers plus cargo) on intra­European routes is shown in 
Figure 5.17. The yield, expressed in real terms, has clearly declined since 1991. This is due to 
a number of factors including an increase in the level of fare competition among carriers (see 
Section 5.7), a change in traffic mix, lower unit costs and the effects of the economic 
recession. 
Figure 5.17. IATA international scheduled services within Europe, 1989­94 (yield in 
1994 prices) 
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Source: IATA, Airline Economic Results and Prospects. 
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To focus the analysis of yield on EU carriers' intra-European passenger operations, yield data 
reported to the AEA were used for more detailed analysis. However, such data are available 
up to 1992 only, and include the European operations of some airlines based outside the EU 
such as Swissair. After 1992, certain member airlines of the AEA decided that yield 
information should be withheld as being commercially sensitive, particularly for those that 
were governed by strict stock exchange reporting requirements. 
Figure 5.18 illustrates the trend in the EU for three intermediate years over the period from 
1985-92. There appear to be mixed trends amongst carriers: overall yields increased in real 
terms from 1985 to 1988, and just kept pace with inflation between 1988 and 1992. However, 
since 1992, the AEA indicates that average passenger yields per passenger (and not per 
passenger-km) for all their members have declined in constant price terms by 5.7% in 1993 
and 3.1% in 1994. 
Figure 5.18. Passenger yields per passenger-km, geographic Europe, by EU airline, 
1985/88/92 (in 1985 prices) 
Passenger Yield per Passenger Km 
Geographic Europe- in 1985 Prices 
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Source: AEA (geographic Europe includes all international routes originating and terminating within Europe (including 
Turkey and the CIS up to 55°E), the Azores, the Canary Islands and Madeira. 
Table 5.16. Trends in European promotional fare usage and discounts 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 (provisional) 
Promotional fare 
as % of full fare 
58.0 
56.5 
57.0 
57.0 
57.0 
54.0 
54.0 
51.0 
48.6 
48.3 
49.2 
Promotional passengers 
as % of total passengers 
60.5 
61.0 
61.5 
62.0 
62.0 
63.0 
64.0 
67.0 
70.1 
71.7 
70.9 
Source: AEA Yearbooks. 
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As mentioned above, declining yields in recent years are caused partly by a change in traffic 
mix, and also by changes in fare structure. 
Table 5.16 reveals that in addition to the dilutionary effect of an increased share of passengers 
travelling on promotional fares, the average discount increased, both developments 
accelerating in the period since 1990. A small reversal of these trends was evident in 1995, 
although this is based on preliminary data. 
Yields appear to have declined in recent years in Europe mainly as a result of changes in fare 
structure, initiated by increased competition in European liberalized markets. This is 
supported by the survey of 18 EU carriers of which a large proportion (77%) indicated that EU 
measures affected their pricing (see Appendix B). 
5.8. Profitability and sources of finance 
The factors affecting airline profitability are complex and many are unrelated to liberalization. 
However, it may be possible to draw some conclusions about the effect on airline profitability 
of the moves towards the creation of the single market from the analyses of unit costs and 
revenues (see Sections 5.5 and 5.6). 
Figure 5.19 shows the worsening profit situation on intra-European routes, following a 
profitable year in 1989. A return to profit at the operating level occurred in 1994 (although an 
overall loss was reported after interest charges), a trend which has continued. 
Figure 5.19. IATA international scheduled services within Europe, 1989-94: 
operating ratio 
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Source: IATA, Airline Economic Results and Prospects. 
The financing of airlines and aircraft acquisitions may also be affected by liberalization, quite 
apart from the increased cost of finance resulting from privatization. The US deregulation 
experience has shown that airline earnings have become more volatile, which in turn increases 
risk and the expected returns from investors in the industry. However, for the European 
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industry there are still few airlines which are not controlled by governments, and few years of 
data upon which to base an analysis of the effects of liberalization on finance, privatization 
and liberalization. 
A recent report concluded that there were huge differences within Europe from country to 
country with regard to the regulatory environment for airline finance [Jet Finance SA, 1994]. 
Their recommendations included the harmonization of such areas as accounting standards, 
taxation, leasing regulations, as well as actions such as setting up an EU-wide aircraft and 
aircraft mortgage register. 
5.9. Environmental impact 
Environmental issues concerning air transport and government-imposed regulations covering 
these issues concern noise and pollution. While noise has a local impact, aircraft pollution has 
a more long-term global impact, not least because most of the products of combustion are 
distributed higher in the atmosphere where the effects are less well understood. However, it 
ought to be mentioned that the transitory contribution of air transport industry operations to 
total global air pollution, based on the existing knowledge, is very small, producing for 
example around 3% of the global carbon dioxide (CO2). Other emissions such as oxides of 
nitrogen (e.g. NOx) are perhaps more of à problem for the industry, and measures to reduce 
NOx (for example with CFM's new A320 engines ordered by Swissair) tend to increase fuel 
burn and CO2 emissions. 
As discussed in Section 5.7.5, the reduction in yield caused by the changes in the mix of traffic 
in favour of passengers travelling on promotional and discount fares, played an important role 
in generating a higher number of passengers than would have been the case if European 
markets had not been liberalized. It was also argued that such an increase in the level of 
demand was met by an even faster growth in capacity. Such an increase in capacity coupled 
with trends in aircraft downsizing have clearly resulted in a greater number of aircraft 
movements in the European liberalized markets than would have been the case under the 
previous regulatory regimes. A larger number of aircraft movements probably means more 
aircraft emissions and noise, although operations by two new fuel efficient smaller aircraft 
such as the Fokker 100 or Airbus 320 may be roughly equivalent to a single Airbus A300 or 
Lockheed Tristar. 
However, regulatory bodies both at regional and international level have responded to the 
environmental impact of aircraft operations by imposing regulations on aircraft noise and, to 
some extent, emissions. In conjunction with discussions on more stringent noise rules than 
ICAO Annex 16 Chapter 3, the European Commission has been considering requiring aircraft 
to meet NO, standards that are 20% lower than those recommended by ICAO in November 
1993. At the same time the airlines appear to have responded to the environmental impact of 
their operation by adopting quieter aircraft with more fuel efficient engines which take greater 
account of emission standards. Replies to the questionnaire distributed to airlines as part of 
this study revealed that 16 of the 18 EU carriers responding have seen their operations affected 
by environmental considerations. 
5.10. Summary of the impact of EU measures 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of the sector-specific EU measures on the 
development of air services, traffic, fares and economics. These developments were evaluated 
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over a period from the mid-1980s up to 1995 (or the most recent year for which data were 
available), principally: 
(a) number of cross-border routes operated; 
(b) average frequencies and seats offered; 
(c) average carriers per route and capacity concentration; 
(d) passenger and cargo traffic; 
(e) airline alliances and code sharing; 
(f) productivity and costs; 
(g) air fares and yields. 
While it may be too early to evaluate the full impact of EU measures, particularly the third 
package, since 1992 there has been an increase in the growth of new routes operated within the 
EU. This was due both to the introduction of non-stop connections between such regional 
points as Billund and Birmingham, as well as the redesignation as scheduled of a number of 
German charter services to Spain. It seems likely that there was some net benefit in terms of 
choice of non-stop destinations, taking into account developments for the control group of 
countries. 
The number of seats offered also expanded over the period, and the average frequencies 
operated increased between 1989 and 1992, although declining between 1992 and 1995. 
However, they will still be higher in 1995 than in 1989. It can be concluded from this that 
some frequency competition occurred in the first period, but more recently average frequencies 
have been diluted by the introduction of the below average frequency (around two departures a 
day) air services described in the previous section. 
The number of carriers per route, and carrier concentration have implications for consumer 
choice and competition. Here the picture is not particularly encouraging, partly because of the 
introduction of single carrier regional routes, and also because the entry of new competitors to 
the denser routes has been limited to particular cases (e.g. British Midland and EBA in 
Belgium). On the other hand, the consumer did gain from the availability of more non-stop 
services between regional cities. 
Passenger traffic has increased over the period of recession of the early 1990s at a much faster 
pace than would be expected from the GDP growth in EU countries. Overall, European air 
traffic was around 20% higher over the period 1992-94 than it would otherwise have been. 
This was due largely to more passengers being attracted by discount fares, and larger discounts 
being offered compared to the full fare, as well as greater availability and awareness of such 
offers. Airlines were able to manage yields and seat inventories better through computer 
driven revenue management systems, but the more competitive European environment gave 
them greater incentive to do this. 
Comprehensive air cargo traffic, including traffic carried by integrated carriers, was not 
available, and a significant amount of cargo now travels between airports by truck. However, 
there is evidence that the measures have encouraged strong growth in air cargo, particularly in 
express parcels. 
Alliance and code sharing activity also increased over the period, but this was more to 
improve economies of scope and global network coverage than to compete in intra-EU 
markets. 
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EU carriers have made some progress in reducing costs, although the gap between EU and US 
carriers is not narrowing. Labour costs have been reduced by many airlines, mainly through a 
reduction in staff numbers and productivity gains, rather than through salary reductions. Some 
outsourcing has probably helped this trend. These efforts have been helped by reduced fuel 
prices in real terms, but many infrastructure costs such as en-route navigation charges remain 
high - and increasing - relative to other world regions. In addition to the liberalization of 
European air transport markets, international competition from airlines of other regions, 
economic recession and the resulting poor financial performance of airlines have all applied 
pressure on airlines to reduce costs. While it proved impossible to evaluate the contribution 
from each, the results of the airline survey indicated that EU measures had played an important 
part in efforts towards cost reduction. 
Intra-EU air fare developments show contrasting trends: fully flexible and club class fares 
have increased, while promotional and conditional fares have fallen. Thus airlines have 
pursued strategies of price discrimination, as was the early experience in both US [Meyer et al. 
1981] and Australian [Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, 1995] air 
transport markets following deregulation. The overall benefit of this has been larger numbers 
of people benefiting from lower fares; the effect on full fares suggests that there has been 
limited competition for the business passenger, with a notable absence of price wars for this 
market segment, for whatever reason. It could be concluded that EU measures have 
encouraged airlines to compete more vigorously for leisure passengers, but competition for 
full fare passengers has been more through level of service and product innovation. 
There are still significant variations in intra-EU fares on a directional basis, and between intra-
EU and domestic fares. The first difference will only disappear if airlines allow cross-border 
ticketing, while the second should fall over time. 
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6. Airline case studies 
Case studies were carried out on five EU airlines, each representing in broad terms a type of 
carrier, defined in terms of ownership and range of operations. The airlines selected were: 
(a) Air France, 
(b) British Airways, 
(c) Eurowings, 
(d) Maersk Air, 
(e) TAP Air Portugal. 
The case study reports can be found in Appendix F. Summaries of the reports follow in this 
section: these focus on the airlines' responses to the single market. Table 6.1 summarizes the 
use made by the five carriers of opportunities opened by the liberalization packages in Europe, 
as well as other tactics not directly facilitated by the three packages, but which carriers have 
used to establish markets on new routes and to increase or maintain their share on established 
routes. 
Table 6.1. Case study airlines: methods of increasing or maintaining market share 
Air France 
state-owned major 
British Airways 
privatized major 
Eurowings 
small regional 
Maersk Air 
charter ^scheduled 
TAP Air Portugal 
smaller national carrier 
Use of liberalization packages 
New routes 
Consecutive 
cabotage 
Very 
limited 
Limited 
None 
None 
Limited 
Third & 
Fourth 
Freedoms 
Limited 
Limited 
Moderate 
Extensive 
Moderate 
Fifth 
Freedom 
Limited 
Limited 
None 
None 
Moderate 
Pricing 
Limited 
Extensive 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Limited 
Protection 
Public service 
obligation 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Yes 
Other tactics 
Code 
sharing 
Extensive 
Very 
extensive 
Extensive 
Extensive 
Limited 
Airline 
acquisitions 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
6.1. Air France 
Air France is a state-owned major carrier. The basis of the carrier's response to the single 
European market has been expansion to ensure that it maintains a strategic European and 
world position prior to an eventual consolidation of the European airline industry, considered 
inevitable by Air France. Network expansion was achieved by a mixture of organic growth, 
alliances, and acquisitions. At the same time the fleet grew rapidly with the addition of new 
aircraft. This took place in spite of worsening finances and at a time when the economic 
recession and the Gulf War were adversely affecting the company's traffic and yields. Drastic 
cost-cutting exercises were needed to rescue the carrier, creating labour unrest and 
demoralizing the workforce. The airline has been unable to combine in a cohesive strategy the 
airline resources it acquired, and has been forced to divest itself of a number of them. Air 
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France finds it difficult to take advantage of its extensive world network to build a Paris hub 
because of the lack of domestic feed into Paris Charles de Gaulle. 
Air France took only limited advantage of the opportunities opened by the third package. 
Some Fifth Freedom routes were initiated. Pricing freedom has been used, but the airline's 
relatively poor yield management system has meant that this has not had a positive effect on 
yield. 
State aid was required to rescue the company, approved by the Commission subject to 
conditions, some of which have prevented the carrier from integrating fully and marketing 
successfully the operations of Air Inter. 
6.2. British Airways 
British Airways was privatized almost ten years before the adoption of the first package. It 
thus passed through a major restructuring process well in advance of the introduction of the 
three packages of liberalization, and wider economic events have had a greater impact on its 
operations and strategy than the EU single market process. The airline has striven to maintain 
its competitive position not only within the European context, but also among North American 
and Asian airlines. The passenger feed from the non-European markets through London into 
the airline's European network gives British Airways a particular advantage over most of its 
European competitors. The three packages have had little effect on the airline outside the 
freedom to price its product competitively, providing it with the opportunity to employ its 
yield management system to great success. British Airways has responded to the more 
competitive environment with a search for size and the development of new marketing 
strategies. Network expansion has resulted from organic growth, major shareholdings in EU 
carriers and in airlines elsewhere, franchising and other forms of alliance. 
British Airways is profitable and confident. It sees as anti-competitive the infusion of state aid 
to the weaker EU airlines. 
6.3. Eurowings 
Eurowings is a privately owned regional airline, formed by the merger between two regional 
carriers in 1992. The initial focus was on the German domestic market, but high costs and 
increasing intermodal competition made the market less attractive. The airline has since 
switched its attention to cross-border services in niche markets where yields are higher. 
Alliances with major carriers have been a key to success on these routes. Eurowings has 
increased its activity in the charter market, again as a niche operator from regional German 
airports. 
The airline has found pricing flexibility made possible in the third package an important 
marketing tool. Network expansion did not generally benefit from the EU liberalization 
process, but the freedoms opened by the process will be important in establishing routes to and 
from Austria. In fact consecutive cabotage of EU carriers in Germany has had a significant, 
and negative, impact on Eurowing's operations on some domestic routes. 
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6.4. Maersk Air 
Maersk is a privately owned carrier based in Denmark. The airline began scheduled 
international operations between Copenhagen and London in 1984, under the 1983 Regional 
Directive. Prior to this, operations had been mainly charter services. The airline prepared for 
the single market, expanding its network by buying a shareholding in a UK carrier, which also 
facilitated the moving of its UK operation from Southend airport to London Gatwick. Maersk 
now fully owns a UK subsidiary which operates under a franchise agreement with British 
Airways. 
The airline continues to operate a substantial charter programme: it is not clear if the 
development of its international services is made possible by cross-subsidization from the 
charter side of the business. 
Maersk's strategy in scheduled operations appears to be that of establishing niche operations 
away from the SAS dominated hub of Copenhagen. Thus, most growth in terms of 
international destinations has been from Billund. Obviously, this strategy has been assisted by 
the third package. Although regulatory barriers have been removed, the airline has found that 
other barriers such as slot availability at major airports are effective constraints. 
6.5. TAP Air Portugal 
TAP is a state-owned carrier operating intercontinental and European routes from a base on 
the periphery of Europe. It has been technically bankrupt, and, in a normal commercial world 
without government ownership, by now would have ceased operations. The airline has not 
made extensive use of the opportunities offered by the three packages. The only direct benefit 
gained from the initial relaxation of constraints was the opening of Fifth Freedom routes to 
serve thin markets which could not otherwise be served in an economical way from Lisbon. 
Very limited use has been made of consecutive cabotage opportunities, in common with most 
other carriers. Code sharing, a marketing tactic increasingly used by TAP, appears to be an 
evolutionary product of the market rather than a direct result of European liberalization. TAP 
did not have a cost base low enough, or a yield management system sufficiently sophisticated, 
to allow it to make profitable use of free pricing. 
The airline divested itself of the obligation to operate unprofitable domestic services to the 
Azores and Madeira, but then successfully re-applied to serve the routes under public service 
obligation rules, with a subsidy from the Portuguese state. 
Throughout the 1980s, rather than follow the more reasonable road of reducing the cost 
burden, the airline pursued a course of route expansion, in Europe and elsewhere. The 
reasoning appears to have been to spread costs: the additional seat-kilometres generated, 
however, could not be filled in a profitable way. The airline was overstaffed, and flew a fleet 
of inadequate composition across a network that was too ambitious. The Portuguese state 
recognized that its national carrier, already technically bankrupt, was not going to recover 
without radical restructuring which would address the need to cut costs and rationalize the 
network. The European Commission approved this action, subject to some conditions. The 
airline is making progress towards the performance objectives it set itself, but these may not 
be achieved within the specified period. 
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7. Conclusions and policy implications 
The purpose of this review has been to examine developments in the EU air transport market 
structure and performance which can be traced back to Community initiated or Community 
inspired changes in the regulatory framework for Community air transport. These were 
discussed in Chapter 3 of the study, with the three packages introduced between January 1988 
and January 1993 being the most significant measures. These have opened up access to, and 
freed pricing for, cross-border services and led to the liberalization of domestic markets, a 
process which will be completed in 1997. 
It would have been unrealistic to expect the degree of competition now apparent in the US 
domestic air transport market to be evident in Europe in such a short space of time, given the 
US's long history of social and cultural integration, and the fact that it deregulated its air 
transport markets over 15 years ago. Secondly, a large part of intra-EU air travel is carried out 
by charter airlines, and this was already liberalized on a bilateral basis before the single market 
measures. This leisure or price-sensitive segment of the industry would perhaps have been 
expected to benefit most from such measures. This chapter summarizes the progress towards 
a single market in air transport by reviewing the impact of the measures in terms of changes in 
airline strategies and market structure, focusing mainly on the scheduled sector. It also 
highlights the remaining barriers to the full exploitation of the single market, concluding with 
the implications of such barriers for EU air transport policy, as well as the implications for 
consumers. 
7.1. Progress towards a single market in air transport 
Progress towards a single market in air transport has been assessed by a review, supported by 
case studies, of airline strategic developments following from, and in anticipation of, the three 
EU air transport packages and other sector-specific measures. It has also been evaluated 
through an analysis of developments in air services, traffic, productivity, air fares and costs 
and profitability. 
Three types of strategic response were identified, which could be summarized as first, the 
blocking strategy, second, going for expansion and greater economies of scope, and third, 
aiming for a more focused competitive stance. Airlines in northern Europe, for example 
KLM, Lufthansa and British Airways, have all made a successful transition from state-owned 
public utility to market-orientated enterprise by pursuing a combination of these strategies. 
All three, particularly KLM, have responded very much to global competition, with BA and 
Lufthansa also active in protecting home and, to a lesser extent, EU markets. EU measures 
have contributed to these strategies, but have not played a major role. For other, smaller 
airlines, such as two of the airlines studied in greater detail in the case studies, Maersk Air and 
TAP, EU markets are much more important. For these airlines the measures have played a 
larger part. 
Examples of less successful strategies have been Iberia's global strategy of South American 
airline investments, and Air France's Sabena and CSA share purchases which were 
subsequently unwound. Air France, however, did undertake some fairly vigorous blocking 
strategies through its acquisition of UTA, which gave it control of Air Inter, although this does 
not so far appear to have been very effective. An increasing number of alliances and code 
sharing agreements were concluded by European airlines, but many of these were more global 
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that intra-EU in scope. Two that did have an impact on intra-EU competition were those 
between Lufthansa and SAS, which was allowed after the European Commission imposed 
conditions, and between Swissair, Austrian and Sabena. While both were again more global 
in nature, they tended to restrict competition on routes between their respective countries, 
without adding significant competition in other EU markets. 
Charter airlines have been somewhat cautious in entering scheduled markets in head-to-head 
competition with flag carriers in northern Europe, possibly because of some of the earlier 
experiences with this strategy. But they have converted some of their charter routes to 
scheduled routes and put more emphasis on direct sales of seat-only products. Southern 
European experience, however, indicates recent entry into scheduled domestic markets by a 
number of charter carriers. Overall, there has also been some tendency for these markets to 
become dominated by vertically integrated travel groups. 
It was concluded from the analysis of the impact of EU measures on airline operations that 
from 1993 there was an increase in the growth of new routes operated within the EU. This 
was due both to the introduction of non-stop connections between regional points, as well as 
the redesignation as scheduled of a number of German charter services to Spain. It seems 
likely that there was some net benefit for consumers in terms of choice of non-stop 
destinations, taking into account developments for the control group of countries. 
The new direct air services that were introduced between 1992 and 1994 were generally of 
relatively low frequency. This meant that the average frequencies operated per route declined 
over this period. However, the earlier period, 1989 to 1992, was characterized by greater 
frequency competition, as well as an increase in the number of effective competitors per route. 
Over the more recent period, the latter trend was reversed, with adverse implications for 
consumer choice and competition. Here the picture is not particularly encouraging, partly 
because of the introduction of single carrier regional routes mentioned above, but also because 
the entry of new competitors to the denser routes has been limited in number (e.g. British 
Midland at Heathrow, and EBA at Brussels). 
Passenger traffic has increased in the early 1990s, in spite of the economic downturn. Growth 
rates were higher than would be expected from the GDP growth of EU countries, and higher 
than had been experienced over the previous (early 1980s) recession. It can be concluded that 
European air traffic was approximately 20% higher over the period 1992 to 1994 than it would 
otherwise have been. This was principally due to the greater use made of reduced air fares and 
special offers, and through the more effective use of computer driven revenue management 
systems, encouraged by the more competitive European environment. 
In the early 1990s, EU carriers have been relatively successful in reducing costs, helped by 
stable or declining fuel costs. Reductions in staff numbers and productivity gains have led to 
lower staff costs for many EU airlines. However, airlines have been less successful in 
reducing salaries to sustainable market levels, and infrastructure costs in Europe remain high 
relative to other world regions. It is difficult to conclude that the liberalizaton of European air 
transport was solely responsible for these cost trends; international competition from airlines 
of other regions also played a part, as did the economic recession and the resulting poor 
financial performance. 
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There has been a greater emphasis on price discrimination by EU airlines, with the resulting 
trend of increased fully flexible fares, and declining promotional and conditional fares. It can 
be concluded that EU measures have encouraged airlines to compete more vigorously for leisure 
passengers through price, but competition for full fare passengers has been more through level of 
service (especially frequency) and product innovation (for example, airport lounges). 
7.2. Remaining single market barriers in air transport 
7.2.1. Sector-specific measures and related barriers 
Any remaining barriers were identified in the light of the industry developments analysed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, which suggested that, in addition to legal and administrative barriers, there 
could also be problems for new entrant airlines attempting to reach a large enough size to 
benefit from economies of scale and scope. Barriers have also been identified from 
questionnaire responses from 18 EU airlines and seven EU air transport administrations, as 
well as interviews with German, French and UK aviation experts, and the UK Air Transport 
Users Council (see Appendix B). 
Taking action to prevent EU airlines becoming too large relative to EU markets, however, may 
limit the degree to which EU airlines can compete on a global scale against the larger US and 
Asian carriers. In fact, many EU airlines see themselves competing in a global marketplace, 
and form alliances or code sharing arrangements to increase their effectiveness in this respect. 
Code sharing, on the one hand, allows airlines to serve markets that legal barriers might 
prevent them serving, and, on the other hand, helps to remove those barriers on a world, rather 
than just an EU scale. As with franchising, code sharing can work both to increase 
competition, by allowing smaller airlines some benefits of economies of scope, but also to 
reduce competition by combining the services of two potential competitors. 
The following list summarizes the barriers that remain, ranked according to the importance 
given to them by both airlines and aviation authorities (expressed in the questionnaire 
responses shown in Appendix B, and summarized in Figure 7.1), from most important to least 
important: 
(a) The lack of peak hour slots at many major airports makes the entry of new carriers on 
the densest routes, where competition would be most viable, almost impossible. It also 
inhibits niche carriers from serving regional routes. The regulation on slot allocation, in 
accepting grandfather rights, has done little to alleviate this. 
(b) Frequent flyer programmes (FFPs) give large carriers a major competitive advantage 
over small new entrants. This is reinforced by franchising agreements which tie many 
smaller carriers into one or other larger airline's FFP. 
(c) Approval by the Commission of state aid with inadequate conditions has enabled high 
cost and unprofitable airlines to continue to operate in markets from which they might 
otherwise have withdrawn. This has distorted competition. 
(d) The marketing and administrative costs of entering international airline markets on any 
significant scale are high, and pose significant barriers to effective market entry. Some 
smaller carriers also experience administrative costs in bringing potential problems to 
the Commission's attention, and have suffered disproportionately from delays in taking 
corrective action. 
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(e) The reluctance of some states to implement the existing regulations, particularly in the 
early stages of the liberalization process, has hindered carriers from taking advantage of 
opportunities that are intended to be available, e.g. Italian resistance to Lufthansa 
consecutive cabotage operations, or Greek delays in processing applications for licences 
and aircraft operator's certificates. 
(f) Airline alliances make it more difficult for smaller airlines or new entrants successfully 
to enter established city-pair markets. However, they are an essential means for EU 
carriers to maintain or enhance their global competitive position. 
(g) The use of override commissions (i.e. high extra commission usually based on sales 
volumes) or other incentives by large carriers gives new entrants a competitive 
disadvantage in selling through travel agents. 
(h) Vertical integration between charter airlines and major tour operators within the same 
country makes new entry into that country's charter market difficult for other 
Community airlines or indeed start-up airlines from that country. Such markets are, 
however, already highly competitive. 
Often the barriers are more powerful in combination: for example, frequent flyer programmes 
and override commissions, taken together, can be a strong deterrent to entry by new airlines. 
Only four of the 18 airline respondents mentioned user charges as a barrier. This might have 
concerned the level of airport and ATC charges in Europe, which for regional operators 
amount to a high percentage of costs per passenger. They may also have had in mind airport 
pricing policies which offer volume discounts only achievable by the national flag carrier (e.g. 
Brussels and Lisbon), or involve high flat rate charges for runway use (e.g. Heathrow) which 
raise user charges for new entrants, who typically operate with smaller aircraft than 
incumbents. These discourage new entry, but are not very significant over the EU as a whole. 
Only one airline out of 18 specifically mentioned ground handling monopolies as a barrier to 
entry; these distort competition through discriminatory pricing, discriminatory quality of 
service and make sensitive information available to the handling agent, who may be an airline 
competitor. Such issues are being addressed in the forthcoming Commission Directive, albeit 
on a gradual basis. (Council Directive 96/67/EC came into force following the completion of 
this study.) 
None of the respondents to the questionnaires mentioned pricing as a barrier, with many 
stressing the positive impact of the flexibility and lack of administrative requirements. 
However, open pricing has enabled incumbent airlines to match selectively or undercut any 
low fares introduced by new entrant airlines, and could be considered to make market entry by 
the latter more difficult. The question of whether such selective pricing is predatory has been 
defined by the Commission with reference to variable costs, but would be difficult to enforce 
in practice. From the questionnaires received, five administrations had referred such predatory 
pricing cases to the European Commission, while two had not. 
Other distortions to the single market are related to the interdependence of the EU air transport 
markets with world-wide markets. First, bilaterals with third countries do not allow for 
ownership of designated airlines by nationals of other Community countries (i.e. the concept 
of a Community Air Carrier is not accepted). This limits the scope for competition on routes 
to third countries and for cross-border mergers. 
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Second, differences in bilaterals with third countries distort competition between carriers 
within the single market, as some carriers have access to profitable, protected markets, whilst 
other carriers face competition in all their major markets. 
Figure 7.1. Importance of various barriers to entry 
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Source: Airline questionnaire responses (Appendix B). 
7.2.2. Horizontal measures and related barriers 
Very significant progress has been made towards the completion of the single market in the 
Community, and this has had both a real and a psychological effect on trade and commerce in 
general. It was impossible, however, to quantify such impact on intra­EU air transport. 
Estimates have been made of the boost that all measures have had on Community GDP, and 
even if this were as low as an incremental effect of 1 % a year, this would have generated an 
additional million or so scheduled passengers a year. In addition, this would have generated a 
substantial number of additional charter passengers. 
In many of the more specific areas, however, such as the rate of VAT charged on domestic air 
travel, or social conditions and charges, EU harmonization measures have yet to be 
introduced. In these areas, benefits are still to come, but in the meantime certain distortions 
will be present in air transport as in other industries. 
Views as to the importance of EU horizontal measures on the air transport industry were 
obtained from airline and aviation authority questionnaire responses. The following 
summarizes the importance that respondents attached to them, ranked from most important to 
least important: 
(a) Differences in social costs between Member States: these have a significant distorting 
effect on labour costs and differences in taxation can distort costs more generally. 
Seventeen out of 25 airlines attached some importance to this, with 11 of these reporting 
a significant impact. 
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(b) The single EU currency: Sixteen out of 25 respondents would expect the introduction 
of a single currency in Europe to have at least some impact, with nine suggesting a 
significant impact. 
(c) Corporate taxation: Fifteen out of 25 attached some importance to differences in 
corporate taxation within the EU, five of them reporting these differences as being very 
significant. 
(d) Barriers to trade: Fourteen out of 25 thought that the removal of trade barriers, 
customs formalities etc. would have some impact, with eight reporting a significant 
impact. 
(e) Variations in rates of indirect taxation: Eleven cited this as having some impact, and 
six a significant impact; this applies specifically to the large variation in VAT applied to 
domestic air travel, ranging from zero to 15%. 
Other related areas mentioned were company law and accounting system variations (three 
giving this a high importance, and eight some importance), and public procurement (with three 
and six respectively). Not mentioned in the survey, but of potential importance, are the 
benefits that other competitive modes of transport receive from subsidies and EU funding. 
These effects can be felt in some domestic markets (e.g. Spain and France), where private 
airlines compete with heavily subsidized rail services. 
7.3. Consumer impacts 
An alternative way of looking at the impact of the EU air transport measures is to see what 
effect they have had on consumers. Economic theory would suggest that improvements in the 
single market for air transport would lead to benefits to consumers in terms of service levels 
(including more direct services), choice of airline and air fares. These benefits have been 
assessed mainly for the scheduled intra-EU markets, rather than the charter markets which had 
already been largely liberalized (although charter carriers have more recently been catering 
increasingly for the seat-only market, giving consumers greater flexibility). After examining 
the service level and fare impacts, the benefits from increased air travel are assessed, followed 
by some discussion of other issues such as denied boarding and CRSs. 
Passengers clearly benefited from access to a larger number of destinations by scheduled non-
stop flights. This was due to more flights between regional cities, but also because of a 
change of designation to scheduled of a number of charters, particularly out of Germany. 
EU measures did not have any downward effect on fully flexible fares which tended to 
increase even faster than the consumer price index over the whole period of liberalization 
measures; however, they reduced the level and increased the range of promotional fares. Both 
the level of discount from the fully flexible fare and the number of passengers taking 
advantage of such discounts have increased between 1985 and 1994, with a small reversal of 
this trend being evident in 1995. 
A combination of service level improvements and greater use of deeper discount promotional 
fares had the combined effect of increasing the number of European scheduled passengers in 
1994 above the level predicted purely by GDP by 25%, or by an additional 14.6 million 
passengers (see model in Section 5.2.3). Some of this traffic might have been diverted from 
surface transport or air charters, but a significant part would have been additional traffic 
generated. 
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The evidence set out above suggests that users appear to have benefited from the strategic 
responses of incumbent carriers and from market entry which have resulted in greater variety 
and choice. The EU liberalization process was designed to avoid as much as possible some of 
the instabilities that occurred in the US, although there were some larger airline failures (e.g. 
German Wings, Dan Air, and Air Europe) which occurred in the earlier days of liberalization. 
But new entrants have provided, and continue to provide, a stimulus to innovation. Demand 
has been stimulated, particularly on French, Italian and Spanish domestic services, on the 
Ireland-UK market, and where airlines with more appropriate cost structures have opened up 
previously non-viable low-density services. 
There is little evidence that pre-existing economic benefits have been lost (i.e. through the 
large-scale permanent withdrawal of services, or disproportionate increases in fares). The one 
benefit which has declined is the automatic acceptance by one airline of another airline's 
tickets (especially for promotional fares), but this needs to be viewed in the light of overall 
choice of carrier and the increased network scope offered by many airlines, and lower fares. 
Discussions with one air transport consumer body did not reveal any increase in the level of 
complaints from air transport users. 
7.4. Policy implications 
Given that by the end of 1997 the one remaining restriction on intra-EU operations will have 
been removed, the most important barrier remaining to the completion of the single market in 
air transport is access to airport slots, which inhibits entry both from new airlines, and larger 
airlines that already operate some services from an airport. This is being addressed currently 
by the Commission, but it is difficult to see a solution that does not involve either confiscation 
or some form of auction (or better still where possible investment in expanding airport 
capacity). An auction has the advantage of not requiring procedures for confiscation, and may 
not be the barrier to new entrants that has often been claimed. 
The second most important problem has been the very large sums of money going to some 
airlines in the form of state aid. This has clearly distorted the single market and presents 
considerable potential problems of unfair price competition. So far this has not happened on a 
very significant scale in intra-EU markets as a whole. Cross-subsidization could be a problem 
also, and this is being addressed within the EU by the phasing out of monopoly rights such as 
ground handling concessions. Cross-subsidization of EU services from profits earned on 
protected long-haul markets could only be dealt with by increasing competition on these 
routes, something that can be done now only on an individual country basis. More rigorous 
monitoring of state aid conditions is thus recommended, as well as changing those conditions 
where necessary as the market situation changes. 
A similar approach to cross-subsidization would be necessary in areas such as alliances, code 
sharing and FFPs. These can be grouped together as tending to reduce competition and 
increasing barriers to entry in intra-EU markets, but increasing competition in global markets. 
Addressing this on a purely single market basis might not lead to the best overall outcome. 
Many of the other benefits that have yet to accrue from the single market are related to 
horizontal measures. These include the harmonization of taxation and social policies in 
member countries. This would ensure that the key airline input markets such as labour, capital 
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and goods and services were more competitive, a position that some of them do not yet 
approach. 
Greater efficiency and the lower cost provision of air transport infrastructure, such as airport 
and air traffic services, would also reduce the cost of operating air services. The Commission 
involvement in these areas has so far been limited, but future action might be inevitable to 
encourage cross-border travel and commerce. 
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APPENDIX A 
Definitions of air transport terms 
Aircraft hours are the total number of aircraft block hours in revenue service, block hours 
being calculated from the moment the aircraft moves under its own power for purpose of flight 
until it comes to rest at the next point of landing. 
Aircraft kilometres are the sum of products obtained by multiplying the number of flights 
performed on each flight stage by the stage distance. 
Aircraft utilization is the average number of block hours that each aircraft is in use. 
Generally this is measured on a daily or annual basis. 
Average aircraft capacity is obtained by dividing available tonne-kilometres by aircraft 
kilometres flown. 
Available seat-kilometres (ASKs) are obtained by multiplying the number of seats available 
for sale on each flight stage by flight stage distance. 
Average passenger haul is obtained by dividing revenue passenger kilometres flown by the 
number of passengers. 
Average stage length is obtained by dividing aircraft kilometres flown by number of aircraft 
departures for each airline; it is the weighted average of stage/sector lengths flown by an 
airline. 
Available tonne-kilometres (ATKs) are obtained by multiplying the number of tonnes of 
capacity available for carriage of passengers and cargo on each sector of a flight by flight stage 
distance. 
Block time (hours) is the time for each flight stage or sector, measured from when the aircraft 
leaves the airport gate or stand (chocks off) to when it arrives on the gate or stand at the 
destination airport (chocks on). 
Operating costs per ATK is a measure obtained by dividing total operating costs by ATKs. 
It includes flight operating expenses, sales ticketing and promotional costs, ground operations 
costs and general and administration costs. It usually excludes interest payments, but includes 
aircraft lease rentals. 
Operating ratio is the operating revenue expressed as a percentage of operating costs. 
Passenger load factor is passenger-kilometres expressed as a percentage of available seat-
kilometres. 
Revenue passenger-kilometres (RPKs) are obtained by multiplying the number of fare 
paying passengers on each flight stage by flight stage distance. 
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Revenue tonne-kilometres (RTKs) are obtained by multiplying the total number of tonnes of 
passengers and cargo carried on each flight stage by flight stage distance. Passenger tonne-
kilometres are normally calculated on standard basis of 90 kg average weight, including free 
and excess baggage. 
Scheduled freight yields are obtained by dividing total revenue from scheduled freight by 
RTK from freight. 
Scheduled passenger yields are obtained by dividing the total scheduled passenger revenue 
by RTK from passengers. 
Seat factor or passenger load factor on a single sector is obtained by expressing the 
passengers carried as a percentage of the seats available for sale; on a network of routes it is 
obtained by expressing the total passenger-kms as a percentage of the total seat-kms available. 
Seat pitch is the standard way of measuring seat density on an aircraft. It is the distance 
between the back of one seat and the same point on the back of the seat in front. 
Unit costs are obtained by dividing total operating costs by ATKs. 
Weight load factor is revenue tonne-kilometres performed expressed as a percentage of 
available tonne-kilometres. 
Yields are obtained by dividing the total operating revenue by RTKs. 
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Market access 
The 1944 Chicago Convention provided a framework within which states could negotiate 
bilaterally the provision of air services. Except for Fifth Freedom, whose applicability has 
always been heavily restricted, these bilateral agreements referred to traffic between two 
contracting countries. 
AIR FREEDOM 
RIGHTS 
FIRST FREEDOM 
To overfly one country en-route to another . s' 
Home Country 
SECOND FREEDOM 
To make a technical stop in another country ι s' 
Home Country 
THIRn FRFFDOM 
To carry passengers from the home country to another ι y ' 
country 1 
Home Country 
FOURTH FRFFDOM 
To carry passengers to the home country from ι ^ ^ 
another country I 
Home Country 
FIFTH FREEDOM . . -■ -
To carry passengers between two countries by an | 
airline ot a third country on route with origin/ | 
destination in its home country Home Country 
SIXTH FREEDOM 
airline of a third country on two routes connecting in its ι / ^ 
home country I A 
Country A 
SEVENTH FREEDOM 
To carry passengers between two countries by an 
airline of a third country on two routes connecting in its ι 
home country 1 
Home Country 
EIGHTH FREEDOM OR CABOTAGE 
To carry passengers within a country by an airline of 
another country on a route with origin/destination in its ι . . · ' ι 
home country 1 1 
Home Country 
TRUE DOMESTIC S^ 
Home 
| 
Country A 
\ ^ ^ ^ 1 
Country A 
~ \ 
Country A 
^ \ 
Country A 
• . * / 
Country A 
^ \ ^ / ^ 
Home Country 
^ ^ 
Country A 
~ / 
Cou 
\ ^ . · 
Country 
" \ | 
Country Β 
- \ 
Country Β 
^ ^ 1 
Country Β 
^ ^ 1 1 
Country Β 
\ ^ ι 
Country Β 
\ ^ ι 
itry A 
Optional 
1 1 
Country A 
Source: Association of European Airlines. 
The term 'Sixth Freedom' was coined to describe the combination of Third and Fourth, 
reflecting the reality of hub-and-spoke networks. More recently, Seventh and Eighth Freedoms 
have been quoted as potential opportunities for liberalization. 
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APPENDIX Β 
Air transport industry survey 
B.l. Approach to industry survey 
To fill the gaps in the data and information required to evaluate the 'effectiveness of single 
market integration in air transport', key officials of airlines and relevant civil aviation 
authorities were surveyed. The survey involved both postal questionnaires and interviews. The 
latter were also used since it is believed that the quality of data and information gathered 
would be richer, and a better insight into the developments of airlines and policies adopted by 
authorities would be gained. 
The questionnaire: The questionnaire structure and questions are shown on the following 
pages. The length and depth of the questionnaire was determined by data requirements and the 
need to limit the time needed to complete it. The questionnaire responses are shown in 
Appendix B.2. 
The interviewer: the interviews were carried out by members of the research team who are 
specialized in their field, and have particular knowledge of the countries and airlines 
concerned. 
The interview approach: once the appointment with the industry officials were made, a copy 
of the list of information required and any points that were to be discusseed in the course of 
the interview were sent to the interviewees (see following pages). This enabled the officials to 
give the matter some thought, arrange for appropriate staff to be present at the interview, and 
possibly gather the information and data required before the actual interview. 
B. 1.1. Civil aviation authorities 
Questionnaires were sent to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
Interviews were conducted with the UK, Germany and France. 
B.l.2. Airlines 
Questionnaires were sent to Aer Lingus, Air France,* Air Liberté, British Airways,* British 
Midland, Eurowings,* EBA, Finnair, Iberia, KLM, Lauda Air, LTU/LTE, Lufthansa, Maersk,* 
Meridiana, Olympic, Ryanair, Sabena, SAS, Spanair and TAP.* 
Interviews were conducted with British Airways, British Midland, Air France, Maersk, 
Eurowings and SAS (by phone). 
Case study airlines. 
114 Air transport 
B.l .3. Interview checklist - Airlines 
For each of the questions the interviewer will try (a) to establish the impact of EU measures on 
any development as opposed to other factors such as competition from international carriers 
outside EU and the economy, and (b) where possible, distinguish between the impact of the 
three liberalization packages. 
The following questions are to ensure that the interviewer will cover all the major areas. 
However, in the course of the interview other areas may also be explored. 
Search for size 
How important do you think the size of your airline is to allow you to compete effectively in 
EU markets and in global markets? 
Do you see concentration increasing on any part of your network? If yes, on which type of 
routes has concentration increased, and why? 
In your opinion, have the three EU packages encouraged airlines to adopt the following 
strategies? If yes, which package has had the most significant impact? 
(a) code sharing; 
(b) alliances; 
(c) franchising; 
(d) establishment of low-cost subsidiary. 
Have you experienced or do you encounter any conflict of interest between charter and 
scheduled operation, and why? Has the third EU package had any impact? 
Route developments 
What are the main factors driving your airline route strategy in Europe (e.g. competition, 
profitability, market share, long-haul feed, etc.)? 
Has your airline policy in relation to European route development changed since 1985? What 
are the reasons for these changes, if any? 
To what extent did the entry to or exit from any European market happen as a direct result of 
the EU three packages? If so, which package? 
Have you made use of consecutive cabotage rights so far, and would you use the unrestricted 
freedom available after 1997? 
Do you see cabotage right as a threat to your own airline's domestic services? 
Product developments 
Has your airline introduced changes in any of its products on European services ( e.g. check-
in facilities, in-flight services, baggage handling, airport lounges)? 
What have been the major changes? 
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What are the main reasons for these changes? Are they driven by the EU liberalization or 
other factors? 
Pricing strategies 
What are the developments in your airline pricing strategies with respect to European 
services? What has affected such developments? 
Are your domestic pricing strategies different from those applied to European cross-border 
services? If yes, specify how they differ. 
Are your European price strategies different from those of international routes outside the EU? 
If yes, specify how they differ. 
Would you say that in recent years your airline has increased fully flexible fares to compensate 
for low revenues from discounted fares? If yes, why? Have EU measures encouraged that? If 
yes, which measure has made the most significant impact? 
What is your relationship with wholesalers? Has your relationship strengthened in recent 
years? If yes, why? 
Who would you say are the price leaders in any of your European markets, and if so, which 
markets? 
What are the main factors driving your airline yields? What is the role of EU measures in that? 
Any specific measure? 
Would you or have you considered a simpler fare structure as a response to greater 
competition? If yes, on which European routes? 
Do you see the pricing freedoms that the third package has allowed in Europe as advantageous 
or not? What are the implications? 
Cost cutting 
What are the cost reduction policies adopted by your airline? 
Would you say that you have been successful in reducing operating costs? If so, in which 
areas? 
When did you start implementing your cost reduction policies? What obstacles did you meet? 
How has aircraft utilization developed in recent years and why? 
To what extent have cost reduction policies been driven by EU measures (specify which 
measure and on which costs category)? 
Are there any EU measures that you think have actually increased your costs? If so, specify the 
measure(s) and the cost category affected. 
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Labour issues 
How have staff numbers in your airline developed over the past few years: have there been any 
reductions? If yes, which categories of staff have been more affected? 
Have you increased the percentage of part-time staff employed? 
Have you increased the percentage of non-EU personnel? 
Have you implemented any changes in working conditions/rules? What are they? 
Have you implemented any changes in salary/wage levels? Can you explain? 
To what extent have EU liberalization packages encouraged the above? Specify which 
package/measures. 
What is the airline management view about unions? Do unions create obstacles? 
Has labour productivity increased? If yes, in which areas? 
Distribution 
Have your distribution policies been affected by EU liberalization packages? If yes, which 
package and how? 
Has your relationship with travel agents changed since 1985? If yes, in what way? 
Are the changes caused by EU liberalization packages? If so, which one(s)? 
Financial performance 
To what extent do you think EU liberalization measures have been responsible for your airline 
financial performance? Which measures have had an impact, and why? 
Barriers to entry 
Are there any markets/routes that your airline wished to enter but could not? 
If yes, which route or market, and what have been the barriers? 
Environmental impact 
Have environmental issues (noise, engine emissions, etc.) restricted your operation? 
Explain in what way. 
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Β. 1.4. Airline questionnaire 
Individual completing this questionnaire 
Name: 
Job title: 
Phone/fax: 
(1) The list attached contains non-stop routes British Airways introduced in the periods 
June 1989-June 1992 and June 1992-June 1995. We should like to know how important EU 
legislation was in your decision to begin operating these sectors. 
Please indicate below those routes you consider introduced largely because of changes in the 
regulatory environment created by the three packages of EU air transport measures. 
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(2) Please indicate the importance of the following barriers to entry for both new airlines 
and existing airlines wishing to enter any cross-border routes within the EU. 
(Score each barrier by ticking a box from 1 to 10: 1 indicates no effect and 10 maximum 
effect). 
Lack of airport slots 
State aids 
Other government protectionism (please specify) 
Reluctance of some states to enforce three packages 
of EU air transport measuress 
Vertical integration of charter airlines, tour 
operators and travel agents 
Use of override commissions 
Frequent flyer programmes 
Airline alliances 
Small airlines' lack of size and image compared to 
established airlines 
Any other barriers (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
; ■ '■■ ν ■; ; . . . ' . · . . . . . . ' " ' ■ 
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(3) Please indicate the effect of the three packages of EU air transport measures on your 
strategies, since 1985, in relation to the following. 
(Score by ticking a box from 1 to 10: 1 indicates no effect and 10 maximum effect). 
Alliances 
Product development 
Distribution 
Pricing 
Marketing innovations 
Cost cutting 
Staff numbers 
Route rationalization 
Others (please specify) 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(4) To what extent have any recent improvements in efficiency been affected by the 
following factors? 
(Score the importance of each factor from 1 to 10: 1 indicates no effect and 10 maximum 
effect). 
Three packages of EU air transport measures 
Competition from EU airlines 
Competition from US carriers 
Competition from Asian carriers 
Other factors (please specif}') 
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 
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(5) To what extent has recent financial performance (profits/losses) been affected by the 
following factors? 
{Score the importance of each factor from 1 to 10: 1 indicates no effect and 10 maximum 
effect). 
Three packages of EU air transport measures 
Economic climate 
Competition from EU airlines 
Competition from US carriers 
Competition from Asian earners 
Other factors (please specify) 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(6) Are you likely to make use of the opportunity opened up by the removal of cabotage 
restrictions in 1997? 
{Indicate the likelihood on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating not likely at all and 10 
definitely). 
Usage of cabotage rights 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(7a) Do you see environmental pressures making an impact on your operations? 
{Indicate the extent on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating no impact and 10 maximum 
impact). 
Impact of environmental pressures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(7b) To what extent is this due to the three packages of EU air transport measures? 
{Indicate the extent on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating not significant and 10 highly 
significant). 
Impact of EU air transport measures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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(8) Although not specifically aimed at air transport, some EU legislation may have an 
impact on the air transport industry. Please indicate the importance to the industry of the 
following EU measures (current or proposed). 
{Score each measure from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating not important and 10 very important). 
Removal of physical barriers to trade 
Indirect taxation 
Public procurement * 
Social legislation 
Corporate taxation 
Single currency 
Company law and accounting legislation 
Any other measures (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
*Public procurement: government policy on the procurement of goods and services for official 
use 
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Β. 1.5. Interview checklist - Department of Civil Aviation 
Bilaterals with other EU countries: elaborate where necessary on answer to question 1 in the 
questionnaire. 
Could you identify new airlines and any problems in relation to the development of 
applications for commercial air services licences, and more recently AOCs (intra-EU)? 
Have you imposed any public service obligations? Have arrangements been made with 
airlines following tender procedures? If so, elaborate. 
In your opinion, have the three EU packages encouraged airlines to adopt the following 
strategies? If yes, which package has had the most significant impact? 
(a) code sharing; 
(b) alliances; 
(c) franchising; 
(d) establishment of low-cost subsidiary. 
Are there any markets/routes that an airline wished to enter but could not? If yes, which route 
or market, and what have been the barriers? 
Have you received any complaint about predatory behaviour from airlines? What have been 
the nature of complaints? Has there been an increase in the number of such cases? 
In your monitoring of air fares since the introduction of the third package, can you give 
examples of air fares that you considered either too high or too low, and was (or will there be) 
further action taken? 
Has there been any problem relating to implementation and enforcement of the three 
packages? If so, specify regulations and directives, and the nature of problems. 
Are there any EU measures which you believe have had a negative impact on airlines or the 
industry as a whole? If so, which measure and what has been the impact? 
Have environmental issues (noise, engine emissions, etc.) restricted airlines operation? If so, 
explain in what way. 
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B.l .6. Department of Civil Aviation questionnaire 
Individual completing this questionnaire 
Name: 
Job title: 
Phone/fax: 
(1) Please tick the following boxes if the bilateral agreement between Austria and each of 
the other EU Member States were unrestricted in terms of designation, capacity and fare on 
the three dates below. 
Unrestricted designation: double (two airlines from each state) or 
multiple (any number of airlines from each state) 
Unrestricted capacity: no restriction on capacity or frequency share 
Unrestricted fare: double disapproval (fares in effect unless both 
governments disaprove), or no government intervention 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany* 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
December 1986 
Designation Capacity- Fares 
December 1988 
Désignation Capacity Fares 
December 1990 
Designation Capacity Fare 
December 1992 
Designation Capacity Fare 
* Assume West Germany until reunification 
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(2) Please indicate the importance of the following barriers to entry for both new airlines 
and existing airlines wishing to enter any cross-border routes within the EU. 
{Score each barrier by ticking a box from 1 to 10: 1 indicating no effect and 10 maximum 
effect). 
Lack of airport slots 
State aids 
Government protectionism 
Other government protectionism (please specify) 
Reluctance of some states to enforce three packages of EU air 
transport measures 
Vertical integration of charter airlines, tour operators and travel 
agents 
Use of override commissions 
Frequent flyer programmes 
Airline alliances 
Small airlines' lack of size and image compared to established 
airlines 
Any other barriers (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(3) Please list any air services (with the operators) that come under public service 
obligation rules. 
Appendix Β - Air transport industry survey 125 
(4a) Do you monitor predatory behaviour in the following areas? 
Pricing 
Frequency 
Capacity 
FFP incentives 
Others (please specify) 
Yes No Comments 
(4b) Have you received any formal complaints in the following areas? 
Pricing 
Frequency 
Capacity 
FFP incentives 
Others (please specify) 
Yes No Comments 
(4c) Have you made formal complaints to the EU in any of the following areas? 
Pricing 
Frequency 
Capacity 
FFP incentives 
Others (please specify) 
Yes No Comments 
(4d) In monitoring air fares since the introduction of the third package, have there been air 
fares you considered either too high or too low, and was further action taken? 
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(5) Do you consider the following airline strategies as anti-competitive? 
Mergers/alliances 
Code-sharing 
Franchising 
Others (please specify) 
Yes No Comments 
(6a) Do you see environmental pressures making an impact on airline operations? 
{Indicate the extent on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating no impact and 10 maximum 
impact). 
Impact of environmental pressures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(6b) To what extent is this due to the three packages of EU air transport measures? 
{Indicate the extent on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating not significant and 10 highly 
significant). 
Impact of EU air transport measures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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(7) Although not specifically aimed at air transport, some EU legislation may have had an 
impact on the EU air transport industry. Please indicate the importance to the industry of the 
following EU measures. 
{Score each measure from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating not important and 10 very important). 
Removal of physical barriers to trade 
Indirect taxation 
Public procurement 
Social legislation 
Corporate taxation 
Single currency 
Company law and accounting legislation 
Any other measures (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Β. 1.7. Department of Civil Aviation questionnaire - statistical information 
Could you please supply air traffic data between Austria and each of the following EU 
countries for 1994. 
To/From: 
To Belgium 
From Belgium 
To Denmark 
From Denmark 
To France 
From France 
To Germany 
From Germany 
To Greece 
From Greece 
To Ireland 
From Ireland 
To Italy 
From Italy 
To Luxembourg 
From Luxembourg 
To Netherlands 
From Netherlands 
To Portugal 
From Portugal 
To Spain 
From Spain 
To UK 
From UK 
Passengers (000) 
Scheduled Charter 
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B.2. Results of industry survey 
Questionnaire responses - Airlines 
Airline response rate 
Total questionnaires 
Total responses 
No responses 
Number of airlines 
21 
18 
3 
% 
100 
86 
14 
Type of airline 
National flag carriers 
Regional airlines 
Charter 
Number of airlines 
12 
5 
1 
% 
67 
27 
6 
Questionnaire responses - National civil aviation authorities 
DCA responses 
Total questionnaires 
Total responses 
No responses 
Number of airlines 
12 
7 
5 
% 
100 
58 
42 
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B.2.1. Airlines 
Ql New routes introduced 1989-92 and 1992-95 due to 1990 and 1992 packages 
Aer Lingus 
Air France 
Alitalia 
British Airways 
British Midland 
Finnair 
Iberia 
KLM 
Lufthansa 
Maersk Air 
Ryanair 
Sabena 
I9J9-92 
BRS-BRU 
BRS-DUS 
BLQ-PAR 
BRU-PAR 
CWL-PAR 
BCN-TRN 
BLQ-BRU 
DUB-MAN 
FRA-PSA 
BFS-CDG 
EDI-CDG 
LHR-BRU 
AGP-AMS | 
AGP-DUB | 
ALC-AMS | 
BCN-DUB 
AMS-BER 
AMS-BFS 
AMS-BHX 
AMS-BOD 
AMS-BRE 
AMS-BRU 
AMS-CWL 
AMS-GCI 
AMS-HAJ 
AMS-JER 
MUC-AGP 
BER-ATH 
DUS-ATH 
HAM-ATH 
STR-ATH 
CGN-BCN 
BER-MIL 
BLL-AMS 
BLL-BRU 
BLL-LGW 
MAN-PAR 
LIS-MAD 
LON-SXB 
AMS-CPH 
LYS-ROM 
MIL-SVG 
MIL-VLC 
ROM-SCQ 
LHR-CDG 
LHR-NCE 
LON-OVD | 
LON-ZAZ 1 
PAR-ZAZ 1 
ROM-VLC 
AMS-LUX 
AMS-MRS 
AMS-NUE 
AMS-ORK 
AMS-SOU 
AMS-STR 
AMS-SVQ 
AMS-TLS 
AMS-TRN 
AMS-VCE 
BER-ROM 
FRA-BIO 
FRA-BRI 
MUC-BRI 
MUC-CAG 
CGN-MAD 
BLL-ARN 
CPH-LGW 
nene 
BRU-BRS 
BRU-GLA 
BRU-HAM 
BRU-LBA 
BRU-VCE 
1992-95 
BER-SXB J 
HAM-SXB 
MUC-SXB 
BRU-DUB 
BRU-ROM t 
PAR-ROM j 
AGP-EMA 
BRU-BHX 
BRU-EMA 
CPH-ED1 
HEL-STO-BER 
HEL-STO-STR 
HEL-STO-MIL 
HEL-STO-MAN 
BRU-AGP 1 
BRU-PMI t 
EDI-MADt 
DUB-ALC| 
AMS-BLL 
AMS-MLH 
AMS-SXB 
HAJ-BCN 
LIS-BCN 
BCN-MIL+ 
BCN-LIS + 
BRU-MIL+ 
CGN-ROM 
CPH-KRS 
BLL-FRA 
DUB-LGW 
STN-PIK 
BRU-HAJ 
BRU-EDI 
BRU-NCL 
BRU-FIR 
BRU-NAP 
BRU-BIO 
SKG-TRN 1 
CPH-GLA 
EMA-NCE 
EMA-PMI 
FRA-LHR 
HEL-STO-MUC 
HEL-STO-LGW 
HEL-DUS-BCN 
DUB-PMI t 
FRA-ZAZ | 
PAR-VLLI 
DUB-MIL + 
HAM-ROM 
HAM-VCE 
MAN-MIL+ 
PAR-MIL+ 
MUC-OLB 
CGN-VCE 
ORK-STN 
NOC-STN 
BRU-ORY 
BRU-BLL 
BRU-BER 
BRU-BLG 
BRU-SXB 
t Services operated by partner or franchise airlines 
+ Operated under code sharing agreement 
X Operated under Public Services Obligation Rules 
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Q2 Importance of the following barriers to entry 
Lack of airport slots Use of override commissions 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
State aids 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
15 
1 
2 
Number of 
airlines 
7 
4 
7 
% 
83 
6 
II 
% 
39 
22 
39 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
2 
11 
Frequent flier programmes 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
8 
5 
% 
28 
11 
61 
% 
28 
44 
28 
Reluctance of some states to enforce three 
packages of EU air transport measures Airline alliances 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
5 
8 
% 
28 
28 
44 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
2 
6 
10 
% 
11 
33 
56 
Vertical integration of charter airlines, tour 
operators and travel agents 
Small airlines' lack of size and image 
compared to established airlines 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
2 
5 
11 
% 
11 
28 
61 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
6 
7 
% 
28 
33 
39 
Other barriers to entry 
User charges 
GH monopoly 
Skilled staff costs 
Number of 
airlines 
4 
1 
1 
% 
28 
6 
6 
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Q3 Effect of EU measures on following strategies 
Alliances 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
8 
5 
% 
28 
44 
28 
Cost cutting 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
7 
5 
6 
% 
39 
28 
33 
Product development 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
9 
4 
5 
% 
50 
22 
28 
Staff numbers 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
7 
5 
6 
% 
39 
28 
33 
Distribution 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
5 
8 
% 
28 
28 
44 
Route rationalization 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
11 
2 
4 
1 
% 
61 
11 
22 
6 
Pricing 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
11 
3 
4 
% 
61 
17 
22 
Marketing innovations 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
9 
3 
1 
% 
28 
50 
17 
6 
Major impact on other strategies 
Hub strategy 
Fleet composition 
Restructuring 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
1 
1 
1 
15 
% 
6 
6 
6 
82 
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Q4 Effect of following factors on recent improvements in efficiency 
1987,1990 and 1993 EU packages 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
7 
7 
3 
1 
% 
39 
39 
17 
6 
Competition from EU airlines 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
12 
5 
1 
% 
66 
28 
6 
Competition from US airlines 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
3 
6 
8 
1 
% 
17 
33 
44 
6 
Competition from Asian airlines 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
2 
3 
12 
1 
% 
11 
17 
67 
6 
Other factors 
Number of 
airlines 
% 
1991-1993 recession 17 
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Q5 Effect of following factors on recent financial performance 
1987, 1990 and 1993 EU packages 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
7 
6 
% 
28 
39 
33 
Competition from Asian airlines 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
1 
4 
13 
% 
6 
22 
72 
Economic climate 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
14 
3 
1 
% 
76 
18 
6 
Competition from EU airlines 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
10 
6 
2 
% 
56 
33 
11 
Competition from US airlines 
Significant effect 
Some effect 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
3 
6 
9 
% 
17 
33 
50 
Q6 Removal of cabotage restrictions 
Likely to make use of removal of cabotage 
restrictions in 1997 
Definitely 
Likely 
Not likely 
No answer 
Number of 
airlines 
2 
6 
9 
1 
% 
11 
33 
50 
6 
Q7 Environmental impact 
Impact of environmental measures on 
operations 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
II 
2 
% 
28 
61 
11 
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Q8 Impact of various items of EU legislation on air transport 
Removal of physical barriers to trade 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
7 
6 
1 
4 
% 
39 
33 
6 
22 
Corporate taxation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
4 
9 
4 
1 
% 
22 
50 
22 
6 
Indirect taxation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
5 
6 
6 
1 
% 
28 
33 
33 
6 
Single currency 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
8 
6 
4 
% 
44 
33 
22 
Public procurement 
Significant Impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
No response 
Number of 
airlines 
2 
6 
8 
2 
% 
II 
33 
44 
11 
Company law and accounting legislation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
No answer 
Number of 
airlines 
2 
7 
8 
1 
% 
11 
39 
44 
6 
Social legislation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little effect 
Number of 
airlines 
10 
5 
3 
% 
56 
28 
17 
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Β.2.2. National civil aviation authorities 
Ql Form of unrestricted bilateral agreements between Member States prior to 1993 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxem 'g 
Nethe'ds 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
December 1986 
Design'n 
UK 
PRT 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
UK 
PRT 
FRA 
ITA 
UK 
PRT 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
IRL 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
UK 
ESP 
BEL 
DNK 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
FRA 
DEU 
Capacity 
UK 
DNK 
NLD 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
Fares 
UK 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
GRC 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
December 1988 
Design'n 
UK 
PRT 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
UK 
PRT 
FRA 
ITA 
UK 
PRT 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
LUX 
NLD 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
IRL 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
UK 
ESP 
BEL 
DNK 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
FRA 
DEU 
Capacity 
UK 
DNK 
UK 
NLD 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
Fares 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
GRC 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
December 1990 
Design'n 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
PRT 
GRC 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
FRA 
ITA 
UK 
DEU 
BEL 
DNK 
PRT 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
IRL 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
UK 
ESP 
BEL 
DNK 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
FRA 
DEU 
Capacity 
UK 
DNK 
NLD 
UK 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
Fares 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
GRC 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
December 1992 
Design'n 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
PRT 
GRC 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
UK 
PRT 
GRC 
FRA 
ITA 
UK 
DEU 
BEL 
DNK 
PRT 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
PRT 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
FRA 
DEU 
IRL 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
ESP 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
FRA 
DEU 
Capacity 
UK 
DNK 
NLD 
UK 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
Fares 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
BEL 
DNK 
GRC 
DEU 
ITA 
LUX 
NLD 
PRT 
BEL 
NLD 
LUX 
IRL 
* Assume West Germany until reunification 
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Q2 Importance of following barriers to entry 
Lack of airport slots 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
% 
14 
43 
29 
14 
Use of override commission 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
0 
1 
5 
1 
% 
0 
14 
71 
14 
State aids 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
0 
2 
4 
1 
% 
0 
29 
57 
14 
Frequent flier programmes 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
1 
4 
1 
% 
14 
14 
57 
14 
Reluctance of some states to enforce three 
packages of EU measures 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
0 
0 
6 
1 
% 
0 
0 
86 
14 
Airline alliances 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
3 
2 
1 
% 
14 
43 
29 
14 
Vertical integration of charter airlines, tour 
operators and travel agents 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
14 
14 
Small airlines' lack of size and image 
compared to established airlines 
Very important 
Important 
Not important 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
3 
3 
0 
1 
% 
43 
43 
0 
14 
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Q3 Routes designated under public service obligation status 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
None 
None 
PAR-AUR BER-SXB RHE-LYN PAR-MCU 
PAR-CCF PAR-LPY LRH-PIS LIL-DIJ 
None 
None 
DUB-KIR DUB-SXL 
DUB-GWY DUB-CPN 
None 
None 
LIS-FNC OPO-PXO LIS-TER FNC-PDL 
LIS-PXO LIS-PDL LIS-HOR FNC-PXO 
OPO-FNC LIS-TER TER-HOR 
None 
SYY-BEB SYY-BRR 
BEB-BRR 
Q4 Monitoring of predatory behaviour 
(a) Monitoring of predatory behaviour in following areas 
Pricing 
Frequency 
Capacity 
FFP incentives 
Number of 
DCA 
Yes 
5 
5 
5 
2 
No 
2 
2 
2 
5 
% 
Yes 
71 
71 
71 
29 
No 
29 
29 
29 
71 
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(b) Complaints received in following areas 
Pricing 
Frequency 
Capacity 
FFP incentives 
Number of 
DCA 
Yes 
2 
1 
1 
0 
No 
4 
5 
5 
6 
% 
Yes 
29 
14 
14 
0 
No 
57 
71 
71 
86 
(c) Are complaints referred to EU of predatory behaviour in following areas? 
Pricing 
Frequency 
Capacity 
FFP incentives 
Number of 
DCA 
Yes 
5 
5 
5 
5 
No 
2 
2 
2 
2 
% 
Yes 
71 
71 
71 
71 
No 
29 
29 
29 
29 
(d) Air fares considered too high or too low 
Too high 
Too low 
Neither 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
1 
3 
2 
% 
14 
14 
42 
28 
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Q5 Anti-competitive airline strategies 
Do you consider the following to be anti-competitive strategies? 
Code sharing 
Franchising 
Mergers 
Number of DCA 
Yes 
2 
1 
2 
No 
3 
5 
3 
Yes/No 
1 
1 
1 
% 
Yes 
28 
14 
28 
No 
42 
71 
42 
Yes/No 
14 
14 
14 
1 DCA did not respond 
Yes/no refers to cases where DCA considered a strategy to be both anti-competitive and not anti-competitive. 
Q6 Impact of environmental pressures 
Q6(a) 
Q6(b) 
Number of DCA 
Little impact 
4 
4 
No response 
3 
3 
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Q7 Impact of various items of EU legislation on air transport 
Removal of physical barriers to trade 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
0 
4 
2 
% 
14% 
0% 
57% 
29% 
Single currency 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
1 
3 
2 
% 
14 
14 
43 
29 
Indirect taxation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
0 
4 
2 
% 
14 
0 
57 
29 
Company law and accounting legislation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
1 
3 
2 
% 
14 
14 
43 
29 
Public procurement 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
0 
4 
2 
% 
14 
0 
57 
29 
Social legislation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
1 
3 
2 
% 
14 
14 
43 
29 
Corporate taxation 
Significant impact 
Some impact 
Little impact 
No response 
Number of 
DCA 
1 
1 
3 
2 
% 
14 
14 
43 
29 
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Scheduled traffic between Member States 1994 (Ό00) 
Β 
DK 
F+ 
Dt 
GRf 
IRL 
I 
LUX 
NL 
Ρ 
E 
UK 
Β DK 
N/A 
F+ 
736 
451 
Dt 
736 
588 
2,460 
GRf 
232 
296 
518 
2.414 
IRL 
109 
71 
281 
268 
38 
I 
N/A 
N/A 
2,702 
2,400 
600 
81 
LUX 
N/A 
N/A 
71 
N/A 
21 
0 
N/A 
NL 
307 
390 
1,111 
1,586 
507 
134 
932 
44 
Ρ 
239 
0 
959 
570 
12 
0 
356 
36 
258 
E 
754 
237 
1,896 
4,017 
98 
59 
1,595 
129 
797 
582 
UK 
1,870 
1,238 
6,663 
6,090 
689 
4,959 
2,916 
160 
3 992 
965 
2,752 
Charter traffic between Member States 1994 (Ό00) 
Β 
DK 
F+ 
Dt 
GRf 
IRL 
I 
LUX 
NL 
Ρ 
E 
UK 
Β DK 
Ν/Α 
F+ 
74 
26 
Dt 
Ν/Λ 
Ν/Α 
96 
"II t 
GRf 
Ν/Α 
Ν/Α 
Ν/Α 
Ν/Α 
IRL 
7 
0817 
148 
76 
78 
M M "t!· M' 
I 
N/A 
N/A 
473 
251 
N/A 
56 
"tj'j"tl··"-· 
LUX 
N/A 
N/A 
5 
N/A 
N/A 
0021 
N/A 
NL 
0.234 
0.469 
14 
7 
736 
9 
32 
0384 
Ρ 
102 
61 
249 
868 
4 
85 
52 
27 
280 
E 
942 
500 
1,167 
8,595 
72 
435 
1,159 
104 
1.107 
97 
UK 
10 
44 
596 
99 
4,273 
34 
1,272 
0.04 
21 
1.657 
14,758 
t Traffic flows to Belgium, Denmark, France and Italy: 1993 data. 
t All data include charter traffic except for UK. Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. 
+ Traffic flows to Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg: 1993 data. 
APPENDIX C 
Cross-border capacity and air fares 
CO. The development of carriers per route by seats, flights and routes: intra­EU services in June 1989,1992,1994 and 1995 
Carriers 
per route 
1 
1 
1 
1 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 9 9 5 
s e a t s 
' : ■ ; , ' ■ ■ * ­; 
1 1 1 , 2 3 2 
4 0 , 9 2 2 
1 2 2 . 8 6 3 
2 5 1 , 1 6 4 
2 3 1 . 5 4 1 
3 4 9 . 3 4 4 
8 8 4 , 4 3 6 
4 5 6 , 4 1 0 
f l i g h t s 
■ 
7 6 8 
2 4 0 
9 0 0 
1 . 7 5 4 
1 , 6 8 6 
2 , 4 4 9 
7 , 2 5 1 
6 , 1 0 2 
r o u t e 
", 
U, ufi­fi. .,„,,,,.,■■.,.,..,.,,, ,.,. 
2 
3 
6 
2 0 
2 9 
6 7 
4 2 0 
9 0 3 
1 9 9 4 
s e a t s 
2 3 , 9 2 7 
2 5 , 2 6 5 
3 2 . 4 5 0 
' " 
1 0 2 , 7 2 7 
2 4 8 , 4 2 1 
2 6 1 , 5 1 0 
2 9 8 , 3 3 8 
7 8 3 , 1 0 7 
4 0 2 , 7 7 7 
'h 
■i 
f l i g h t s 
1 4 8 
1 5 3 
2 1 9 
6 6 3 
1 , 7 8 7 
1 , 9 8 6 
2 , 3 5 6 
6 , 6 2 1 
5 , 6 6 3 
r o u t e s 
1 9 9 2 
s e a t s 
■' 
1 
1 
2 
6 
1 0 
3 4 
6 7 
3 5 3 
8 3 6 
1 1 2 , 9 4 5 
3 9 , 3 7 5 
3 1 , 6 4 8 
9 1 , 6 7 1 
6 1 , 6 0 0 
1 0 1 , 0 7 1 
2 0 5 . 5 6 0 
3 0 5 . 4 8 5 
7 1 6 . 6 2 5 
2 8 4 . 6 0 8 
f l i g h t s 
7 0 1 
2 1 0 
1 6 4 
6 5 1 
4 8 1 
7 2 4 
1 , 4 3 5 
2 , 5 2 8 
6 , 7 4 0 
4 , 1 8 0 
routes 
·· * : 
2 
""•r::">.:::­ . : V C î 
3 
2 
4 
5 
1 0 
2 5 
4 9 
3 7 4 
6 8 0 
1 9 8 9 
s e a t s 
5 0 . 0 5 7 
8 1 , 9 5 6 
2 2 , 5 2 5 
3 2 , 3 3 1 
3 6 , 8 3 6 
6 7 , 0 1 1 
1 1 0 , 4 2 2 
4 7 , 5 0 2 
1 4 4 , 6 1 4 
1 6 5 , 7 5 5 
5 5 9 , 5 5 5 
2 3 3 , 1 3 1 
f l i g h t s 
3 3 6 
5 2 9 
1 2 4 
1 9 5 
3 1 8 
4 7 2 
9 4 2 
3 2 3 
1 , 0 7 4 
1 , 3 6 5 
5 , 2 4 2 
3 , 5 5 9 
r o u t e s 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
5 
6 
5 
2 4 
4 8 
3 1 8 
6 2 5 
NB: Routes are directional (i.e. Madrid­Rome and Rome­Madrid are two routes). Non­EU Fifth Freedom carriers are included. 
-a o 
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C.l. 100 busiest EU cross-border routes, June 1995 
Ranking by 
Seats 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
ASK 
3 
5 
18 
7 
25 
16 
9 
2 
4 
39 
8 
11 
36 
6 
12 
14 
41 
1 
10 
19 
84 
55 
15 
71 
21 
51 
62 
47 
13 
38 
44 
88 
22 
31 
23 
20 
86 
68 
33 
28 
59 
70 
24 
56 
60 
52 
54 
43 
85 
50 
Between 
State 
UK 
IRL 
N 
D 
Β 
I 
UK 
UK 
E 
F 
I 
D 
D 
D 
E 
UK 
UK 
GR 
Ρ 
UK 
F 
I 
E 
NL 
GR 
UK 
E 
D 
Ρ 
NL 
D 
IRL 
E 
D 
Β 
D 
UK 
NL 
D 
E 
NL 
UK 
Β 
Β 
D 
Β 
UK 
D 
D 
E 
City 
LON 
DUB 
AMS 
FRA 
BRU 
MIL 
LON 
LON 
MAD 
PAR 
ROM 
CPH 
FRA 
DUS 
MAD 
LON 
LON 
ΑΤΗ 
LIS 
LON 
PAR 
MIL 
MAD 
AMS 
ΑΤΗ 
MAN 
MAD 
MUC 
LIS 
AMS 
HAM 
DUB 
MAD 
CPH 
BRU 
FRA 
ΒΗΧ 
AMS 
FRA 
BCN 
AMS 
ΒΗΧ 
BRU 
BRU 
CPH 
BRU 
LON 
BER 
DUS 
BCN 
and 
State 
F 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
F 
I 
I 
UK 
Ν 
F 
UK 
F 
E 
F 
D 
D 
UK 
F 
F 
B 
D 
I 
D 
I 
F 
Ρ 
F 
UK 
I 
UK 
UK 
I 
FR 
I 
E 
IRL 
UK 
I 
UK 
DK 
F 
E 
I 
D 
DK 
F 
UK 
F 
FR 
City 
PAR 
LON 
LON 
LON 
LON 
PAR 
MIL 
ROM 
LON 
AMS 
PAR 
LON 
PAR 
PMI 
PAR 
MUC 
DUS 
LON 
PAR 
NCE 
BRU 
FRA 
ROM 
FRA 
ROM 
PAR 
LIS 
PAR 
LON 
MIL 
LON 
MAN 
MIL 
PAR 
ROM 
PMI 
DUB 
MAN 
ROM 
LON 
CPH 
PAR 
MAD 
MIL 
FRA 
CPH 
LYS 
LON 
PAR 
PAR 
Weekly 
Seats 
111,232 
77.925 
55,224 
48,312 
47,080 
32.448 
31,268 
30,279 
29,803 
29,581 
28,009 
27,632 
26,930 
26,492 
25,496 
24,828 
23,048 
19.524 
18,892 
18.710 
18,014 
17,134 
16,848 
16,556 
16,194 
15,674 
15,529 
15,366 
15,030 
14.602 
14,406 
14,401 
14,350 
14,146 
14.090 
13,938 
13.870 
13,814 
13,600 
13.588 
12.760 
12,700 
12.452 
12.012 
11,884 
11,821 
11,804 
11,656 
11,496 
11,354 
ASK million 
38.5 
35.6 
20.0 
31.2 
16.1 
20.8 
30.5 
43.5 
36.8 
11.9 
30.8 
26.9 
122 
35.5 
267 
232 
11.3 
47.0 
27.3 
19.4 
4.6 
8.7 
22.4 
6.0 
17.3 
9.2 
8.0 
10.4 
23.5 
12.1 
10.7 
3.8 
16.9 
14.2 
16.5 
17.4 
4.4 
6.7 
13.0 
15.6 
8.1 
6.2 
16.3 
8.4 
8.1 
8.9 
8.8 
11.0 
4.5 
9.6 
Flights 
768 
622 
457 
275 
422 
196 
176 
147 
203 
211 
189 
196 
178 
87 
200 
168 
164 
100 
136 
130 
151 
125 
91 
102 
70 
116 
132 
128 
84 
98 
110 
132 
84 
110 
106 
68 
134 
126 
86 
84 
98 
108 
82 
112 
94 
113 
108 
82 
86 
102 
Carriers 
operating 
8 
5 
6 
7 
4 
3 
3 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
3 
5 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
2 
2 
5 
7 
2 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2 
4 
4 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Percentage 
total week! 
Seats 
4.5% 
3.2% 
2.3% 
2.0% 
1.9% 
1.3% 
1.3% 
1.2% 
1.2% 
1.2% 
1.1% 
1.1% 
1.1% 
1.1% 
1.0% 
1.0% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.8% 
0.8% 
0.7% 
0.7% 
0.7% 
0.7% 
0.7% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
ASK 
1.7% 
1.5% 
0.9% 
1.3% 
0.7% 
0.9% 
1.3% 
1.9% 
1.6% 
0.5% 
1.3% 
1.2% 
0.5% 
1.5% 
1.2% 
1.0% 
0.5% 
2.0% 
1.2% 
0.8% 
0.2% 
0.4% 
1.0% 
0.3% 
0.7% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.5% 
1.0% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.2% 
0.7% 
0.6% 
0.7% 
0.8% 
0.2% 
0.3% 
0.6% 
0.7% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.7% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.2% 
0.4% 
1 
Flights 
3.6% 
2.9% 
2.2% 
1.3% 
2.0% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.7% 
1.0% 
1.0% 
0.9% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.4% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.8% 
0.5% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.7% 
0.8% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.3% 
0.5% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.6% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.3% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
Cumulative pere 
total weekl 
Seats 
4.5% 
7.7% 
10.0% 
12.0% 
13.9% 
15.2% 
16.5% 
17.7% 
18.9% 
20.1% 
21.3% 
22.4% 
23.5% 
24.6% 
25.6% 
26.7% 
27.6% 
28.4% 
29.2% 
29.9% 
30.7% 
31.4% 
32.1% 
32.7% 
33.4% 
34.0% 
34.7% 
35.3% 
35.9% 
36.5% 
37.1% 
37.7% 
38.3% 
38.9% 
39.4% 
40.0% 
40.6% 
41.1% 
41.7% 
42.2% 
42.8% 
43.3% 
43.8% 
44.3% 
44.8% 
45.3% 
45.7% 
46.2% 
46.7% 
47.1% 
ASK 
1.7% 
3.2% 
4.1% 
5.4% 
6.1% 
7.0% 
8.3% 
10.2% 
11.8% 
12.3% 
13.7% 
14.8% 
15.3% 
16.9% 
18.0% 
19.0% 
19.5% 
21.6% 
22.7% 
23.6% 
23.8% 
24.2% 
25.1% 
25.4% 
26.1% 
26.5% 
26.9% 
27.3% 
28.3% 
28.9% 
29.3% 
29.5% 
30.2% 
30.8% 
31.6% 
32.3% 
32.5% 
32.8% 
33.3% 
34.0% 
34.4% 
34.6% 
35.3% 
35.7% 
36.1% 
36.4% 
36.8% 
37.3% 
37.5% 
37.9% 
antage 
Fliqhts 
3.6% 
6.6% 
8.7% 
10.0% 
12.0% 
12.9% 
13.8% 
14.4% 
15.4% 
16.4% 
17.3% 
16.2% 
19.1% 
19.5% 
20.4% 
21.2% 
22.0% 
22.4% 
23.1% 
23.7% 
24.4% 
25.0% 
25.4% 
25.9% 
26.2% 
26.8% 
27.4% 
28.0% 
28.4% 
28.9% 
29.4% 
30.0% 
30.4% 
30.9% 
31.4% 
31.8% 
32.4% 
33.0% 
33.4% 
33.8% 
34.2% 
34.8% 
35.1% 
35.7% 
36.1% 
36.6% 
37.2% 
37.5% 
37.9% 
38.4% 
146 Air transport 
C l . 100 busiest EU cross­border routes, June 1995 (continued) 
Ranking by 
Seats 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
ASK 
58 
67 
96 
37 
95 
74 
32 
42 
35 
94 
61 
27 
77 
100 
34 
63 
82 
66 
73 
48 
53 
29 
83 
79 
30 
92 
76 
99 
72 
91 
26 
57 
80 
90 
46 
97 
49 
75 
40 
64 
93 
65 
69 
17 
98 
45 
81 
89 
78 
87 
Between 
State 
E 
D 
DK 
Ρ 
Β 
IRL 
D 
I 
NL 
UK 
E 
E 
UK 
NL 
E 
D 
Β 
F 
D 
E 
E 
D 
F 
NL 
UK 
NL 
D 
UK 
F 
F 
UK 
E 
D 
NL 
UK 
NL 
D 
I 
Ρ 
UK 
UK 
E 
E 
D 
I 
D 
UK 
D 
UK 
UK 
City 
BCN 
DUS 
CPH 
ΟΡΟ 
BRU 
ORK 
FRA 
MIL 
AMS 
LON 
BCN 
AGP 
LON 
AMS 
MAD 
BER 
BRU 
PAR 
HAJ 
BCN 
BCN 
FRA 
PAR 
AMS 
ΑΤΗ 
AMS 
HAM 
G LA 
PAR 
PAR 
ΑΤΗ 
BCN 
DUS 
AMS 
ΑΤΗ 
AMS 
DUS 
BLQ 
LIS 
LON 
LON 
PMI 
BCN 
DUS 
MIL 
DUS 
BHX 
NUE 
LON 
LON 
and 
State 
I 
I 
D 
F 
D 
UK 
E 
D 
I 
NL 
I 
UK 
IRL 
B 
NL 
F 
UK 
I 
UK 
NL 
D 
Ρ 
I 
D 
D 
UK 
F 
IRL 
IRL 
D 
F 
Β 
UK 
D 
I 
D 
E 
F 
BE 
I 
D 
D 
PT 
E 
D 
UK 
D 
F 
I 
D 
City 
MIL 
MIL 
HAM 
PAR 
FRA 
LON 
MAD 
CPH 
ROM 
RTM 
ROM 
LON 
SNN 
BRU 
AMS 
PAR 
MAN 
VCE 
LON 
AMS 
FRA 
LIS 
TRN 
MUC 
FRA 
ΒΗΧ 
PAR 
DUB 
DUB 
STR 
PAR 
BRU 
MAN 
STR 
MIL 
HAM 
IBZ 
PAR 
BRU 
VCE 
CGN 
STR 
LIS 
LPA 
MUC 
SKG 
FRA 
PAR 
TRN 
STR 
Weekly 
Seats 
10,958 
10,446 
10,204 
10,102 
10,042 
9,941 
9,900 
9,569 
9,548 
9.504 
9,453 
9.410 
9,282 
9,076 
8,776 
8,742 
8,726 
8.540 
8,460 
8,315 
8,106 
8,036 
8,012 
8,008 
8,006 
7,994 
7,788 
7,775 
7,673 
7,572 
7,560 
7,533 
7,344 
7,292 
7,173 
7,148 
7,026 
6,860 
6,616 
6,456 
6.426 
6.372 
6,311 
6,310 
6,230 
6,120 
6,114 
6,104 
5,966 
5,853 
ASK million 
8.1 
7.0 
2 8 
12.1 
3.1 
5.7 
14.0 
11.0 
12.4 
3.1 
8.0 
15.7 
5.5 
1.4 
12.8 
7.4 
4.7 
7.1 
5.9 
10.3 
8.8 
15.1 
4.6 
5.4 
14.5 
3.5 
5.7 
2.1 
6.0 
3.7 
15.8 
8.1 
4 8 
3.7 
10.5 
2.7 
10.1 
5.7 
11.4 
7.3 
3.4 
7.3 
6.3 
20.1 
2.2 
10.6 
4.7 
3.8 
5.5 
4.4 
Flights 
80 
74 
70 
70 
84 
88 
68 
70 
70 
156 
69 
68 
63 
110 
70 
74 
76 
56 
56 
69 
56 
54 
62 
78 
52 
102 
76 
80 
59 
66 
28 
65 
60 
66 
30 
66 
22 
52 
59 
42 
39 
28 
53 
18 
76 
30 
50 
62 
40 
43 
Carriers 
operating 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Percentage 
total week! 
Seats 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
ASK 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.5% 
0.1% 
0.2% 
0.6% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.7% 
0.2% 
0.1% 
0.6% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.7% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.6% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.7% 
0.4% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.5% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
0.2% 
0.5% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.9% 
0.1% 
0.5% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
Í 
Flights 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.7% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.5% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.4% 
0.2% 
0.5% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.2% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.1% 
0.3% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
0.1% 
0.2% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
Cumulative pere 
total weekl 
Seats 
47.6% 
48.0% 
48.4% 
48.8% 
49.3% 
49.7% 
50.1% 
50.5% 
50.8% 
51.2% 
51.6% 
52.0% 
52.4% 
52.8% 
53.1% 
53.5% 
53.8% 
54.2% 
54.5% 
54.9% 
55.2% 
55.5% 
55.9% 
56.2% 
56.5% 
56.8% 
57.2% 
57.5% 
57.8% 
58.1% 
58.4% 
58.7% 
59.0% 
59.3% 
59.6% 
59.9% 
60.2% 
60.5% 
60.7% 
61.0% 
61.3% 
61.5% 
61.8% 
62.0% 
62.3% 
62.5% 
62.8% 
63.0% 
63.3% 
63.5% 
ASK 
38.3% 
38.6% 
38.7% 
39.2% 
39.3% 
39.6% 
40.2% 
40.7% 
41.2% 
41.3% 
41.7% 
42.4% 
42.6% 
42.7% 
43.2% 
43.5% 
43.7% 
44.0% 
44.3% 
44.8% 
45.1% 
45.8% 
46.0% 
46.2% 
46.8% 
47.0% 
47.2% 
47.3% 
47.6% 
47.8% 
48.4% 
48.8% 
49.0% 
49.2% 
49.6% 
49.7% 
50.2% 
50.4% 
50.9% 
51.2% 
51.4% 
51.7% 
52.0% 
52.8% 
52.9% 
53.4% 
53.6% 
53.7% 
54.0% 
54.2% 
antage 
Flights 
38.8% 
39.2% 
39.5% 
39.8% 
40.2% 
40.6% 
40.9% 
41.3% 
41.6% 
42.3% 
42.7% 
43.0% 
43.3% 
43.8% 
44.1% 
44.5% 
44.8% 
45.1% 
45.4% 
45.7% 
46.0% 
46.2% 
46.5% 
46.9% 
47.1% 
47.6% 
48.0% 
48.3% 
48.6% 
48.9% 
49.1% 
49.4% 
49.6% 
50.0% 
50.1% 
50.4% 
50.5% 
50.8% 
51.0% 
51.2% 
51.4% 
51.5% 
51.8% 
51.9% 
52.2% 
52.4% 
52.6% 
52.9% 
53.1% 
53.3% 
Total EU interstate services: 
Weekly 
Seats 
2,447,496 
ASK million 
2,312 
Flights 
21,200 
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C2. Capacity index for routes from Spain representing 50% of total capacity 
From 
city 
MAD 
MAD 
PMI 
MAD 
MAD 
MAD 
PMI 
BCN 
MAD 
BCN 
BCN 
MAD 
BCN 
AGP 
MAD 
BCN 
BCN 
BCN 
IBZ 
BCN 
PMI 
LPA 
To 
state 
UK 
FR 
D 
1 
Ρ 
I 
D 
UK 
Β 
F 
I 
0 
I 
UK 
NL 
NL 
D 
Β 
D 
Ρ 
D 
D 
city 
LON 
PAR 
DUS 
ROM 
LIS 
MIL 
FRA 
LON 
BRU 
PAR 
MIL 
FRA 
ROM 
LON 
AMS 
AMS 
FRA 
BRU 
DUS 
LIS 
STR 
DUS 
MAD 
MAD 
BCN 
BCN 
MAD 
MAD 
AGP 
MAD 
MAD 
MAD 
BCN 
BCN 
UK 
F 
F 
UK 
I 
D 
UK 
NL 
Ρ 
I 
D 
NL 
LON 
PAR 
PAR 
LON 
ROM 
FRA 
LON 
AMS 
LIS 
MIL 
FRA 
AMS 
MAD 
MAD 
MAD 
BCN 
MAD 
BCN 
MAD 
AGP 
BCN 
MAD 
BCN 
MAD 
FR 
GB 
IT 
GB 
PT 
FR 
IT 
GB 
IT 
DE 
PT 
BE 
PAR 
LON 
ROM 
LON 
LIS 
PAR 
MIL 
LON 
MIL 
FRA 
US 
BRU 
Carrier shares of capacity June 1995 (%) 
AR 5% 
AF 31% 
DE 21% 
AR 5% 
IB 42% 
AZ 45% 
DE 49% 
BA 57% 
BQ 16% 
AF 58% 
AZ 54% 
IB 44% 
AZ 68% 
BA 41% 
IB 38% 
IB 36% 
IB 54% 
BQ 26% 
DE 22% 
IB 24% 
DE 84% 
DE 37% 
BA 42% 
AR 12% 
LT 77% 
AZ 37% 
NI 21% 
IB 55% 
FV 14% 
IB 43% 
IB 45% 
IB 42% 
IB 40% 
LA 12% 
IB 32% 
FV42% 
KL 62% 
KL64% 
LH 46% 
IB 37% 
LT 78% 
LH 27% 
LT 16% 
LT 63% 
FV 12% 
IB 42% 
YP 2% 
IB 41% 
TP 36% 
LH 14% 
MU 5% 
LH 6% 
LH 44% 
ZB 18% 
SN 37% 
TP 49% 
IB 36% 
IT 10% 
KU 3% 
LT 14% 
SN 33% 
UK 5% 
RN 5% 
TG 14% 
YP 9% 
Index(%) 
33% 
30% 
64% 
33% 
38% 
50% 
30% 
51% 
35% 
51% 
45% 
40% 
57% 
38% 
53% 
54% 
50% 
34% 
66% 
37% 
73% 
54% 
Carrier shares of capacity June 1992 (%) Index (%) 
BA 46% 
AF 45% 
AF 42% 
BA 42% 
AM 6% 
AV 7% 
BA 38% 
IB 43% 
AF 15% 
AZ 51% 
IB 45% 
IB 45% 
AF 42% 
BA 40% 
AR 7% 
BA 43% 
AC 20% 
AF47% 
AZ 45% 
BA 52% 
AZ40% 
AV 11% 
TP 17% 
IB 56% 
DA 11% 
AR 3% 
IB 32% 
DA 7% 
AR 10% 
IB 42% 
BD 11% 
JL 7% 
IB 57% 
IB 49% 
LH 43% 
KL 55% 
FV 9% 
AV7% 
IW 16% 
FV 12% 
AZ 30% 
LA 8% 
FV 38% 
KL 50% 
TP 27% 
RH 12% 
Carrier shares of capacity June 1! 
AM 8% 
DA 6% 
AZ32% 
IB 57% 
IB 44% 
IB 53% 
IB 55% 
IB 40% 
IB 60% 
IB 57% 
TW 83% 
SN 44% 
AR 8% 
IB 54% 
IB 47% 
TP 36% 
ZB 8% 
LH 32% 
IB 34% 
IB 45% 
RH 10% 
IB 40% 
IB 39% 
LH 44% 
ZB 12% 
TG 15% 
35% 
41% 
32% 
35% 
28% 
38% 
32% 
44% 
43% 
50% 
40% 
51% 
89(%) Index (%) 
AV 8% 
TG 14% 
IB 35% 31% 
45% 
35% 
51% 
36% 
50% 
51% 
43% 
52% 
44% 
72% 
51% 
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C3. Cross-border air fares 
C.3.1. Sample size for air fare analysis 
Origin 
State 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
TOTAL 72 26 
EU cross-border 
routes 
4 
4 
3 
5 
15 
3 
1 
7 
2 
4 
-
3 
8 
8 
5 
Control group 
routes 
5 
1 
1 
3 
2 
-
-
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
9 
3 
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C.3.2. Cross­border air fare regression results 
In order to identify the extent to which fare is influenced by variation in stage length, linear 
regression was performed on the sample of intra­EU city­pair fare data. The process involved 
regressing fare against stage length for three different fare types at four time intervals set 
between 1986 and 1995. In the regression model below for each city­pair if, Y and SL 
represent fare and stage length (in km) whilst a functions as a model constant and β 
represents the stage length (SL) coefficient. As fare generally increases with stage length, the 
parameter β would be expected to have a positive sign: 
Ytj=a+ßSLjj 
The statistical significance of such a relationship is measured by the t­statistics and the 
coefficient of determination r2. The value of the β t­statistic and r2 should be above 1.96 and 
0.60 respectively to guarantee significance. Regression equations covering each individual fare 
type for each time interval are outlined below. Y, YAVG and YLOW refer to one­way fully 
flexible economy fare, average economy fare and lowest economy fare respectively. The t­
statistics are expressed in italics below their respective parameters and η represents the sample 
size. 
Y1986 ¡J = 121 + 0.19 SLy r2 = 0.70, η = 57 
11.54 
Y1989 y = 107 + 0.20 SLy r! = 0.80, η = 57 
15.42 
Y1992y = 126 + 0.19 SLy r2 = 0.77, η = 57 
15.87 
Y1995 y = 144 + 0.16 SLy r2 = 0.56,n = 57 
8.63 
YAVG 1986 y = 113 + 0.12 SLy r2 = 0.42, η = 63 
6.80 
YA VG1989 y = 103 + 0.13 SLy r2 = 0.53,n = 63 
8.44 
YA VG 1992 y = 98 + 0.14 SLy r' = 0.61, η = 63 
9.93 
YAVG 1995y = 129 + O.OTSLy r1 = 0.26, η = 63 
4.32 
YLOW 1986 y = 91 + 0.07 SLy r2 = 0.14, η = 61 
3.30 
YLOW 1989 y =111 + 0.09SLy r2 = 0.19, η = 61 
3.89 
YLOW 1992 y = 68 + 0.11 SLy r2 = 0.33, n = 61 
3.61 
YLOW 1995 y = 101 + OMSLy r2 = 0.14, n = 61 
3.29 
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C.3.3. Fully flexible fares against stage length, 1986­95 
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C.3.4. Lowest economy fares against stage length, 1986­95 
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C.3.5. Average economy fares against stage length, 1986­95 
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C4. Fully flexible fares against stage length by EU state, 1995 
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C i l . Exchange rate parities (ECU conversion rate), 1986-95 
Average rate for March to September in each year 
State 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Currency 
Schilling 
Franc 
Kroner 
Franc 
Deutschmark 
Drachma 
Punt 
Lira 
Franc 
Guilder 
Escudos 
Peseta 
Franc 
Pound 
National currency units to 1 ECU 
1986 
14.80 
43.60 
8.02 
6.93 
2.10 
157.17 
0.75 
1486.01 
43.75 
2.37 
158.89 
133.47 
1.77 
0.65 
1989 
14.59 
43.47 
8.07 
7.02 
2.07 
178.16 
0.78 
1506.18 
43.58 
2.34 
172.69 
130.00 
1.80 
0.67 
1992 
14.36 
42.09 
7.89 
6.90 
2.04 
246.08 
0.77 
1544.75 
42.12 
2.30 
188.53 
129.45 
1.84 
0.71 
1995 
12.98 
38.32 
7.22 
6.45 
1.84 
299.26 
0.81 
2166.47 
37.94 
2.06 
194.06 
162.07 
1.51 
0.83 
Source: Financial Times I Datastream. 
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D.I. The three densest domestic routes, 10 EU states, June 1995 
State 
Portugal 
Between 
LIS 
LIS 
LIS 
and 
ΟΡΟ 
FNC 
FAO 
Weekly 
Seats 
19,498 
15.176 
6.772 
ASK million 
5.40 
14.63 
1.48 
Flights 
162 
163 
57 
A/L 
3 
1 
2 
PORTUGAL TOTAL 
Netherlands AMS 
AMS 
RTM 
MST 
EIN 
EIN 
62.745 
1,980 
1,376 
855 
38.02 
0.33 
0.14 
0.07 
684 
66 
35 
45 
1 
1 
1 
NETHERLANDS TOTAL 
Italy 
ROM 
ROM 
ROM 
MIL 
PMO 
CTA 
5,461 
12,317 
5,597 
1,434 
0.70 
2.40 
1.30 
0.37 
272 
63 
63 
26 
1 
1 
1 
ITALY TOTAL 
Ireland 
DUB 
DUB 
DUB 
SNN 
ORK 
KIR 
12,317 
5,597 
1,434 
2.40 
1.30 
0.37 
63 
63 
26 
1 
1 
1 
IRELAND TOTAL 
Greece 
ΑΤΗ 
ΑΤΗ 
ΑΤΗ 
SKG 
HER 
RHO 
22,160 
18.412 
12,718 
9,666 
4.43 
5.49 
3.97 
4.04 
298 
82 
80 
74 
1 
1 
1 
GREECE TOTAL 
UK 
LON 
LON 
LON 
EDI 
GLA 
BFS 
120,820 
51,937 
46,871 
46,140 
34.78 
27.79 
26.17 
24.11 
1,554 
371 
348 
394 
3 
3 
5 
UK TOTAL 
France 
PAR 
PAR 
PAR 
MRS 
NCE 
TLS 
448,975 
76,526 
70,671 
60,448 
176.89 
48.26 
47.84 
34.98 
6,505 
418 
405 
336 
4 
4 
3 
FRANCE TOTAL 
Spain 
MAD 
BCN 
MAD 
BCN 
PMI 
PMI 
651.224 
63,897 
27,961 
19,522 
345.421 5,827 
30.86 
5.62 
10.66 
459 
197 
128 
3 
3 
3 
SPAIN TOTAL 
Denmark 
CPH 
CPH 
CPH 
AAR 
AAL 
KRP 
450,372 
19.222 
14.360 
11,914 
260.09 
3.21 
3.42 
2.76 
3,227 
132 
98 
86 
1 
1 
1 
DENMARK TOTAL 
Germany 
BER 
FRA 
BER 
FRA 
HAM 
MUC 
68,292 
29,102 
27.045 
25.587 
13.63 
12.54 
11.14 
12.92 
756 
122 
126 
215 
1 
1 
3 
GERMANY TOTAL | 400.123| 159.19J 4.2251 
% National domestic 
Seals 
3 1 % 
24% 
11% 
ASK 
14% 
38% 
40% 
Flights 
24% 
18% 
8% 
36% 
25% 
16% 
48% 
20% 
10% 
24% 
13% 
17% 
15% 
11% 
8% 
16% 
11% 
12% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
56% 
25% 
6% 
54% 
29% 
8% 
21% 
21% 
9% 
15% 
11% 
8% 
16% 
11% 
12% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
12% 
10% 
10% 
16% 
15% 
14% 
6% 
5% 
6% 
12% 
11% 
9% 
14% 
14% 
10% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
14% 
6% 
4% 
12% 
2% 
4% 
14% 
6% 
4% 
28% 
2 1 % 
17% 
24% 
25% 
20% 
17% 
13% 
11% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
8% 
7% 
8% 
3% 
3% 
5% 
% national share of 
EU domestic 
Seats | ASK | Flights 
2% | 3% | 3% 
0%| 0%| 100% 
5% | 3% | 6% 
1 % | 0%| 1% 
5% | 3% | 6% 
17%| 14%| 25% 
25% | 28% | 22% 
17%| 2 1 % | 13% 
3%| 1 % | 3% 
15%| 13%| 16% 
TOTAL EU SERVICES | 2,610,827| 1,225.94| 26,195| 
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D.2. Entry and 
Route 
PAR-TLS 
PAR-NCE 
PAR-MRS 
PAR-MPL 
PAR-BOD 
PAR-SXB 
PAR-TLN 
PAR-PGF 
PAR-PUF 
PAR-LYS 
PAR-BIO 
PAR-BES 
PAR-FNI 
PAR-ΕΑΡ 
PAR-NTE 
PAR-AJA 
PAR-GNB 
capacity on French domestic trunk routes 
Pre-entry 
Carriers 
IT/AF 
IT 
AF 
IT 
IT/AF 
IT 
IT/AF 
IT 
IT/AF 
IT 
IT/AF 
IT 
IT 
IT 
IT 
AF 
IT 
IT 
IT 
IT 
IT 
IT 
IT 
IT 
Seats per 
weekday 
908 
3690 
4598 
2414 
2856 
5272 
939 
4416 
5355 
390 
1488 
1878 
594 
2552 
3146 
422 
2454 
2876 
1032 
1032 
688 
688 
830 
830 
409 
1345 
1754 
860 
788 
797 
1232 
730 
390 
797 
Post-entry 
Entry 
date 
1/1995 
4/1991 
1/1995 
10/1995 
5/1995 
9/1995 
2/1996 
2/1996 
2/1996 
Carriers 
IT/AF 
IT 
VD 
AF 
IT 
IW 
IT/AF 
IT 
IW 
IT/AF 
IT 
IW 
IT/AF 
IT 
VD 
IT/AF 
IT 
VD 
IT 
IW 
IT 
IW 
IT 
IW 
Seats per 
weekday 
908 
3518 
676 
5102 
1188 
3574 
620 
5382 
939 
4122 
1085 
6146 
390 
1488 
620 
2498 
594 
2552 
1014 
4160 
422 
2380 
676 
3478 
1174 
1639 
2813 
688 
998 
723 
1033 
Entry 
date 
4/1995 
1/1996 
3/1995 
1/1996 
Camers Seats per 
weekday 
IT/AF 908 
IT 3011 
VD 1014 
RN 520 
5453 
AF 853 
IT 2580 
IW 1860 
VD 845 
6138 
IT/AF 939 
IT 3349 
IW 1395 
IJ 612 
6295 
1T/.AF 390 
IT 1660 
IW 620 
VD 390 
3060 
Entry 
date 
10/1995 
Carriers Seats per 
weekday 
IT/AF 908 
IT 2967 
VD/RN 2267 
IJ 612 
6754 
Airline and airport three letter codes 
Airlines 
AF 
U 
IT 
IW 
RN 
VD 
Air France 
TAT 
Air Inter 
AOM 
Euralair 
Air Liberté 
Airports 
PAR 
TLS 
NCE 
MRS 
MPL 
BOD 
SXB 
TLN 
PGF 
PUF 
LYS 
BIQ 
BES 
FNI 
EAP 
ΝΤΕ 
AJA 
GNB 
Paris 
Toulouse 
Nice 
Marseilles 
Montpellier 
Bordeaux 
Strasbourg 
Toulon 
Perpignan 
Pau 
Lyon 
Biarritz 
Brest 
Nimes 
Mulhouse 
Nantes 
Ajaccio 
Grenoble 
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D.3. Air fares on the Paris­Toulouse route 
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D.4. Comparison of domestic fares in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, 1989, 
1992 and 1995 
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One­Way Fully Flexible Domestic Fares 1992 
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50 ­
One­Way Fully Flexible Domestic Fares 1995 
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D.5. Comparison of French domestic and intra-EU air fares 
1986 Lowest Economy Return Fare vs Stage Length 
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1986 One Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
French Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
2000 
1800 
1600 
1400 
£ 1200 
"£ 1000 
« 800 
600 -f 
400 
200 
0 
O Domestic Routes 
■ Intra­EU Routes 
350 400 450 500 550 600 
Stage Length (km) 
650 700 
1989 One Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
French Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
2000 
1800 
1600 
1400 
¡Γ 1200 
Τ 1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 
m 
LU 
O Domestic Routes 
■ Intra­EU Routes 
350 400 450 500 550 
Stage Length (km) 
600 650 700 
Appendix D ­ Domestic capacity and air fares 171 
1992 One Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
French Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
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D.6. Comparison of German domestic and intra-EU air fares 
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1992 Lowest Economy Return Fare vs Stage Length 
German Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
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1986 One­Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
German Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
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1992 One-Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
German Domestic and Intra-EU Routes 
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D.7. Comparison of Italian domestic and intra-EU air fares 
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1986 One-Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
Italian Domestic and Intra-EU Routes 
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1992 One-Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
Italian Domestic and Intra-EU Routes 
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D.8. Comparison of Spanish domestic and intra-EU air fares 
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1986 One­Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
Spanish Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
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1992 One­Way Fully Flexible Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
Spanish Domestic and Intra­EU Routes 
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D.9. Comparison of UK domestic and intra-EU air fares 
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1992 Lowest Return Economy Fare vs Stage Length 
UK Domestic and Intra-EU Routes 
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APPENDIX E 
EU airline labour costs 
190 Airtransport 
Air France Average Expenses per Employee 
in 1994 prices 
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SAS Average Expenses per Employee 
in 1994 prices 
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APPENDIX F 
Airline case studies 
F.l. Air France 
F. 1.1. Strategic responses 
Throughout the 1990s Air France has faced the most profound difficulty in attempting to 
make the transition from highly protected carrier into one which has to face the full rigours of 
a competitive marketplace. Successive rounds of ever more stringent cost-cutting measures 
have yet to restore profitability. The broad consensus that existed in the late 1980s that 
Western Europe's airline industry would undergo rapid consolidation prior to the creation of 
the single European market had a strong influence in determining Air France's strategic 
policy for the 1990s. The company's perception that only large airlines with extensive route 
networks would survive in the global marketplace resulted in its decision to seek rapid 
expansion. To ensure its place in future events the company began rapidly to increase its 
fleet size, having some 52 aircraft on order in December 1989. In addition to organic 
expansion, the company embarked on a programme of developing alliances with other 
carriers. 
The flag carrier's take-over of UTA in January 1990 marked the beginning of this period of 
rapid build-up in capacity as the airline prepared itself for the competitive onslaught to come. 
The elimination of UTA, a move that mirrored British Airways' acquisition of British 
Caledonian, was beneficial in two key areas for Air France. Whilst UTA had competed 
directly with the state airline on a small number of international routes, its real threat lay in 
its potential to develop a European route network. The second benefit derived by Air France 
was the control it gained of Air Inter. In the process of acquiring UTA, however, the 
company was required by the Commission to relinquish its shareholding in TAT. 
In 1989 Air France had widened the alliance it had previously developed with Lufthansa 
(Amadeus, Atlas - a joint aircraft maintenance consortium, Euroberlin) to include staff 
training, aircraft purchasing and catering. The same year the company had acquired a 1.5% 
shareholding in Austrian Airlines. Despite worsening finances, the carrier continued with its 
acquisition policy in the early 1990s by taking a 19.9% stake in CSA and a 37.5% holding in 
Sabena. The latter purchase, which received Commission approval in October 1992, 
followed an abortive attempt by British Airways and KLM to take over the Belgian flag 
carrier. Whilst the motivation for the Sabena purchase was clearly defensive, the marketing 
alliances established in 1992 with Aerovías de Mexico and Air Canada were viewed as a 
means of improving access to the US market. By comparison with British Airways, Air 
France's share of transatlantic traffic has been low, partly as the result of a less favourable 
bilateral agreement. 
The long and deep economic recession of the early 1990s, exacerbated by the adverse impact 
of the Gulf War, produced a substantial decline in traffic, resulting in a dramatic decline in 
yields. Unfortunately for Air France this large downturn coincided with a period of high 
capital spending for the company. The outcome was one of mounting losses, which the 
carrier first sought to counter in September 1990. The Austerity Plan aimed to improve the 
carrier's financial plight, by freezing recruitment, lowering capital spending and reducing 
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paid non-work periods. These measures, however, were clearly inadequate to deal with the 
fundamental problems faced by Air France. A second attempt to stem the company's losses 
was introduced by the Chairman, Bernard Aitali, in September 1993. Under CAP 93, a three-
point restructuring plan, 3,000 jobs were to be trimmed, representing some 5% of the 
carrier's workforce. In addition, a further FF 5 billion of capital was to be raised in order to 
fund the company's expansion and fleet renewal programme. The company's strategy 
remained clear: to reduce costs, absorb UTA, take a stake in Sabena and consolidate Air 
Inter. 
Unfortunately, the strategy was flawed. A moribund economic climate in France and 
increasing competition from leaner airlines led to a rapid deterioration in the company's 
finances. Attempting to turn around and integrate Sabena, merge the activities of UTA, find 
some means by which to marry Air Inter's domestic operations focused at Orly with Air 
France's international network hubbing at Charles de Gaulle, develop Eastern European 
activities through its part acquisition of CSA and extract the benefits from the various 
marketing alliances it had established with carriers around the world, set against a 
background of declining yields and high operating costs, was an impossible task. Calls by 
Bernard Aitali for even more draconian measures in September 1993, the carrier's fourth 
cost-cutting plan in three years, were not supported by the workforce. The inevitable strike 
action precipitated his departure from the airline in October ofthat year. 
The cuts proposed by Mr Aitali would have had the effect of reducing Air France's unit costs 
in 1995 by 19%. Another 4,000 jobs were to have gone by the end of 1994 and the number 
of routes served by the carrier would have fallen by 40% since 1990. Even given the scale of 
the cost-cutting, assuming its successful implementation, a further injection of capital would 
have been required from the state. In the event the French Transport Minister, Bernard 
Bosson, cancelled the company's restructuring plan. 
The appointment of Christian Blanc as Chairman in October 1993 heralded the abandonment 
of the expansionist global strategy pursued by his predecessor. It was readily apparent that if 
Mr Blanc's plan was to succeed he would need the support of the workforce. The corporate 
plan announced in March 1994 called for a three-year wages freeze and further staff 
reductions. Unsurprisingly, it did not receive overwhelming trade union support. A direct 
approach to the company's employees, however, proved successful, with 81% of employees 
giving their consent to the new restructuring measures. 
F. 1.2. Routes, air services and capacity 
The airline's ability to take advantage of a more liberalized air transport market in Europe 
has been severely limited as a result of its deteriorating financial position. Much of the route 
expansion embarked upon by the company at the end of the 1980s has had to be abandoned. 
During the early 1990s the company was forced to close some 50 loss-making routes linking 
French regional points with major European cities. Some lower yield destinations served by 
Air France from Paris, such as those in Spain and North Africa, were transferred to Air Inter. 
Decentralization formed a key part of the company's 1994 corporate plan. The policy 
involved the establishment of 11 profit centres. Six of the profit centres are traffic based and 
the remainder concerned with logistical aspects of the carrier's operations, a horizontal 
organizational structure contrasting with the vertical arrangement that had existed previously. 
Long haul operations account for four of the six traffic profit centres (Americas, Africa and 
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Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Antilles-French Guyana-Indian Ocean), with European routes and 
cargo services forming the other two. A total of 20 destinations are served by the Americas 
profit centre (ten in the US, nine in South America, and Tahiti), using a mixed fleet of 747-
400, A340, 767 and Concorde aircraft. The company's South American network was 
rationalized in 1994/95, with loss-making routes pruned. To serve the 37 locations in Africa 
and 11 in the Middle East, a fleet of ten A310 and eight 747-200 combi aircraft are 
employed. The company had reduced the number of destinations served in these two regions 
from 51 in 1993 to 40 in late 1994, but has since reinstated many of these routes. 
The company's fleet of largest aircraft, the 747-400, is used mainly to operate to the 14 
destinations served in the Asia-Pacific region. Operations to Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka were withdrawn during 1994 and those to Australia in 1995. The 
carrier's older fleet of 747 aircraft are used to operate routes to the French Overseas 
Departments and Territories, on which it faces stiff competition from both Air Liberté and 
AOM. Within Europe, Air France employs a mixed fleet of aircraft ranging from the 105 
seat 737-200 and its more modern equivalent the 737-500, the 150 seat A320 and the 
considerably larger A300. 
The company has a particularly large cargo division, operating a fleet of eleven 747 
freighters. Substantial growth in traffic has been achieved over the past two years, resulting 
in a near 70% load factor. 
At the regional level the carrier has a long history of contracting small, independent French 
airlines to operate services on its behalf on routes warranting the use of aircraft seating fewer 
than 100 passengers. Its use of the turbo-prop and small jet aircraft operated by Air Littoral, 
Brit Air and TAT (until its acquisition by British Airways) served the duel purpose of tying 
in potential competitors, whilst simultaneously enabling the company to operate lightly 
trafficked routes in a cost-effective way. The operation of a growing fleet of 50 seat 
Canadair Regional jets by both Air Littoral and Brit Air under the guise of Air France - Air 
Inter Express represents the most recent manifestation of this policy. The independent 
German regional carrier, Euro wings, also operates services on behalf of the company. 
F. 1.3. Marketing, traffic and market share 
Within Europe, Air France has fared badly in terms of market share, when compared with the 
majority of its competitors. This situation has arisen for a number of reasons. The lack of an 
effective domestic feed for its international services at Charles de Gaulle and its record of 
industrial unrest have been two key factors. Whilst British Airways and Lufthansa have fully 
integrated route networks operating under a single brand name, the policy of maintaining Air 
France and Air Inter as two distinct airlines has been a major disadvantage in attracting 
traffic. 
To help improve its image and catch up with the enhanced in-flight service provided by other 
carriers, Air France introduced its L'Espace and Tempo brands in 1995. The fact that Air 
Inter Europe continues to market a different in-flight service brand may well prove confusing 
to consumers. 
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F. 1.4. Productivity and operating costs 
The aim of the current restructuring plan is to restore the company to profitability by the 
beginning of 1997. In order to achieve this target, productivity has to be increased by 30% 
over 1993 levels. A continuing improvement in productivity was one of the conditions laid 
down by the Commission to enable payment of the second and final tranches of state aid. To 
achieve the 30% target, the number of staff employed by Air France is to be reduced to 
35,000 by January 1997, down from 39,950 in January 1994. By the end of the 1994/95 
financial year, half of the required reduction in staffing levels had been achieved. 
Despite the severe cost reducing measures, Air France's unit operating costs continue to lag 
behind those of Lufthansa. The French carrier's direct operating costs were 7.5% higher than 
those of Lufthansa in the first half of 1995. This situation represents an improvement over 
the situation in 1993 when the differential was 10.6%. For long haul routes, the differential 
remains at the 1993 level. Overall, it is clear that Air France has some way to go to match 
the operating cost and productivity levels of British Airways and Lufthansa. 
Apart from cuts in the labour force, productivity improvements are being sought through 
better utilization of aircraft, fleet rationalization, which has involved some downsizing, and 
longer flying hours from both flight deck and cabin crew. It remains to be seen whether these 
improvements can be achieved by early 1997. At present, the signs are not particularly strong 
that they will be realized. For example, in terms of aircraft utilization the carrier has yet to 
match the levels it achieved in 1989. Where its fleet is concerned, it would appear that the 
number of aircraft types employed has actually increased. During the 1990s, apart from 
replacing some older generation aircraft with more fuel efficient equipment, the number of 
different types and variants of aircraft operated has gone up from 11 in 1990 to 18 in 1995. 
Whilst providing the carrier with a greater degree of flexibility in terms of matching demand 
and supply across its route network, there is an undoubted disadvantage in terms of scale 
economies. 
F.l.5. Pricing and yields 
Yields have fallen throughout the 1990s. In the financial year 1994/95 the airline's average 
yield was some 9.9% lower than in 1993 (the 1993 yield was down by 7% on the 1992 
figure). Whilst the company has been effective in achieving high load factors, 72% in 
1994/95, it has an inappropriate mix of fares. The airline has acknowledged its poor yield 
management as being a major weakness. It is anticipated that this situation will improve 
during the spring of this year with the introduction of a new yield management system 
acquired from Sabre Decision Technologies. The Airmax Origin and Destination software 
performs forecasting and optimization across the carrier's entire route network, a feature 
lacking in the internally developed OPERA system. 
F. 1.6. Profitability and sources of finance 
The extent of the company's difficulties is apparent from the scale of the financial aid 
required to set the airline on a sound footing. In July 1994 the Commission approved a 
restructuring plan which was dependent on FF 20 billion of state funding. A key element of 
the new strategy involved the creation of a new holding company, Groupe Air France SA. In 
addition to this new organization acquiring a 79% stake in Air France for a symbolic franc, it 
also took over the flag carrier's 72% shareholding in Air Inter. The plan aimed to tackle a 
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major shortcoming of the previous strategy, namely the lack of co-ordination between these 
two carriers. The low level of interlining between the two airlines at Charles de Gaulle 
represented a substantial lost opportunity for the group. To overcome this difficulty a new 
company is to be set up which will combine the European services of Air France and all of 
Air Inter's activities. This could not be implemented before 1997, however, as a consequence 
of conditions imposed by the Commission. 
The disposal of shareholdings acquired during the early 1990s in other carriers accompanied 
the new restructuring programme. Sabena's dissatisfaction with its shareholder partner led to 
an announcement by Air France in 1994 that it was disposing of its stake in the airline. In 
1995 the carrier also sold its holding in CSA. Further sales have included the company's 
interests in the Méridien Hotel chain, a further condition of the state aid package. 
A number of the aircraft ordered and held on option by the airline from Airbus and Boeing 
have been cancelled, whilst others have had their delivery dates deferred. A further 
requirement imposed by the Commission was that the fleet should be reduced in size by some 
20 aircraft. However, this has had little impact, as the company already had 21 of its aircraft 
either on lease to other airlines or out of service. 
Another major objective of Mr Blanc's corporate plan involved the modification of Air 
France's structure and status to enable employees of the airline to become shareholders. A 
law enabling joint stock companies with labour holdings to become ordinary limited 
companies was enacted in August 1994. Holders of labour shares were to receive shares in 
the new holding company, Groupe Air France, by way of compensation. The change in 
status enabled the airline to convert its salaried employees into shareholders, with a collective 
ability to hold up to 20% of the company's capital. At the end of 1994 some 12,000 of the 
carrier's staff became shareholders (owning 5% of the equity) in exchange for a reduction in 
their salaries. 
Given the carrier's financial problems, it would seem unlikely that privatization of the 
company will be achieved during the 1990s. 
F. 1.7. Impact of EU measures and conclusions 
As is evident, Air France has not been in a strong position to take much advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the third package. According to the company only three new 
services were started between June 1989 and June 1992 (Amsterdam-Copenhagen, Lisbon-
Madrid, London-Strasbourg) and three in the following three years (Berlin-Strasbourg, 
Hamburg-Strasbourg, Munich-Strasbourg) as a consequence of EU legislation. The falling 
yields experienced by the carrier, however, bear witness to the high degree of competition 
evident in many of its markets. The pricing freedom given to carriers operating within 
Europe since 1993 has not been used to good effect by the company. Its weakness at 
managing yield has placed it at a great disadvantage to carriers such as British Airways and 
Lufthansa, who have placed considerable emphasis in this area. 
It is readily apparent that Air France has still a considerable way to go before it can match the 
levels of profitability achieved by British Airways. A number of obstacles remain in its path. 
Given the confusion engendered by the continued separation of Air France and Air Inter 
(albeit now in the guise of Air Inter Europe), prolonging the distinction would appear to serve 
no useful purpose. Until the operations of the two companies are fully integrated under the 
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well-known Air France brand name and effective hubbing occurs at both Paris airports, it will 
be difficult to match the marketing achievements of British Airways. 
Whether Air France can achieve the targets set out as a condition of its FF 20 billion state aid 
package remains doubtful. It continues to experience fundamental difficulty in persuading its 
workforce of the necessity to change the company's culture from one of protected state 
monopoly to competitive enterprise. The strong bond between state and airline has acted to 
prolong this perception. For as long as the French government is willing to shield its flag 
carrier from the rigours of the free market this corporate culture will persist. 
The real problem for Air France has been, and continues to be, that the goalposts are 
continually being moved. Whether the political will and sheer stamina required to maintain a 
sufficient degree of profitability over the longer term exist remains a matter of conjecture. 
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PASSENGER TRAFFIC RPK ASK 
(thousand) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
2.351 
2,424 
2.843 
3,144 
3.359 
3,276 
2,097 
1,940 
1,726 
1,830 
Europe 
5.345 
5.425 
6.174 
7.029 
7.738 
7.759 
7.105 
7.393 
7,251 
7,968 
lnt'nl 
10.132 
9,602 
10.518 
11,625 
12.721 
12.412 
11,106 
11,813 
12,621 
13.762 
Total 
12.483 
12.025 
13.361 
14.769 
16.080 
15,688 
13,203 
13.754 
14.347 
15,592 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
5.286 
5.593 
6.959 
7,793 
8,010 
7.630 
6.921 
7.289 
7.149 
7,969 
Europe 
3.999 
4.009 
4.642 
5,356 
5,975 
6,081 
5,449 
5,826 
5,726 
6,333 
Infill 
23.297 
21,978 
24,481 
26,540 
28,724 
29,023 
26,790 
29,746 
36,385 
42,151 
Total 
28.583 
27,571 
31,440 
34,333 
36,734 
36,653 
33,711 
37,034 
43,535 
50,119 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
7,376 
7,657 
9,172 
10,448 
10,834 
10.535 
9,572 
9,932 
9,957 
9,957 
Europe 
6,586 
6.786 
7.561 
8.805 
9.731 
10.224 
10.297 
10.725 
10,330 
10.263 
lnt'nl 
34,719 
34,609 
36,034 
36,491 
41,259 
42,402 
40,901 
44,821 
54,264 
57,957 
Total 
42,095 
42.266 
45.207 
46,939 
52,093 
52,938 
50,473 
54,752 
64.220 
67.914 
ATK RTK WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
2.351 
2,424 
2,843 
3,144 
3,359 
3,276 
2.097 
1,940 
1,726 
1.830 
Europe 
5.345 
5,425 
6.174 
7.029 
7.738 
7.759 
7,105 
7.393 
7.251 
7,968 
lnt'nl 
10.132 
9,602 
10,518 
11,625 
12.721 
12,412 
11.106 
11,813 
12.621 
13,762 
Total 
12,483 
12,025 
13,361 
14,769 
16.080 
15.688 
13.203 
13.754 
14,347 
15.592 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
1.582 
1.612 
1,899 
2,000 
1.989 
1,976 
1.273 
1,149 
1,157 
1.405 
Europe 
2.838 
2,837 
3.248 
3,760 
4.155 
3,996 
3,311 
3.512 
3.756 
4,836 
lnt'nl 
6,606 
6,001 
6.868 
7,475 
8,065 
7,807 
6.442 
7,005 
8.178 
10.335 
Total 
8.188 
7,613 
8,768 
9,474 
10.054 
9,783 
7,714 
8,154 
9,335 
11,740 
<%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
67.30% 
66.50% 
66.80% 
63.60% 
59.20% 
60.30% 
60.70% 
59.20% 
67.00% 
76.80% 
Europe 
53% 
52% 
53% 
54% 
54% 
52% 
47% 
48% 
52% 
61% 
lnt'nl 
65% 
63% 
65% 
64% 
63% 
63% 
58% 
59% 
65% 
75% 
Total 
66% 
63% 
66% 
64% 
63% 
62% 
58% 
59% 
65% 
75% 
PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR 
(%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
72% 
73% 
76% 
75% 
74% 
72% 
72% 
73% 
72% 
80% 
Europe 
61% 
59% 
61% 
61% 
61% 
59% 
53% 
54% 
55% 
62% 
lnt'nl 
67% 
64% 
68% 
73% 
70% 
68% 
65% 
66% 
67% 
73% 
Total 
68% 
65% 
70% 
73% 
71% 
69% 
67% 
68% 
68% 
74% 
PASSENGER REVENUE PER RPK 
(US cents l'JS5 prices) 
FREIGHT AND MAIL TONNE KM 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
5.19 
6.30 
6.48 
6.17 
5.56 
6.61 
5.83 
5.66 
N/A 
N/A 
Europe 
15.06 
19.42 
21.21 
20.83 
18.88 
21.33 
: i «: 
21.77 
N/A 
N/A 
Intern'l 
8.37 
10.07 
10.42 
10.38 
9.70 
10.53 
10.53 
10.25 
N/A 
N/A 
Total 
7.78 
9.30 
9.55 
9.43 
8.79 
9.72 
9.56 
9.35 
N/A 
N/A 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
61 
61 
69 
73 
81 
90 
83 
63 
55 
54 
Europe 
47 
52 
54 
57 
54 
60 
56 
56 
44 
48 
lnt'nl 
1.173 
1.226 
1.342 
1,390 
1,353 
1,479 
1,478 
1,371 
1,655 
1.788 
Total 
1.234 
1,287 
1,411 
1,463 
1,434 
1,568 
1,561 
1,435 
1.710 
1.842 
FREIGHT AND MAIL YIELD 
(US cents 1990 prices) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
AVERAG 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
23 
29 
32 
31 
28 
28 
29 
28 
N/A 
N/A 
E AIRCRA 
Domestic 
360 
358 
361 
352 
332 
326 
361 
265 
280 
286 
Europe 
56 
66 
72 
67 
61 
59 
60 
54 
N/A 
N/A 
FT SIZE 
Europe 
140 
132 
124 
124 
123 
123 
128 
122 
116 
114 
lnt'nl 
24 
26 
26 
25 
23 
23 
24 
23 
N/A 
N/A 
lnt'nl 
239 
226 
216 
199 
208 
206 
205 
203 
213 
213 
Total 
24 
26 
26 
25 
23 
23 
24 
23 
N/A 
N/A 
(seats) 
Total 
254 
242 
235 
220 
226 
222 
224 
212 
221 
221 
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AVERAGE PASSENGER HAUL TOTAL AIRCRAFT KM FLOWN 
(km) (million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
2,248 
2,307 
2,448 
2,479 
2,385 
2,329 
3,301 
3.756 
4.142 
4.355 
Europe 
748 
739 
752 
762 
772 
784 
767 
788 
790 
795 
lnt'nl 
2,299 
2.289 
2,328 
2,283 
2,258 
2,338 
2,412 
2,518 
2,883 
3,063 
Total 
2,290 
2.293 
2.353 
2,325 
2,284 
2,336 
2,553 
2,693 
3,034 
3,214 
FLEET SIZE 
(un i is) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
41 
44 
43 
50 
51 
56 
58 
67 
68 
61 
lnt'nl 
93 
98 
98 
97 
103 
112 
135 
139 
140 
126 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
21 
21 
25 
30 
33 
32 
27 
38 
36 
35 
Europe 
47 
52 
61 
71 
79 
83 
80 
88 
89 
90 
lnt'nl 
146 
153 
167 
184 
198 
206 
199 
221 
255 
272 
Total 
166 
175 
193 
213 
231 
239 
226 
259 
291 
307 
TOTAL HOURS FLOWN 
(hours) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
32.600 
34.000 
40,300 
47.800 
53,800 
53.500 
39,200 
37.500 
35.500 
34,800 
Europe 
93,800 
102,900 
126,100 
153,100 
170,100 
180,300 
173,200 
189,400 
194,000 
196.900 
lnt'nl 
258.737 
271,020 
302,903 
344,635 
373,712 
387,261 
380,720 
413,339 
416,000 
439,500 
Total 
291,337 
305.020 
343.203 
392.435 
427.512 
440.761 
419,920 
450.839 
451.500 
474.300 
EMPLOYEES 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Average 
35.325 
35.350 
35,580 
36,507 
38,117 
39,461 
39,640 
41,113 
42,425 
40.954 
o o 
DAILY AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION ATK PER EMPLOYEE AIR FRANCE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AIR FRANCE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
6.3 
6.4 
8.0 
8.4 
9.1 
8.8 
8.2 
7.7 
7.8 
8.8 
(hours) 
Int'l 
7.6 
7.6 
8.5 
9.7 
9.9 
9.5 
7.7 
8.1 
8.1 
9.6 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Average 
214,023 
224,942 
243.151 
263.381 
266,612 
265,260 
273,439 
273,476 
300.315 
315,161 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Op'ing 
Revenue 
5.065 
4.234 
4,096 
4.212 
4.553 
4.219 
4,864 
8,301 
5,369 
N/A 
(1990 prices - million ECU) 
Op'ing 
Cost 
4,672 
3,893 
3,734 
3,902 
4,430 
4,443 
4,936 
8,513 
5,967 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Profit 
393 
341 
362 
310 
123 
-224 
-72 
-212 
-599 
Ν/Λ 
Net 
Profit 
140 
119 
119 
189 
104 
-127 
-84 
-458 
-1.084 
N/A 
(current pnces - million íiCU) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1993 
Op'ing 
Revenue 
3.966 
3.499 
3.533 
3.793 
4,329 
4,219 
5,060 
8,891 
5.876 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Costs 
3.658 
3.217 
3.221 
3.514 
4.212 
4.443 
5.135 
9.117 
6.531 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Profit 
307 
282 
312 
279 
117 
-224 
-75 
_τ>7 
-655 
N/A 
Net 
Profit 
109 
99 
103 
170 
99 
-127 
-87 
-491 
-1.187 
N/A 
•a 
o 
3 
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F.2. British Airways 
F.2.1. Strategic responses 
British Airways (BA) is a classic case of a major EU airline which sees itself as a global 
carrier competing in a global marketplace; while operations within the EU are vital to its 
success, its overall strategy is driven by wider issues. For example, it identifies the three 
dominant regional air transport markets to be Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific and 
the three dominant intercontinental markets to be those linking these three. Its strategy is to 
be a major participant in all six markets, either directly or via long-term relationships. Its 
partnerships with USAir, Qantas, TAT and Deutsche BA (DBA) need to be seen in this light. 
Its interest in regulatory reform in North America (i.e. ownership rules), and Asia-Pacific (i.e. 
arrangements between Australia and New Zealand) are of similar importance to the EU 
single market process. 
One of the most important events which acted as a catalyst to its strategic responses to a more 
competitive environment was the announcement by the British government in 1979 that the 
airline was to be privatized. This was nearly ten years before the adoption of the first 
package, but resulted in many actions to restructure the airline which other EU carriers did 
not begin to adopt until the final stages of the EU liberalization process. For them, British 
Airways provided something of a case study. 
Because of this, British Airways indicates that the three packages have had no effect on 
product development, distribution strategy, the rate of marketing innovation or route 
rationalization. They have had only modest effect on alliances, pricing, cost-cutting and staff 
numbers. 
The British Airways 1981-82 accounts recorded a UK£ 544 million deficit including special 
provisions for an extensive 'survival plan' which was also designed to prepare for 
privatization. It is interesting to note that this included staff cuts, suspension of unprofitable 
routes, disposal of surplus assets, the acquisition of a new fleet not constrained by political 
interference, and a major rebranding exercise. Many of these have parallels with current 
strategies being implemented with varying degrees of success by Aer Lingus, TAP, Sabena, 
Olympic, Air France and Iberia - and those being decided upon within Alitalia. 
Unlike many other airlines in the EU, British Airways had to contend with a series of new-
style bilaterals from the mid-1980s, which were precursors of the first two packages of 
liberalization measures. It also faced competition in specific markets from an efficient, 
largely deregulated charter sector. The momentum of the restructuring exercise was 
maintained and the airline was successfully privatized in February 1987 via a public flotation 
which was 11 times oversubscribed. 
Over the last decade, British Airways has made a classic response to a more competitive 
market with a search for size and a set of new marketing strategies. 
The former began with the acquisition of its main UK scheduled competitor, British 
Caledonian, in July 1987. The timing of this move was obviously not directly influenced by 
the EU packages of reform, but was a recognition that a reform process was under way. BA's 
move to secure interests in operators in the two next largest EU markets after the UK via 
Deutsche Β A and TAT in 1992 (see Section 3.2) preceded the third package and the 
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introduction of the concepts of Community ownership and common licensing. In any case, 
Β A appears to have wished that these moves to ensure representation in one of the world's 
big regional markets did not result in adverse political and local consumer reaction to a 
'British' brand. It was also concerned not to create difficulties with bilaterals with non-EU 
states for existing and future DBA and TAT operations. 
In 1992 it took over the assets of the Gatwick-based carrier Dan Air and also began the 
process of securing a 24.6% stake in USAir. A further step in its strategy of global linkages 
was put in place with its agreement in 1993 to take a 25% stake in the Australian carrier 
Qantas. 
The stake in USAir was in fact the culmination of a long search for a North American 
partner, which began with a marketing relationship signed with United in 1987. In 1989 it 
attempted to cement this arrangement with a 15% investment, but this had to be withdrawn 
when its other partners in the proposed buyout failed to raise the necessary funds, and United 
decided to start its own transatlantic services. A further unsuccessful partnership proposal, 
this time with KLM to acquire Sabena as part of a joint venture which opened the possibility 
of linking with Northwest, foundered in late 1990. The airline also held talks with KLM in 
early 1991 regarding a merger, again without any concrete results. 
Partly as a result of its desire to secure its home market, and partly because it recognized that 
its own cost structure was not suited to low-density operations, BA pioneered the concept in 
1993 of franchise operations. These arrangements can also be seen as part of its wider 
marketing response to liberalization. However, the UK industry, with its relatively large 
number of independent airlines, is uniquely open for non-UK airlines to gain a presence via 
acquisition. The setting up of an airline of significant size in the UK is made more difficult 
because of slot constraints. Recognizing that KLM and SAS had already made such moves 
via Air UK and BMA, a further motivation for BA to enter strong franchise arrangements 
was to provide a practical barrier to market entry by non-UK carriers at little investment cost 
to itself. It was also aware that these relationships would be difficult for the competition 
authorities to oppose. 
F.2.2. Routes, air services and capacity 
Much of BA's expansion within the EU has been via the growth of its franchisees and 
partners on relatively low density routes. These appear as BA code shares, and the traffic 
carried is not shown in the tables at the end of this section. Research carried out for this 
report using ABC World Airways Guide data reveals 10 new services opened between June 
1989 and June 1992 and 40 routes opened between June 1992 and June 1995. According to 
BA (see questionnaire) only three of these (Paris-Rome, Brussels-Rome and Thessaloniki-
Turin, all opened between 1992 and 1995) were not franchisees or partners. 
F.2.3. Marketing, traffic and market share 
British Airways increased its overall level of scheduled activity excluding franchise 
operations, as measured by revenue passenger-kilometres, by a factor of just over two (2.07) 
between 1985 and 1994. This was partly a result of organic growth, and partly because of 
mergers and acquisitions. Surprisingly, the airline's UK domestic traffic grew faster than this 
average, but this was explained largely by its acquisition of British Caledonian. On intra-
European international routes (i.e. geographical Europe, not intra-EU) the traffic carried by 
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BA has grown at the same rate as its non-European international traffic, at first sight 
suggesting little effect of the single market process. 
Over the same time period, the traffic of the AEA airlines grew slightly more slowly, by a 
factor of 2.01. Although it is difficult to make direct comparisons, because of changes in 
AEA membership and variations in definitions, it would appear that British Airways has at 
least maintained its market share at around 15% of AEA intra-European international 
revenue passenger-kilometres. In terms of total (world) international RPKs, it has advanced 
its share of AEA activity from around 20% to around 23%. 
British Airways believes that the lack of airport slots within the EU is the most important 
barrier to market entry on cross-border routes. In 1990 it took the initiative to set up the 
Infrastructure Action Group, operating under the aegis of IATA, to lobby for better provision. 
In the charter sector it sees vertical integration with tour operators and travel agents as an 
important barrier. It does not see override commissions, frequent flyer programmes or airline 
alliances as particular barriers to entry. It has to be noted, however, that these are factors 
which are of considerable benefit to British Airways and its response needs to be interpreted 
accordingly. 
F.2.4. Productivity and operating costs 
In order to maintain productivity and control costs, BA has periodically been through a series 
of staff reduction, cost reduction and 'gap closing' exercises. It has admitted that its cost 
levels in several areas are still above those of some of the smaller UK airlines, but its brand 
position, its powerful marketing strategy and its domination of high yield business travel, 
particularly out of Heathrow, have helped it to maintain its profit record. 
The biggest changes to the airline's staff productivity occurred prior to privatization in the 
first half of the 1980s. However, it has proven itself willing to react quickly to adverse 
economic conditions and reduce its headcount when necessary. For example, at the onset of 
the recession in the UK and in the aftermath of the Gulf War the airline reduced its workforce 
from a high of 52,252 in 1990, to 50,398 in 1991 and 47,103 in 1992. When reviewing these 
actions, the airline cites the need to remain competitive with US and Asian carriers as 
significantly more important than the three packages and the need to be competitive with EU 
airlines. 
Amongst EU airlines, British Airways has taken the lead in outsourcing non-core activities 
and in creating internal profit centres to focus management attention on costs and efficiency. 
Its cargo operations and its engineering operations were the first departments to be made into 
profit centres, and the latter has recently been transformed into a separate, wholly-owned 
company. 
It has pioneered amongst EU majors the concept of profit sharing (not an easy option for 
many EU carriers), performance related pay, flexible working and the location of labour-
intensive tasks away from London with its high costs. 
F.2.5. Pricing and yields 
One of British Airways' strengths relative to its domestic, EU and global competitors is its 
yield management system. The airline has been able to combine a policy of gradually 
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increasing its premium fares while participating fully but in a controlled way in the low fares 
market. Research presented elsewhere in this report shows that cross-border fares out of 
London are amongst the lowest in the Community. This is partly because of competition, but 
also because of successive depreciation of the UK pound. The airline has made use of its 
yield management system to direct intercontinental traffic from elsewhere in the EU over 
London to gain maximum benefit from network effects. 
Its yields are typically below the AEA average, but its passenger seat factors are typically 
somewhat higher. It would see itself as innovative in terms of pricing and has recently taken 
steps to implement a system of remaindering excess capacity under the brand name of 'World 
Offers'. 
F.2.6. Profitability and sources of finance 
Although British Airways and its predecessor companies had a mixed profit performance 
prior to privatization, and changes in its accounting practices make year to year comparisons 
difficult, since privatization its record has been exceptionally good relative to industry and 
EU airline averages. 
As part of its strategy of seeking additional funds, in 1992 it sought credit ratings from 
Moody's Investor Services and from Standard and Poor's. Both assigned it an 'A' grade or 
equivalent. In May 1993 it raised UK£ 442 million, net of expenses, by way of a rights issue. 
Some of this was used to pay for its stake in USAir, which many suggest was ill-advised. 
Unlike other EU carriers which are not disciplined by the financial markets, however, it has 
demonstrated a willingness to write off the investment in time, effort and money associated 
with what have turned out to be poor investments, for example in Air Russia. 
It has to be recognized that the airline's global ambitions have not had an entirely positive 
effect on its financial performance. In addition to its losses on Air Russia, its investment in 
USAir has had to be written down in value - although British Airways claims that the 
principal benefits have been gained through increased feed through co-ordinated schedules, 
code sharing and joint operations. Neither TAT nor Deutsche BA are profitable, and this has 
provided a cautionary lesson about the difficulties of linking operations based in separate EU 
states. 
Even when activities have been profitable, but have not been considered essential to the core 
business, it has been willing to dispose of them in order to focus management time and 
investment resources on airline operations (i.e. the sale of its engine overhaul business to 
General Electric, the sale of its charter operation Caledonian Airways to Inspirations). This 
process has moved ahead in parallel with the move towards greater out-sourcing and the 
creation of profit centres mentioned in Section B.2.4 above. 
Since privatization, BA's shares have moved from trading between a high of 183 and a low 
of 158 pence in 1987, to trading between 436 and 398 in the first quarter of 1996. At flotation 
some 17% of shares were owned by foreign nationals. In March 1995, this proportion stood 
at 35%, with a large proportion held in the United States. 
Like most private sector airlines, British Airways has acquired a proportion of its fleet under 
operating leases, with the majority of these off balance sheet. Of the March 1995 total fleet of 
243 aircraft, excluding Deutsche BA and TAT, just under one-fifth (53 aircraft) were on off 
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balance sheet operating leases. Although rather a simplistic view, the use of operating leases 
provides additional fleet planning flexibility, but in the case of British Airways this has not 
been brought about by the increased uncertainty associated with the creation of a single EU 
market in air transport. It is a reflection of wider planning uncertainties (i.e. tighter noise and 
emission rules) in a competitive global environment. 
Although it is difficult to cite detailed evidence, British Airways has a reputation for being 
particularly aggressive with aerospace manufacturers when negotiating the acquisition of 
aircraft and engines. This covers not only price, but also guarantees, warranties and support. 
This is a skill which has reduced investment requirements and which other EU airlines, 
whose fleet planning has often been seen as part of their home state's industrial policy, may 
learn to apply. 
In terms of factors affecting its financial performance, the airline sees the economic climate 
as most important. As with the spur for efficiency, it ranks the challenge from Asian and US 
carriers as more important than EU airlines or the three packages, which are seen as having 
little effect. 
F.2.7. Impact of EU measures and conclusions 
British Airways' motivation to become one of the world's leading airlines has not been 
stimulated by the EU's single market measures. Its drive to achieve the economies and other 
benefits of scale and scope are not driven primarily by rivalry with other EU airlines for the 
internal market. 
EU traffic is important to BA, both because of its volume and because of feed to and network 
effects with the rest of its route structure. But success within the EU and being large in EU 
terms is not a sufficient condition to be competitive on a global scale. 
British Airways sees the removal of restrictions on EU domestic services in April 1997 as 
being the final step in the liberalization process. It suggests that its investments in TAT and 
Deutsche BA provide vehicles for expansion within the EU - although the third package and 
cabotage rights make such investments unnecessary. 
It believes that 
'one of the biggest problems facing European airlines is the issue of fair competition. State 
ownership in Europe has resulted in subsidy and the legal battles currently being conducted 
by Europe's private airlines over the French government's latest state aid of FF 20 billion to 
Air France are witness to a competitive distortion that still exists within the Union. It is only 
when all airlines are subject to forces of a truly competitive market that real competition can 
flourish.' (Source: British Airways Fact Book 1995) 
As the UK market and later the EU market were liberalized, British Airways has been one of 
the first EU airlines to find itself subject to general competition law rather than specific air 
transport regulation. For example, its takeover of British Caledonian, its proposed joint 
venture with KLM to acquire Sabena and its takeover of Dan Air have all been subject to 
scrutiny by authorities concerned with competition. It has found itself the subject of court 
action as a result of the so-called 'dirty tricks' campaign against Virgin Atlantic, and it has 
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taken a leading role in challenging in the European Court of Justice the Commission's 
approval of a package of state aid to Air France. 
A large measure of BA's success is due to its dominant position at London Heathrow, which 
is the largest hub in the EU. Although congestion puts a constraint on the airline's growth 
there, except by using larger aircraft, the lack of slots provides an effective barrier to 
additional competition. BA is unenthusiastic about the possibility of the Community 
negotiating Air Services Agreements with third countries. Part of the reason for this is the 
fear that greater access to Heathrow for the airlines of a non-EU state might be traded for 
some additional rights required by another EU Member State and airline. 
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PASSENGER TRAFFIC RPK ASK 
(thousand) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
4.144 
4.269 
4,618 
5,594 
5.216 
5,488 
4,942 
5.130 
5.766 
6.269 
Europe 
8,203 
8.271 
9.336 
10,650 
11.296 
12,420 
11,029 
12,314 
13,751 
14,615 
lnt'nl 
12,824 
12,729 
14.482 
16,922 
17.965 
19,684 
17,927 
20,247 
22,377 
23.933 
Total 
16,968 
16,998 
19,100 
22,516 
23,181 
25.172 
22.869 
25.378 
28.143 
30,202 
(milium) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
1,920 
2,025 
2,215 
2,979 
3.195 
3.961 
3.581 
4.621 
5,042 
5,179 
Europe 
6,533 
6,551 
7,439 
8,639 
9,248 
10,218 
9,500 
11,054 
12,654 
13.738 
lnt'nl 
39.182 
38,405 
44,085 
53,960 
57,563 
62,835 
59,254 
67,870 
75,044 
81,053 
Total 
41,103 
40,430 
46,299 
56,939 
60,757 
66,795 
62,835 
72.491 
80,086 
86,232 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
2.970 
3.261 
3,392 
4,501 
4,810 
5.769 
5.612 
6,837 
7,322 
7,437 
Europe 
9,786 
10,324 
10,859 
13,000 
14,013 
15,066 
14,867 
16,956 
19,768 
20,501 
lnt'nl 
56,909 
57,874 
61,065 
78,410 
80,652 
87,424 
85,379 
95,186 
107,176 
113.778 
Total 
59,879 
61,135 
64,457 
82,911 
85,462 
93,192 
90,991 
102,023 
114,497 
121.215 
ATK RTK WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
305 
350 
368 
493 
531 
661 
659 
818 
875 
883 
Europe 
1,032 
1,096 
1,162 
1,435 
1,553 
1.695 
1,769 
2,025 
2,349 
2.471 
lnt'nl 
7,447 
7,651 
8,081 
10,713 
10,981 
12,099 
12,042 
13,368 
14,765 
15,666 
Total 
7,752 
8,000 
8,449 
11.206 
11,512 
12,760 
12,701 
14,186 
15,639 
16,548 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
178 
187 
205 
280 
302 
396 
368 
482 
522 
538 
Europe 
639 
644 
723 
901 
964 
963 
915 
1,073 
1,233 
1,341 
lnt'nl 
4,803 
4,835 
5,487 
6,963 
7,335 
7,901 
7,587 
8,556 
9,420 
10,214 
Total 
4,981 
5,022 
5,692 
7,244 
7,637 
8,297 
7,954 
9,037 
9,942 
10,752 
(%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
58% 
54% 
56% 
57% 
57% 
60% 
56% 
59% 
60% 
61% 
Europe 
62% 
59% 
62% 
63% 
62% 
57% 
52% 
53% 
53% 
54% 
lnt'nl 
64% 
63% 
67% 
65% 
66% 
65% 
63% 
64% 
64% 
65% 
Total 
64% 
63% 
67% 
65% 
66% 
65% 
63% 
64% 
64% 
65% 
PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR PASSENGER YIELD FREIGHT AND MAIL TONNE KM 
(%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
65% 
62% 
65% 
66% 
66% 
69% 
64% 
68% 
69% 
70% 
Europe 
67% 
63% 
69% 
66% 
66% 
68% 
64% 
65% 
64% 
67% 
lnt'nl 
69% 
66% 
72% 
69% 
71% 
72% 
69% 
71% 
70% 
71% 
Total 
69% 
66% 
72% 
69% 
71% 
72% 
69% 
71% 
70% 
71% 
(US cents (1985 prices)) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
14.77 
17.41 
18.73 
17.87 
16.28 
15.99 
16.78 
14.61 
N/A 
N/A 
Europe 
13.46 
15.82 
16.48 
17.60 
16.09 
17.76 
17.18 
16.75 
N/A 
N/A 
lnt'nl 
7.25 
7.97 
8.49 
8.93 
8.44 
8.88 
8.49 
7.88 
N/A 
N/A 
Total 
7.60 
8.44 
8.99 
9.41 
8.85 
9.30 
8.94 
8.31 
N/A 
N/A 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
5 
5 
5 
12 
14 
40 
45 
66 
60 
63 
Europe 
51 
55 
55 
65 
70 
74 
64 
65 
79 
89 
lnt'nl 
1,275 
1,375 
1,520 
2,104 
2,158 
2,244 
2,252 
2,446 
2,538 
2,785 
Total 
1,280 
1,380 
1,525 
2,116 
2,172 
2,284 
2,297 
2,511 
2,598 
2,848 to o 
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FREIGHT AND MAIL YIELD 
(US cents (1985 prices)) 
AVERAGE PASSENGER TRIP LENGTH TOTAL AIRCRAFT KM FLOWN 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
102.07 
125.23 
141.26 
59.95 
65.71 
30.03 
28.37 
24.95 
N/A 
N/A 
Europe 
60.99 
72.85 
83.10 
74.81 
65.06 
67.03 
62.96 
55.41 
N/A 
N/A 
lnt'nl 
23.19 
23.35 
22.31 
21.45 
20.47 
20.80 
20.01 
18.45 
N/A 
N/A 
(km) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
234 
245 
237 
280 
283 
319 
325 
375 
367 
354 
Europe 
796 
792 
797 
811 
819 
823 
861 
898 
920 
940 
lnt'nl 
3.055 
3,017 
3.044 
3.189 
3.204 
3,192 
3,305 
3,352 
3,354 
3,387 
Total 
2,422 
2,379 
2,424 
2,529 
2,621 
2,654 
2,748 
2.856 
2,846 
2,855 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
24 
25 
26 
32 
32 
31 
30 
32 
40 
43 
Europe 
74 
78 
83 
101 
106 
117 
113 
121 
134 
138 
lnt'nl 
219 
288 
273 
310 
318 
346 
333 
363 
400 
426 
Total 
243 
313 
299 
342 
350 
378 
363 
395 
440 
469 
AVERAGE AIRCRAFT SIZE FLEET SIZE TOTAL HOURS FLOWN EMPLOYEES 
DAILY AIRCRAFT UTILISATION 
(hours) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
4.9 
4.9 
5.0 
4.9 
5.1 
5.6 
5.2 
5.6 
6.0 
6.2 
Int'l 
7.0 
6.8 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
6.7 
7.2 
7.9 
7.5 
Total 
8.3 
8.1 
8.3 
8.2 
8.1 
8.0 
7.8 
8.2 
9.1 
8.8 
(seats) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
123 
129 
132 
140 
151 
184 
188 
212 
183 
173 
Europe 
133 
132 
132 
128 
132 
129 
132 
140 
148 
149 
lnt'nl 
260 
201 
223 
253 
253 
252 
257 
262 
268 
267 
Total 
246 
195 
216 
242 
244 
247 
251 
258 
260 
259 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
80 
86 
88 
114 
115 
115 
119 
117 
119 
118 
lnt'nl 
129 
138 
141 
186 
195 
211 
207 
211 
212 
231 
(hours) 
ATK PER EMPLOYEE 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Average 
210.585 
212,790 
220,006 
257,127 
236,802 
248.957 
255.276 
305.150 
334.469 
350,751 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
60.000 
62,100 
63,100 
80,800 
79,500 
79,400 
76,100 
79,100 
94,600 
104,800 
Europe 
144.200 
152,900 
160,900 
203,600 
215,600 
236,500 
224,400 
237,300 
261,200 
267,000 
Intern'l 
329,202 
344.616 
362,072 
474,809 
495,563 
539,547 
509,804 
551,833 
607,992 
634,900 
Total 
389,202 
406,716 
425,172 
555,609 
575,063 
618,947 
585,904 
630,933 
702,592 
739,700 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Average 
36.967 
37,789 
38,688 
44.025 
49.623 
52,252 
50,398 
47,103 
47,334 
48.233 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(1990 prices - million ECU) 
BRITISH AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(current prices - million ECU) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Op'ing 
Revenue 
5,521 
5,499 
4,513 
5.110 
6.318 
5.972 
6.165 
6.243 
5.817 
6,589 
Op'ing 
Cost 
4,887 
5,096 
4,220 
4,695 
5,767 
5,430 
5,939 
5,794 
5,462 
6,024 
Op'ing 
Profit 
634 
403 
292 
416 
551 
542 
225 
449 
355 
565 
Net 
Profit 
348 
356 
236 
241 
284 
330 
129 
332 
204 
326 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Op'ing 
Revenue 
4.323 
4.545 
3.893 
4,603 
6,008 
5,972 
6,412 
6,686 
6,367 
7.346 
Op'ing 
Cost 
3,826 
4,211 
3.640 
4.228 
5.484 
5.430 
6.178 
6.206 
5.978 
6,716 
Op'ing 
Profit 
497 
333 
252 
374 
524 
542 
235 
480 
388 
630 
Net 
Profit 
272 
294 
204 
217 
270 
330 
134 
356 
223 
363 
o 
3 
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F.3. TAP Air Portugal 
Portugal is a small country on the edge of Europe. Its population of around ten million 
enjoys a per capita GDP among the lowest in the EU. National territory extends to two 
Atlantic island groups, the Madeira archipelago and the Azores, respectively one-hour's and 
2!/2 hours' flying time from Lisbon. Portugal inherited strong social, economic and political 
links with Africa and South America from its days as a colonial power: the nation's later 
economic decline created communities of emigrants and their descendants in the United 
States, Canada and South America. Continental Portugal and Madeira are the focus of 
strong, seasonal tourist movements from northern Europe. Until the recent past this 
environment has been the driving force behind the network development of TAP Air 
Portugal, and has defined the airline's commercial strategy. 
F.3.1. Strategic responses 
TAP began life as an offshoot of the Portuguese transport ministry in 1945, before being 
privatized in 1953. In the economic and political turmoil resulting from the end of the 
country's years of dictatorship in 1974 and immediate withdrawal from its colonial role, the 
airline was nationalized. Until then TAP had made heavy profits from its African network, 
serving as the only operator between metropolitan Portugal and the colonial territories of 
Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Principe. In the years of 
independence war that preceded the 1974 revolution, the national carrier was awarded 
lucrative military transport contracts on these routes. These revenues allowed the carrier to 
subsidize its European and North American networks. The freshly nationalized carrier thus 
inherited a capacity, in terms of fleet, workforce and engineering facilities, suited to a major 
intercontinental operator but with a much reduced market. Since then, as Portugal moved 
into mainstream Europe after years of isolation, TAP began to focus on the integration of a 
European network with its intercontinental services. Building on its South American and 
African networks, the airline attempted to establish a mini-hub at Lisbon by adjusting 
schedules, and marketing connections, particularly in the United Kingdom. Heavy demand 
for these services from Lisbon and from the destination countries, at both premium and 
leisure fares, together with a growth of direct services from Europe to Johannesburg and 
Brazilian cities, gave the venture only limited success. Currently, TAP's intercontinental 
connections are marketed outside Portugal mainly through consolidators. 
Since the late 1980s the airline has begun to face economic reality: its domestic market is low 
yield; its African market is characterized by political instability and difficulty in repatriating 
revenues; the airline faces strong competition from charter carriers for leisure traffic on 
European routes; Portugal's North American market is thin, low yield and highly seasonal. 
The airline had been slow to adapt to changes and opportunities in the European 
environment; its fleet mix was inefficient in terms of type and capacity; labour efficiency was 
low at all levels while union power maintained high levels of restrictive practices. The 
company had pursued high load factors on its European routes at the expense of yield and 
operating results: a high proportion of its seats were sold to tour operators and through 
consolidators. 
In 1985 the carrier recognized that although the capacity it offered on routes to its principal 
leisure market, the United Kingdom, was roughly equal to that of UK scheduled carriers, its 
market share of total traffic between the UK and Portugal was probably less than 20%: the 
bulk of the market being carried by highly efficient charter operators based at London's 
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Gatwick and Luton airports. TAP responded by forming a charter subsidiary: Air Atlantis 
was successful in capturing some 30% of the charter market by operating for tour operators 
interested in developing the market from the UK's provincial airports, but the cost base of an 
ultimately state-owned airline was no match for year-round operators such as Britannia 
Airways, and the company ceased operations in 1992. 
In the period 1986-89 TAP embarked on a programme of network expansion to North 
America and within Europe. The spreading of fixed costs was certainly one motivation for 
the move, and it was facilitated in Europe by the first package (Article 8) which gave 
Portugal and Ireland, as peripheral states, the right to introduce Fifth Freedom services within 
the Community ahead of general implementation of regulatory relaxation. Having to fly 
long, thin routes to Europe's major population centres, TAP was accustomed to developing 
routes by initially operating from Lisbon via Porto to, say, Manchester. The operation of 
Fifth Freedom services linking Lisbon to cities where demand was not sufficiently high to 
warrant a dedicated service operated by aircraft of a size available to TAP was therefore a 
concept which appealed to the airline. Between 1987 and 1988 it began operations from 
Lisbon to Dublin via Manchester, Vienna via Munich, Hamburg via Amsterdam, Stuttgart via 
Nice and Athens via Rome. Success of the strategy was mixed: at present Munich and 
Vienna are still linked by a Fifth Freedom service as are Athens and Rome; Manchester has 
not survived as a TAP destination; Dublin is operated once a week from Lisbon through 
Faro; Stuttgart is a code-share destination operated by Portugalia; while Nice is served as a 
consecutive cabotage through Lyon. Hamburg appears to be the only TAP Fifth Freedom 
destination to have successfully grown into a dedicated operation, although one of its weekly 
services goes on to Berlin. 
Prestige routes to North America were intended to tap the ethnic markets of New England, 
Toronto and California. Thus the airline resumed its Boston service in 1986, began a 
Toronto service in 1987 and offered Los Angeles as a destination in 1989. Travel on these 
routes was likely to be predominantly leisure-based, targeting mainly population groups in 
the US and Canada with relatively low levels of disposable income visiting family in 
Portugal. Given that low-cost North American charter companies were geared up to 
providing the mainly seasonal service as they had been doing for years, the reasons behind 
the decision of a scheduled carrier to enter the market with a weekly year-round service are 
unclear. One justification for the route expansion was the dilution of unit costs across the 
TAP network. The period of expansion coincided with an improvement in the carrier's cash 
flow through a sale and lease back operation on its long-haul Lockheed Tristar fleet. 
F.3.2. Routes, air services and capacity 
The Portuguese domestic market consists of three types of air service: those in continental 
Portugal, dominated by the Lisbon-Porto route; public service obligation routes to the Azores 
and Madeira from the mainland and between the two island regions, and services within the 
Azores. TAP faces competition on continental routes from Portugalia, Portugal's private 
scheduled carrier. On services linking the continent with the Azores and Madeira. TAP 
operates under public service obligation rules defined in the third package, while services 
within the Azores are provided by SATA, owned by the regional government of the Azores 
and operating under the temporary exclusion of the Azores from application of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2408/92 of the third package. 
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Network growth within the EU has been achieved through: 
(a) development of Fifth Freedom services; 
(b) consecutive cabotage services in France and Germany; 
(c) operating direct services from Faro, Funchal and Porto through Lisbon; 
(d) capacity sharing and code sharing arrangements. 
Only the first two of the above tactics have been facilitated directly by EU legislation. 
TAP's greatest difficulties in initiating and developing successfully routes between Portugal 
and destinations outside the major European centres lie in the distance between Lisbon and 
potential markets and the capacity of aircraft available in the TAP fleet. The unit capacity of 
the airline's medium-range fleet is between 118 and 156 seats. This results in low frequency 
operations on non-trunk routes, for example to Nice three times weekly, which fail to 
stimulate the market to the extent that might be achieved by a daily operation. The airline 
attempts to overcome this by operating through Porto, amalgamating the traffic to and from 
the northern capital to Lisbon's traffic, and by increasing its code share operations with 
Portugal's second international scheduled operator, the privately owned Portugalia. 
Between June 1989 and June 1992 Air Portugal initiated 15 new non-stop intra-European 
routes, between: 
Lisbon and: 
Faro and: 
lieriin 
Bilbao 
Bordeaux 
Seville 
Malaga 
Marseilles 
Brussels 
Porto and: 
Funchal and: 
Barcelona 
Bologna 
Bordeaux 
Lyon 
Santiago de 
Compostela 
Seville 
London 
Frankfurt 
Of these routes those in italics are no longer served by TAP. The Porto-Bologna and 
Porto-Barcelona services originate in Lisbon. Marseilles continues to be served from Lisbon, 
but on a stopping service operated by Air Toulouse. Porto-Bordeaux is now a route of 
Regional Air, a French carrier. Funchal is served from Frankfurt non-stop by Condor and 
LTU, but the TAP service has fallen to a one-stop through Lisbon. 
Between June 1992 and June 1995 new non-stop intra-European routes were started between: 
Lisbon and: Munich Funchal and: Paris 
Faro and: Dublin Porto and: Hamburg 
Paris Luxembourg 
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The Lisbon-Munich non-stop service survives, as do the weekly non-stops between Faro and 
Dublin, a service originating in Lisbon, and Faro-Paris, originating in Funchal and replacing 
the Funchal-Paris non-stop service. Hamburg is now served from Porto by Hamburg 
Airlines, Luxembourg no longer has a direct service from Porto. 
It is worth noting that carriers which have taken over routes abandoned by TAP (the French 
carrier Regional Air and Hamburg Airlines) operate respectively 36-seat Saab 340 and 
97-seat BAe-146 equipment. This compares with TAP's smallest aircraft, the Boeing 737, 
which can carry 118 passengers. Portugalia employs Fokker 100 jet aircraft, with seats for 
101 passengers. 
The TAP fleet at the end of 1994 included two newly purchased Airbus A3 40 aircraft, in 
partial replacement of the long-haul fleet of Lockheed Tristar-500. The purchase of these 
aircraft ended the airline's policy of acquisition through operating leases. In the same year 
the leases on two Boeing 737-300 aircraft terminated and they were not replaced. The airline 
has found it difficult to dispose of its Tristar fleet: one of the seven aircraft is leased to 
Angolan Airlines, another to BWIA. Since 1994 TAP has acquired two further A340 
aircraft. The composition of the present fleet is set out in Table F.l : 
Table F.l. TAP fleet 1994 
Units 
8 
8 
6 
5 
5 
4 
Source: 
Aircraft 
Boeing 737-200 
Boeing 737-300 
Airbus A320-200 
Airbus A310-300 
Lockheed 1011-500 
Airbus A340-300 
No. 
118 
132 
156 
215 
250 
280 
World Air Transport Statistics, 1 
of seats 
[ATA. 
Utilization (hours/day) 
1994 
8.43 
8.93 
8.89 
8.42 
8.24 
N/A 
Increase from 1992 (%) 
0 
4 
10 
4 
(-4) 
TAP enjoys certain advantages in aircraft utilization. High capacity aircraft can be used on 
the denser European routes during the day and on African and South American flights at 
night, benefiting from Lisbon airport's curfew-free night operations. Lower capacity aircraft 
can be employed outside the more attractive hours for European operations on TAP's public 
service routes to Madeira and the Azores. 
F.3.3. Marketing, traffic and market share 
Comparing TAP's capacity share in Europe with that of all AEA airlines, measured in ASK, 
TAP has increased production between 1992 and 1994 by around 4% over the two years 
while AEA members have reduced their total production by 7%. Thus TAP's share of AEA 
production has risen from 3.1% of AEA total of available seat-kilometres in 1992 to 3.6% in 
1994. 
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In terms of marketing in Europe TAP has started a number of code sharing arrangements 
with Portugalia which have added new destinations to its network. An alliance with British 
Midland was established in 1995 which gives the airline access to six provincial UK 
destinations via London Heathrow from Faro, Funchal, Lisbon and Porto. Outside the 
European market, alliances have been signed with Air Afrique between Lisbon and Abidjan, 
and with Delta Airlines for code shares between Lisbon and New York's Kennedy airport 
(Delta service) and Newark (TAP service). 
The airline has introduced a frequent flyer programme to encourage passenger loyalty, but 
faces the difficulties met by other smaller carriers in creating a product which is attractive to 
frequent flyers resident outside Portugal. The eventual solution for TAP will be to join the 
programme of a carrier with a global network. 
TAP offers a premium product on all European services: Navigator Class. The carrier has 
invested in dedicated lounge facilities at all Portuguese airports, and buys space in similar 
facilities where possible at airports served outside Portugal. 
It is difficult to assess the airline's market share on individual European routes. However, 
TAP's overall 1994 passenger load factor in European operations was 63% compared with 
the AEA average of 60%. But here it is important to stress the importance of the interplay 
between load factor and average passenger yield: there is little point in pursuing high load 
factors if this is achieved by loading the aircraft with low yield passengers. The market share 
of passengers paying premium, business class fares is crucial to commercial success. In 
Europe TAP produced 3.1% of all AEA members airlines' revenue passenger-kilometres in 
1994. This was a fall from the 1993 figure of 3.8%, reflecting the carrier's rationalization of 
its European network. 
Deservedly or not, TAP Air Portugal developed a generally poor reputation for reliability. 
Management has addressed the airline's image and punctuality, measured in percentage of 
departures leaving within 15 minutes of schedule, which rose each year from 1990 (74%) to 
1994(88%). 
F.3.4. Productivity and operating costs 
Between 1985 and 1994 TAP increased its activity on European routes, measured in terms of 
seat-kilometres produced, by around 160%, from 1,717 million ASK to 4,429 million ASK. 
The RPK, those seat-kilometres sold to passengers, rose by a smaller amount, reflected in the 
fall in average load factor on the carrier's European routes over the same period from 70% to 
63%. 
Growth on TAP's international services outside Europe has been much slower, with 
production measured in ASK increasing by 47% over the same period. This is a result of the 
airline's withdrawal from most North Atlantic routes: international, non-EU, ASK have 
fallen each year between 1992 and 1994. 
Total 1994 current costs (before extraordinary items) showed an improvement of 7.7% over 
the previous year. Financial costs reduced to 9% of total, due largely to the Portuguese 
state's capital injection. Personnel costs, representing 29% of total costs, showed an 
improvement of over 4% on 1993. 
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In terms of personnel the airline is working towards the objectives set in its restructuring 
plan, reaching year end in 1994 with 614 fewer on the payroll than 12 months before. The 
highest drop (11%) came from reductions in staff overseas, as the network of sales offices 
and representatives was rationalized. Absenteeism, tackled in the restructuring programme, 
fell from the pre-restructuring levels of 9% to 5.5% in 1994. 
F.3.5. Pricing and yields 
Measured in terms of US cents per revenue passenger-kilometre, TAP's average yield on 
European services grew by around 33% between 1985 and 1992, while on services outside 
Europe it fell in real terms. 
On many of its European routes TAP is in competition with major world carriers serving 
strong markets and international traffic fed into their European network through home-base 
hubs. These major carriers also enjoy the potential for wide-ranging capacity and code 
sharing arrangements with other majors. In this situation the Portuguese carrier is seldom a 
leader in pricing its products. An exception to this has been in the innovative marketing of 
its premium fare product, Navigator Class: this has been sold at discounts directly and 
through consolidators. Here the airline treads the difficult path between dilution of business 
class revenue and increasing the overall yield by creating a more flexible fare structure. 
Promotions to increase occupancy of the Navigator cabin include partner fares, 
complimentary or low cost overnight hotel packages and special fares to leisure destinations 
such as Funchal. 
Part of TAP's restructuring programme is a commitment to increase average yields. This is 
to be achieved by reducing capacity available and improving the efficiency of its resale 
through the application of an increasingly sophisticated yield management system. 
F.3.6. Profitability and sources of financing 
The airline has failed to return a profit since nationalization. In 1994 TAP's financial 
performance reflected the company's efforts to reduce costs: the operating loss was reduced 
from ESC 14.1 billion to 2.6 billion, but the 1994 net result was a loss of almost 
ESC 30 billion (USD 190 million). The accumulated debt and narrow capital base has meant 
that the airline has been technically bankrupt for some years. At end 1992 the carrier's total 
assets represented 88.7% of its total outside liabilities. At end 1993 TAP's equity was over 
ESC 50 billion in the red (negative by around USD 350 million). State aid, directly or 
indirectly, has plugged some gaps while the financial guarantees of the state gave creditors a 
measure of confidence in the company. In 1988 the government transferred to the airline the 
land and buildings from which it operates at Lisbon airport. Annual state subsidies helped 
compensate for the high costs and the low, government imposed, fare structure of operations 
to the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores, while other subsidies offset losses 
associated with operating inherently unprofitable services to the ex-colony of São Tomé. 
Subsidies for services operated by TAP under public service obligation rules added 
ESC 4.7 billion (around USD 30 million) to its revenue in 1994. TAP's exemption from 
taxes is set to continue until 1997, when the current restructuring programme is complete and 
the final injection of state cash has been received (see below). 
In 1994 the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that they intended to increase 
the capital of the national carrier. This was to be accompanied by the adoption of a four-year 
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restructuring programme aiming to restore the airline's economic and financial structure, 
with formal state guarantees for the company's credit operations. 
Restructuring had begun earlier, when the Portuguese government realized that TAP's erratic 
decline would eventually lead to the total collapse of the national carrier: 
(a) the labour bill was attacked with a wage freeze and a programme of early retirement 
inducements, agreed redundancy and natural wastage to reduce the size of the 
workforce; 
(b) a number of activities were identified which could be run successfully as individual 
profit centres: among them was ground handling; 
(c) the operations of the charter subsidiary Air Atlantis were terminated. 
The intention was to pay into the company in four annual instalments beginning in 1994, a 
total of ESC 180 billion (around USD 1.2 billion). The restructuring programme aims to 
return an operating profit in 1996, and an overall profit by the end of the programme, in 
1997. The productivity target to be achieved was set at 242,000 ATK per employee, 780 
hours per cockpit staff and 13,450 ASK per member of cabin staff. In broad terms this was 
to be achieved by: 
(a) elimination of chronically unprofitable routes within Europe (in 1992 one in ten 
European routes returned in revenue less than half the associated cost); 
(b) discontinuing all North American routes except Lisbon-New York; 
(c) reducing the size of the fleet to 32 units (from 38); 
(d) improving financial management, marketing analysis and yield management. 
The Portuguese government contended initially that the capital was a necessary move which 
would be pursued by a rational private investor. The Commission ruled that unlikely and 
preferred to regard the money as state aid, which it would allow to continue subject to TAP 
implementing a restructuring plan it proposed and achieving performance objectives. A 
number of undertakings were also required, among them: 
(a) the capital would be used for restructuring the airline: there would be no purchase in 
whole or in part of any European carrier during the restructuring period; 
(b) the airline would at the end of the restructuring period begin a process which would 
eventually lead to its privatization; 
(c) tax exemptions would not continue after the restructuring programme was completed; 
(d) TAP should not increase its production (ASK) above an agreed proportion of total EEA 
supply. 
Complete outsourcing of the maintenance and security of the company's buildings was 
achieved in 1994. Duty free shops at Portuguese airports have been a TAP concession but 
will become a joint-stock company with TAP's participation at 51%. Handling, maintenance 
and medical services will eventually become autonomous operations. 
F.3.7. Impact of EU measures and conclusions 
The reaction of TAP Air Portugal to European liberalization was slow to develop. The 
airline took advantage of early Fifth Freedom opportunities, but only recently has it 
considered capacity share with other airlines as an alternative to creating a more flexible fleet 
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of its own to serve non-trunk routes between Portugal and the rest of the European Union. 
This has been paralleled by the carrier's reluctance to enter into strategic alliances with major 
world carriers and regional carriers, although these are now developing. 
It appears that the greatest direct effects of Community legislation on the operating and 
management strategy of TAP have been: 
(a) operation of Fifth Freedom services within the Community (first package); 
(b) operation of consecutive cabotage services (third package); 
(c) increased flexibility of fares (second and third packages); 
(d) public service obligation rules (third package); 
(e) the formal requirement, imposed by the Commission as a condition of state aid, and 
reinforcing the airline's own judgement, of the adoption of an austerity plan and a 
series of measures aimed at restoring the carrier to financial equilibrium 
(Article 93 (2)). 
Indirectly, an increasingly competitive air transport environment within the Community has 
induced the carrier to consider forming alliances with regional carriers within the 
Community, as well as major carriers on intercontinental services. 
Following the recognition of the need for capital and operational restructuring of the airline, 
and the requirement to obtain EU agreement for state aid, TAP's management and technical 
resources have been focused sharply on the European market. The airline is making progress 
towards achieving the goals set out in its agreement with the Commission (and the third 
tranche of state aid was recently approved by the Commission). Figure F. 1 sets out the 
relevant statistics describing TAP's labour efficiency of production in relation to the 1997 
target, and shows achievement to date. 
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Figure F.l. TAP's productivity and the targets of its restructuring plan 
1992 1993 1994 1995 target 
ATK per employee 
ASK per cabin staff 
Rev hours per 
cockpit crew (est.) 
137,000 
7.966 
466 
157,000 
9.435 
465 
165,000 
9,568 
488 
242,000 
13.450 
780 
60% 
40% ™ m. n m 
m m 
■å_m 
1992 1993 1994 
%_M 
: Ball employees 
Έ cabin staff 
j Q cockpit crew 
1997 
Source: World Air Transport Statistics, IATA. 
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PASSENGER TRAFFIC RPK ASK 
(thousand) (million) (million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
719 
732 
841 
818 
730 
796 
829 
879 
940 
1,003 
Europe 
867 
934 
1,104 
1,269 
1,465 
1,656 
1,728 
1,890 
1,978 
1,863 
lnt'nl 
1,306 
1,401 
1,598 
1,817 
2,060 
2,304 
2,359 
2,600 
2,677 
2,498 
Total 
2,026 
2,133 
2,439 
2,635 
2,791 
3,100 
3,188 
3.479 
3,617 
3.501 
ATK 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
95 
98 
112 
126 
122 
125 
136 
138 
142 
162 
Europe 
197 
217 
251 
330 
406 
460 
508 
550 
545 
533 
lnt'nl 
707 
769 
807 
958 
1,102 
1,166 
1,236 
1,333 
1,317 
1,280 
Total 
802 
867 
919 
1,084 
1,224 
1,291 
1,372 
1,471 
1,459 
1,442 
PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR 
(%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
71% 
71% 
73% 
70% 
71% 
75% 
74% 
76% 
75% 
72% 
Europe 
70% 
68% 
71% 
66% 
64% 
65% 
64% 
61% 
64% 
63% 
lnt'nl 
69% 
66% 
71% 
69% 
67% 
70% 
68% 
68% 
70% 
68% 
Total 
69% 
67% 
71% 
69% 
68% 
70% 
68% 
69% 
70% 
69% 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
603 
626 
717 
761 
733 
768 
825 
879 
897 
970 
Europe 
1,196 
1,294 
1,560 
1,853 
2,151 
2,446 
2,608 
2,838 
2,992 
2,812 
lnt'nl 
3,637 
3,850 
4,261 
4,879 
5,498 
6,067 
6,200 
6,793 
6,971 
6,616 
Total 
4,240 
4,475 
4,978 
5,640 
6,231 
6,836 
7,025 
7,671 
7,868 
7,586 
RTK 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
61 
63 
73 
79 
79 
85 
89 
94 
96 
104 
Europe 
125 
136 
162 
192 
230 
260 
273 
294 
305 
293 
lnt'nl 
427 
454 
495 
565 
651 
709 
716 
775 
794 
771 
Total 
488 
517 
569 
644 
730 
794 
805 
869 
890 
875 
PASSENGER YIELD 
(US cents - 1985 prices) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
4.89 
6.10 
6.48 
6.70 
6.24 
7.10 
7.32 
8.54 
N/A 
N/A 
Europe 
8.61 
10.27 
11.34 
11.33 
10.62 
11.54 
11.37 
11.47 
N/A 
N/A 
lnt'nl 
7.21 
7.42 
8.02 
8.23 
7.86 
8.55 
8.96 
8.58 
N/A 
N/A 
Total 
6.88 
7.24 
7.79 
8.02 
7.67 
8.39 
8.77 
8.58 
N/A 
N/A 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
854 
881 
984 
1,088 
1,031 
1,020 
1,121 
1,152 
1,198 
1,352 
Europe 
1,717 
1,896 
2,190 
2,811 
3,359 
3,785 
4.084 
4,620 
4,656 
4,429 
WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
65% 
65% 
66% 
63% 
64% 
68% 
66% 
68% 
68% 
64% 
Europe 
63% 
63% 
65% 
58% 
57% 
57% 
54% 
54% 
56% 
55% 
lnt'nl 
5,308 
5,814 
6,037 
7,083 
8,150 
8,698 
9,169 
9,992 
10,011 
9,695 
lnt'nl 
60% 
59% 
61% 
59% 
59% 
61% 
58% 
58% 
60% 
60% 
FREIGHT AND MAIL TON KM 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
7 
7 
9 
10 
13 
16 
15 
15 
12 
14 
Europe 
17 
20 
22 
25 
36 
40 
38 
38 
32 
36 
lnt'nl 
95 
108 
112 
126 
156 
163 
158 
164 
157 
226 
Total 
6,162 
6,695 
7,021 
8,171 
9,181 
9,718 
10,290 
11,144 
11,209 
11,047 
(%) 
Total 
61% 
60% 
62% 
59% 
60% 
61% 
59% 
59% 
61% 
61% 
(million) 
Total 
102 
114 
121 
137 
169 
179 
173 
179 
169 
239 
O 
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> ■a ~a 
FREIGHT AND MAIL YIELD 
(US cents - 1985 prices) 
AVERAGE PASSENGER TRIP LENGTH TOTAL AIRCRAFT KM FLOWN 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
36 
49 
43 
39 
33 
24 
42 
52 
Europe 
54 
75 
73 
66 
53 
44 
58 
59 
lnt'nl 
33 
42 
41 
38 
33 
29 
36 
35 
Total 
33 
42 
41 
38 
33 
28 
36 
36 
(km) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
839 
854 
853 
930 
1,003 
965 
996 
999 
954 
967 
Europe 
1,380 
1,386 
1,414 
1,460 
1,468 
1,477 
1,509 
1,501 
1,512 
1,510 
lnt'nl 
2,784 
2,748 
2,666 
2,685 
2,669 
2,633 
2,628 
2,613 
2,604 
2,648 
Total 
2.093 
2.098 
2.041 
2,140 
2,233 
2,205 
2,204 
2,205 
2,175 
2,167 
(million) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
9 
9 
10 
Europe 
12 
13 
15 
20 
23 
26 
28 
33 
34 
34 
lnt'nl 
28 
30 
32 
38 
43 
47 
50 
56 
57 
56 
Total 
34 
37 
40 
46 
51 
55 
58 
65 
66 
67 
AVERAGE AIRCRAFT SIZE FLEET SIZE 
(seats) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Domestic 
129 
128 
130 
130 
136 
126 
132 
131 
136 
133 
Europe 
146 
144 
144 
142 
147 
144 
145 
140 
139 
132 
lnt'nl 
192 
192 
189 
187 
190 
185 
184 
178 
176 
172 
Total 
180 
180 
178 
176 
182 
177 
177 
172 
171 
166 
DAILY AIRCRAFT UTILISATION 
(hours) 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
3.76 
4.55 
5.29 
5.99 
6.56 
7.53 
7.53 
7.47 
6.55 
6.82 
Int'l 
3.95 
4.53 
4.99 
5.95 
6.49 
6.82 
7.31 
6.98 
5.96 
6.09 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
14 
13 
13 
15 
16 
16 
17 
20 
23 
22 
lnt'nl 
28 
26 
25 
25 
26 
27 
27 
32 
38 
38 
TAP FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(1990 prices - million ECU) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Op'ing 
Revenue 
680 
564 
N/A 
681 
N/A 
787 
841 
803 
748 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Cost 
694 
613 
N/A 
712 
N/A 
821 
861 
969 
943 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Profit 
-15 
-49 
N/A 
-31 
N/A 
-35 
-20 
-166 
-196 
N/A 
Net 
Profit 
-40 
-32 
N/A 
-21 
N/A 
-12 
-29 
-140 
-169 
N/A 
TOTAL HOURS FLOWN 
(units) 
EMPLOYEES 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Europe 
19,200 
21,600 
25,100 
32,800 
38,300 
44,000 
46,700 
54,500 
55,000 
54,800 
lnt'nl 
40,336 
42,956 
45,560 
54,321 
61,548 
67,164 
72,042 
81,574 
82,664 
84,500 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Average 
9,786 
9,685 
9,580 
9,580 
9,662 
10,102 
10,681 
10,829 
10,123 
9.108 
TAP FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(current prices - million ECU 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Op'ing 
Revenue 
532 
466 
N/A 
613 
N/A 
787 
875 
860 
818 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Cost 
544 
506 
N/A 
642 
N/A 
821 
896 
1,037 
1,032 
N/A 
Op'ing 
Profit 
-11 
-41 
N/A 
-28 
N/A 
-35 
-21 
-178 
-214 
N/A 
Net 
Profit 
-31 
-27 
N/A 
-19 
N/A 
-12 
-30 
-149 
-185 
N/A 
ATK PER EMPLOYEE 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Average 
88,900 
93,324 
99,055 
116.895 
127,423 
128.450 
128,767 
136,085 
144.500 
158.630 
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F.4. Maersk Air 
Maersk Air was formed in 1969 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the A Ρ Moller (Maersk 
Line) Group. Developed primarily as a charter airline, Maersk Air has developed an 
extensive Danish domestic network and, in 1984, launched international scheduled flights 
from Billund to London Southend. This route was subsequently replaced by a service from 
Billund to London Gatwick. Scheduled services are now operated from Copenhagen to 
London Gatwick, the Faroe Islands and Kristiansand and from Billund to Amsterdam, 
Brussels, the Faroe Islands, Frankfurt, Paris and Stockholm. In 1993 Birmingham European 
Airways was bought by Maersk Air and the former now operates as Maersk Air UK. 
F.4.1. Strategic responses 
The A Ρ Moller Group has interests in shipping, oil exploration, shipbuilding and retailing. 
Maersk Air is a self-supporting subsidiary of the Group. Initially, the airline operated 
scheduled services between Copenhagen and Odense, Skrystrup and Stanning although the 
core business gradually developed into charter and inclusive-tour operations and further 
significant development of scheduled services did not occur until the mid-1980s. 
Initially, the growth of Maersk was constrained by the regulatory regime of Denmark. This 
was because of limits imposed on the number of charter operations and package-tour 
duration. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Scandinavian governments (Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden) set up and imposed a joint aviation policy whereby 50% of the 
domestic route licences were awarded to SAS and the remaining 50% to private operators. 
This was to protect national government investment in SAS. 
As an example, when a new non-flag-carrier entrant applied to operate a scheduled service on 
an unserved route, SAS was given first refusal. Also, SAS held a monopoly between major 
city pairs within Scandinavia. Therefore, for many years, airline competition on scheduled 
routes has been constrained by the regulatory authorities. 
The 1983 EC Regional Directive gave Maersk the opportunity to establish a scheduled 
service between Billund and London (Southend). This operated from 1984-90 and, during 
this period, was the only scheduled international service operated by Maersk. Shortly after 
operations commenced, allegedly because of pressure from competing airlines flying from 
Copenhagen to London (Heathrow), London (Southend) was changed to Southend in the 
ABC airline guide. 
The joint aviation policy continued until 1988 when, as the result of pressure from the other 
non-flag-carriers, the Scandinavian authorities allowed the non-flag-carriers to operate intra-
Scandinavian services, except between seven major cities, and also from Category 1 to 
Category 2 airports in the EC. In the case of the latter routes, this was provided that SAS was 
not interested in operating these routes and that there was no existing service to the same 
Category 2 airport from other airports in Scandinavia. This partial liberalization was 
unattractive as small carriers could operate and develop thin routes to feed SAS hubs but 
with the possibility of having these routes taken over by SAS if traffic grew. 
In 1988 Maersk also purchased a 40% stake in Plymouth (UK) based Brymon Airways which 
in turn bought loss-making Birmingham Executive Airways (which shortly afterwards was 
renamed Birmingham European Airways). This financial investment was seen at the time as 
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an initial stepping-stone towards the transfer of flights from Southend to Gatwick and initial 
preparation for the single European market. In August 1993, Birmingham European Airways 
became wholly owned by Maersk and was renamed Maersk Air UK. The airline now 
operates under a franchise agreement with British Airways. At the same time, Brymon 
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Airways. 
These partial measures towards full liberalization permitted smaller independent airlines to 
serve trans-Scandinavian routes without harming SAS, which the governments were 
determined to protect. However, the Danish government did not want to see any erosion of 
Copenhagen's importance as an international gateway which might happen if there were a 
sudden proliferation of services from provincial airports to Stockholm and Oslo. Back in 
1986 Air Business unsuccessfully applied for licences from Billund and Esbjerg through 
Aarhus to Stockholm, Oslo and Gothenburg. Cimber and Maersk were equally unsuccessful 
with similar applications. Ten years later, the only one of these routes that is being operated 
is by Maersk between Billund and Stockholm. 
The 1990 second package allowed new entrants to serve routes between national Category 2 
airports and other Category 1 airports and between national Category 1 and other Category 2 
airports within the EU. In addition, multiple designations by a state were allowed for major 
routes. For example, the Copenhagen-London (Gatwick) route was fully liberalized although 
each country was allowed to do what they wanted with their designation policy, for example, 
to ensure the protection of state-owned airlines. Therefore, in 1990 there was the prospect of 
BA and Air Europe being in competition with SAS and Maersk, although it was up to the 
Danish Minister of Transport to decide if a second Danish carrier be allowed. 
As it turned out, the second package enabled Maersk to take a major step forward as an 
international scheduled carrier. Firstly, SAS pulled out of the Copenhagen-London 
(Gatwick) route (to be followed by Air Europe some time later) leaving the way clear for 
Maersk and, secondly, Maersk was able to introduce services from Billund to Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Frankfurt, London (Gatwick) and Stockholm. 
The third package, effective 1 January 1993, introduced the principle of free pricing, route 
designation of airlines no longer applied and capacity was unrestricted. So far, the third 
package has provided little benefit to the route development strategy of Maersk and other 
problems, discussed later, have exercised some constraints on the subsequent development of 
the airline. One example of this is that under the third package the potential commercial 
benefits depend on the catchment and services that are already operating. Therefore, Maersk 
as a new entrant had reduced potential for developing Copenhagen traffic (SAS being the 
incumbent airline) and had therefore chosen to concentrate their activities on Jutland. 
F.4.2. Routes, air services and capacity 
Between 1989 and March 1996 Maersk have gradually expanded their portfolio of scheduled 
services. These are shown in Table F.2 together with weekday service frequencies in each 
direction. 
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Table F.2. Maersk scheduled, services 1989-96 
Route 
From Copenhagen 
Billund 
Bornholm 
Esbjerg 
Faroe Islands 
Kristiansand 
London - Gatwick 
Odense 
Vojens 
Total routes 
From Billund 
Amsterdam 
Brussels 
Copenhagen 
Esbjerg 
Faroe Islands 
Frankfurt 
London - Gatwick 
Odense 
Paris - CdG 
Southend 
Stavanger 
Stockholm 
Total routes 
1989 
10 
8 
1 
8 
4 
10 
1 
2 
3 
1990 
10 
7 
1 
8 
4 
10 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1991 
10 
7 
1 
9 
5 
5 
1 
1 
10 
1 
1 
5 
1992 
10 
7 
1 
2 
9 
6 
6 
1 
2 
10 
<1 
2 
1 
6 
1993 
10 
6 
7 
1 
2 
9 
6 
7 
1 
2 
10 
<1 
1 
2 
2 
7 
1994 
10 
6 
8 
1 
3 
2 
8 
6 
« 
1 
2 
10 
<1 
2 
2 
1 
7 
1995 
9 
7 
7 
1 
3 
2 
8 
6 
« 
2 
3 
9 
<1 
2 
3 
1 
7 
1996 
9 
7 
7 
1 
3 
2 
8 
6 
« 
3 
3 
9 
<1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
9 
While Table F.2 is of interest, there are specific factors which have influenced the 
development of these routes. Between 1986 and 1996 domestic scheduled services in 
Denmark have been provided on a continuous basis by SAS, Maersk, and Cimber Air. The 
domestic routes were split up in the late 1980s between the three airlines and run under the 
auspices of the Dan Air organization (no relation of Dan Air which was absorbed by British 
Airways) which set the fares. The ownership of Dan Air was split 38% (Maersk), 57% 
(SAS) and 5% (Cimber). With the onset of full liberalization Dan Air was wound up in late 
October 1995 and each of the airlines can now fly where they want. Because of the restricted 
domestic market, in autumn 1995 Maersk claimed that they would not be introducing an 
extensive range of new domestic scheduled services, although a new service to Odense from 
Billund is shown in the March 1996 OAG timetable. 
Apart from the Billund to London (Southend)/London (Gatwick) service, Maersk's 
development of international scheduled services has been a policy of staged development. 
Billund has been developed as a hub in view of the SAS dominance of Copenhagen. In fact, 
Copenhagen-London is the only city pair in which Maersk is in competition with SAS (who 
operate to Heathrow). From the start (1991) the Billund-Brussels service was operated as 
code share between Maersk and Sabena. It is understood the Billund-Amsterdam service has 
gone the same way, following a code share agreement between Maersk and KLM. 
Outside Western Europe, the range of destinations served by scheduled services from 
Denmark are dominated by the SAS monopoly. Even the development by Maersk of new 
routes to Eastern Europe would, subject to demand, be possible only should there be a lack of 
Appendix F - Airline case studies 223 
interest by SAS. Maersk indicated that 'it could never be visualized that Maersk would be in 
a position to commence scheduled operations to New York'. 
Although other Danish operators (Muk Air, Newair) have operated cabotage routes, Maersk 
have never done so, nor are there any plans to do so in the future. 
In 1992 it had been predicted that Maersk would take advantage of the third package and 
launch routes from Copenhagen to Oslo, Stockholm and Gothenburg. This has yet to happen, 
although Maersk now operate from Billund to Stockholm and the other two cities are 
considered to be long-term options for future services from Billund. In addition, a more 
recent document, 'CAP 654 - The Single European Aviation Market - Progress So Far' (UK 
Civil Aviation Authority) suggested a number of routes from Copenhagen with potential for 
new entrants. Apart from Oslo and Stockholm, the additional routes identified were 
Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Helsinki. 
Maersk have identified route viability to be dependent on prospects for interlining, costs and 
travel times to the destination city centre. As an example, Milan (Linate) is considered to be 
a non-starter because of its designation as a domestic airport while Milan (Malpensa), 
designated for international services, is unattractive because of the airport distance from the 
centre of Milan. 
The recent introduction of a scheduled service from Billund to Paris (Charles de Gaulle) was 
an example of where the lack of slots can constrain the development of new services. In the 
case of Maersk, initial operations had three different evening departure times during the week 
with, in one case, only a 20 minute turnaround time. 
Maersk have also commented that en-route and airport charges have, on average, increased 
above the rate of inflation and, therefore, while in theory there are no problems for new 
entrants into new routes, in practice there still appears to be a number of constraints which 
prevent the operation of a truly free market. 
The other barrier is the number of flights that would have to be operated by a new entrant to 
achieve a proportionate market share. Copenhagen-Oslo is effectively an SAS monopoly 
with a current daily frequency (March 1996) of 16 flights in each direction. According to 
CAP 654, a new entrant would require to have an entry frequency of at least 4 flights in each 
direction in order to achieve a reasonable market share. Similarly, Copenhagen-Stockholm 
would require a new entrant frequency of at least three flights in each direction. This, of 
course, assumes that the slots are available. 
The thinner routes from Copenhagen to Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Helsinki are even less 
attractive. On the Amsterdam route Maersk would be in competition with SAS and KLM 
and on the Helsinki route the competition is SAS and Finnair. On the Copenhagen to 
Frankfurt route, services were operated by SAS and Lufthansa. With the recent code sharing 
agreement between these two airlines, this route is now a monopoly and offers some 
opportunities for new entrants particularly as the European Commission has stipulated 
specific conditions (slots, interlining) which would be of benefit to a new entrant. 
For all three routes, adopting a rule of thumb that a new entrant should ideally have the same 
frequency as the smallest incumbent, then all three routes would require an entry frequency 
of three flights per day in order to achieve a proportional market share. 
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The Maersk aircraft fleet has consisted for some years of a mixture of Fokker 50 turbo-props 
and variants of the B737 family. The policy of Maersk is to keep the average age of the fleet 
low. There appears to be an ongoing policy of both leasing in and leasing out aircraft. Table 
F.3 shows a summary of the aircraft types and numbers that are known to have been used for 
Maersk's scheduled and charter operations; actual levels of ownership are higher than those 
shown in the table. 
Table F.3. Aircraft types used by Maersk Air 
BAe 125 
S-360 
DHC.7 
F50 
B737-200 
B737-300 
B73 7-400 
B737-500 
Total 
1988 
5 
2 
3 
10 
1989 
2 
6 
2 
2 
12 
1990 
6 
2 
2 
10 
1991 
1 
6 
3 
4 
14 
1992 
1 
7 
2 
5 
15 
1993 
1 
7 
3 
3 
14 
1994 
1 
8 
3 
1 
4 
17 
1995 
1 
9 
4 
3 
17 
F.4.3. Traffic and market share 
Between 1985 and 1994 Maersk increased the level of scheduled activity and, with the 
continuing modest introduction of new routes and increased frequencies, this trend is 
continuing. What is interesting is the lack of growth in the domestic scheduled market; in 
fact traffic levels have declined from a peak reached in 1988/89. At the same time, there 
have been wild fluctuations in the number of charter passengers with traffic levels only now 
exceeding those experienced in the mid-1980s (just under 500,000 passengers a year). Other 
operating statistics have moved in line with the fluctuation in passenger numbers. There is 
no readily available information on traffic levels for individual routes. 
F.4.4. Productivity and operating costs 
In 1994 Maersk produced 440 million seat-kilometres on its domestic network and sold 263 
million of them to give a passenger load factor of 59.7%, little changed over the previous 
year. International services, however, showed an increase of 19% in ASK in 1994, to give a 
total of 533 million. The airline was less successful in selling its production on international 
routes, averaging a passenger load factor of just 37.1%, a modest increase from the 36.1% 
achieved in 1993. When combined, the international and domestic networks produced 973.5 
million ASK, and achieved a load factor of 49.3%. 
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The airline's increasing involvement in the charter market is reflected in the growth of the 
proportion of total ASK attributable to charter operations: 45% in 1993 grew to 59% in 1994. 
Unit operating costs measured in US cents per available tonne-kilometre of production were 
USD 1.16 in 1994. These figures include charter operations. 
Between end-1993 and end-1994, the number of people employed by Maersk rose by 22.3% 
to 1,310. 
F.4.5. Pricing and yields 
Pricing strategies of Maersk have to be seen in context with a number of factors. Firstly, on 
the majority of Maersk routes there are no competitors. For example, from Billund, code-
sharing deals have been reached with Sabena and KLM; the remaining routes are operated by 
Maersk alone. Likewise, from Copenhagen, with the exception of flights to the Faroe 
Islands, the only city-pair route on which there is competition is Copenhagen-London. 
Secondly, although against the spirit of the third package, Maersk gave the impression that, 
under certain circumstances, incumbent carriers could object to fares set between a specific 
city-pair but via an alternative routing. For example, consider the development of Billund by 
Maersk as a rival hub to Copenhagen. Major carriers have an interest in protecting their own 
hubs so SAS would not welcome Billund as an alternative hub to Copenhagen, in particular, 
if cheaper through-fares are offered through the former. 
Probably the most competitive pricing strategies are in operation on the Copenhagen-London 
route which, as previously mentioned, is the scene of competition between Maersk, BA, SAS 
and Air UK. On this route Maersk has offered a lower C2 fare (business, maximum stay 1 
year, no stopovers) for some time. In November 1994 this was 20% (from London) and 24% 
(from Copenhagen) lower than the Heathrow carriers (BA, SAS). Maersk also offers a Y2 
(as C2 but economy) fare, which in November 1994 was 29% (from London) and 33% (from 
Copenhagen) below the Β A and SAS fare. This was available in 1992 but the penalty for 
reservation changes no longer applies. Note, also, that Air UK fares between Copenhagen 
and London are extremely competitive. However, for both Maersk and Air UK it could be 
argued that the lower fares are a bid to attract traffic, away from Heathrow, to the less 
attractive airports of Gatwick and Stansted. 
Other pricing strategies by Maersk include volume discounts for corporate accounts and 
Maersk's long-term strategy includes proposals to 'attack' the trunk route market on price by 
the introduction of new fares that might offer savings of up to 60% on pre-liberalization 
levels. Other possibilities mooted in late 1995 included a cut-price air pass for multi-
destination travel by international visitors; in March 1996 it was announced that Finnair, 
Maersk, Braathens and Transwede had banded together to launch an air pass scheme with 
individual sectors costing as little as £48. 
F.4.6. Profitability and sources of finance 
There is limited information available on the financial status of Maersk. What information 
there is indicates that, overall, the last 15 years of operations have proved to be profitable. 
Highlights include the announcement of a £10 million profit for 1986 and that the reported 
loss in 1991 was the first for a decade. In 1994, the airline made a net profit of USD 20.8 
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million, up 4.2% from the previous year on total revenues of USD 266.7 million (up 17.7% 
from the previous year). This indicates a very healthy operating ratio. 
Much of the success can be attributed to being a subsidiary of the A Ρ Moller shipping 
company. Although running a consistent operating profit in its own right, the financial 
backing of the parent company has enabled Maersk to have the confidence to purchase new 
aircraft on a regular basis (and the phasing out of old aircraft) and diversification into other 
air transport activities. Apart from monopoly domestic and international (almost) scheduled 
traffic, other activities include charter flights, long-term aircraft leasing, a North Sea 
helicopter company, a travel agency chain and a stake in the handling company Copenhagen 
Air Services. 
F.4.7. Impact of EU measures and conclusions 
From this case study it can be seen that the EU measures influenced the development of 
Maersk Air in three main ways. 
(1) The measures forced a relaxation in the domestic regulatory environment under which 
Maersk (and other Danish non-flag carriers) operated. 
(2) The second package encouraged the development of new international services 
fromBillund. 
(3) Lastly, the third package gave Maersk the right to operate on routes outside of 
Denmark and the right to acquire or set up carriers in other EC countries. As part of 
AP Moller's shipping strategy has been to set up subsidiaries in the United Kingdom, 
Spain, the United States and Asia, it would be natural to do the same for company 
aviation activities. The creation of Maersk Air UK and the development of Copenhagen 
Air Services activities outside of Denmark are initial steps in this process. 
However, there are a number of factors which are seen as constraints on the future 
development of Maersk. The most important are: 
(a) high salaries, social legislation and taxes that have to be paid by Danish operators; 
(b) market domination of major carriers (including alliances and frequent flyer 
programmes); 
(c) state aids to flag carriers; 
(d) slot constraints and environmental measures at major airports; 
(e) air traffic control and airport charges increasing faster than the rate of inflation. 
MAERSK AIR 
TRAFFIC AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS 1985-94 
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PASSENGER TRAFFIC 
(units) 
RPK 
(thousand} 
ASK 
(thousand) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
14,305 
39,565 
42.206 
118,945 
162.342 
232.850 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
720.000 
818.495 
876,435 
873.964 
715.180 
732.032 
743,910 
Total 
Scheduled 
720,000 
832.800 
881,000 
916,000 
916.170 
834.125 
894.374 
976.760 
Total 
Charter 
409,000 
435.000 
412.000 
369.000 
309.333 
245.932 
298.552 
488,696 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
11 
30 
35 
114 
161 
200 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
259 
283 
283 
278 
249 
263 
263 
Total 
Scheduled 
259 
294 
326 
313 
313 
363 
424 
463 
Total 
Charter 
1,055 
1,197 
1,243 
1,095 
804 
630 
716 
1.284 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
27 
60 
78 
321 
447 
533 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
417 
434 
505 
483 
463 
448 
440 
Total 
Scheduled 
417 
461 
519 
565 
561 
784 
895 
973 
Total 
Charter 
1.275 
1,341 
1,438 
1,304 
874 
783 
741 
1.414 
ATK 
(million) 
RTK 
(million) 
WEIGHT LOAD FACTOR 
(%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
3 
7 
9 
40 
47 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
45 
44 
52 
49 
64 
39 
Total 
Scheduled 
45 
47 
54 
59 
58 
104 
86 
Total 
Charter 
131 
138 
133 
126 
91 
87 
141 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
1 
2 
3 
10 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
26 
32 
26 
25 
24 
Total 
Scheduled 
26 
33 
29 
28 
28 
34 
Total 
Charter 
99 
108 
112 
99 
70 
57 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
36% 
3 3 % 
3 5 % 
26% 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
58% 
7 3 % 
4 9 % 
5 1 % 
3 7 % 
Total 
Scheduled 
58% 
70% 
54% 
4 7 % 
4 8 % 
3 3 % 
Total 
Charter 
76% 
7 8 % 
84% 
79% 
7 7 % 
6 6 % 
FREIGHT AND MAIL TON KM 
(thousand) 
TOTAL AIRCRAFT KM FLOWN 
(thousand) 
PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR 
(%) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
31 
1 
55 
589 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
2.241 
7.085 
7 
206 
683 
Total 
Scheduled 
2,241 
7,116 
7 
8 
261 
1,272 
Total 
Charier 
35 
6,000 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
0 
648 
1.335 
1,723 
3,673 
4,973 
6,426 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
6,689 
6,523 
7,053 
6,645 
6,077 
5,943 
5,834 
Total 
Scheduled 
6,689 
7,171 
8,217 
8,388 
8.368 
9,750 
10,916 
12,260 
Total 
Charter 
10.347 
10.615 
11,085 
9.334 
6.989 
5,863 
6,890 
9,904 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
41% 
50% 
4 5 % 
36% 
36% 
3 8 % 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
62% 
6 5 % 
56% 
58% 
54% 
59% 
60% 
Total 
Scheduled 
62% 
64% 
6 3 % 
5 5 % 
56% 
46% 
4 7 % 
4 8 % 
Total 
Charter 
8 3 % 
89% 
86% 
84% 
92% 
80% 
9 7 % 
9 1 % 
MAERSK AIR 
TRAFFIC AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS 1985-94 
AVERAGE PASSENGER HAUL 
HOURS FLOWN 
(units) 
(km) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Total 
Scheduled 
18,598 
18,243 
21,566 
18,701 
17,071 
16,952 
19,010 
21,477 
Total 
Charter 
15,230 
15,970 
16,526 
15,650 
12,735 
7,963 
9.017 
12,877 
Total 
33,828 
34,213 
38,092. 
34,351 
29,806 
28,075 
24,915 
28,027 
34,354 
FLEET SIZE 
(units) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Total 
17 
18 
19 
22 
22 
25 
15 
29 
20 
DAILY AIRCRAFT UTIL'N 
(hours) 
ATK PER EMPLOYEE 
(units) 
AVERAGE AIRCRAFT SIZE 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
769 
758 
829 
958 
992 
859 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
360 
346 
323 
318 
348 
359 
354 
Total 
Scheduled 
360 
353 
370 
342 
342 
435 
474 
474 
Total 
Charter 
2579 
2752 
3017 
2967 
2599 
2562 
2398 
2627 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Total 
5.45 
5.21 
5.49 
4.28 
3.71 
3.08 
2.65 
4.71 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Total 
208284 
195664 
164278 
190676 
MAERSK LTD FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(1990 prices - million ECU) 
MAERSK LTD FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(current prices - million ECU) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Operating 
Revenue 
151 
152 
153 
145 
149 
Operating 
Cost 
141 
140 
141 
126 
136 
Operating 
Profit 
10 
11 
12 
19 
13 
Net 
Profit 
18 
18 
12 
10 
5 
EMPLOYESS 
(average) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Total 
845 
946 
907 
967 
1,187 
1,191 
(seats) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Intern'l 
Scheduled 
42 
45 
45 
87 
90 
83 
Domestic 
Scheduled 
62 
67 
72 
73 
76 
75 
75 
Total 
Scheduled 
62 
64 
63 
67 
67 
80 
82 
79 
Total 
Charter 
123 
126 
130 
140 
125 
134 
108 
143 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Operating 
Revenue 
118 
125 
132 
131 
142 
Operating 
Cost 
no 
116 
122 
113 
129 
Operating 
Profit 
8 
9 
10 
18 
13 
Net 
Profit 
14 
15 
10 
9 
5 
o 
3 
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F.5. Eurowings 
Eurowings was formed in 1992 as the result of a merger between NFD Luftvekehr and REG 
Regionalflug, which was completed at the beginning of 1994. Talks had been held in 
November 1991 on the possibility of RFG taking a 30% stake in NFD, following the collapse 
of Air Europe which originally owned 49% of NFD. Prior to the merger, the two carriers had 
co-operated on joint aircraft purchase, spares pooling and pilot training. The merger was the 
result of RFG's need for additional capacity for expansion, and NFD's financial situation 
following over-expansion and the burden of having to buy back the Air Europe stake. The 
industrialist, Albrecht Knecht, holds 93.66% of the shares in the new company, the remainder 
owned by the chief executive and other employees. 
F.5.1. Strategic responses 
NFD started scheduled operations in 1975, and by 1987 were carrying around 80,000 
passengers with a fleet of 2 ATR-42, 6 Metro III and 3 Cessna aircraft. At that time some 
services were flown for Lufthansa, with aircraft painted in Lufthansa colours, and closer co-
operation was envisaged in the future. It carried 184,300 passengers in 1987, and operated a 
fleet of 2 ATR42s, 8 Metro Ills and 1 Dornier 228. Close co-operation was also started at 
that time with Air France and KLM. The airline operated some services on behalf of 
Lufthansa, the remainder focused on scheduled services from their Nuremberg base. A 
second hub was started at Hanover, which they saw as having considerable longer term 
potential. However, one of their Hanover routes (Manchester-Hanover) was later withdrawn. 
The negative reaction to their Metro III was given as the main reason for the losses on this 
route. NFD started operating jet aircraft in 1988 with BAe 146-200 charters for the express 
cargo company, TNT. 
RFG started scheduled operations in 1979 with the Dortmund-Munich route, followed by 
Nuremberg-Paris in 1980, and by 1985 were carrying around 33,000 passengers. Scheduled 
services were operated between Dortmund and Paderborn and Munich, and 
Paderborn/London Gatwick was served as part of British Caledonian Commuter Services. 
The two airlines started co-operating in 1985, both realizing that they lacked the necessary 
economies of scale to survive alone. A joint purchasing agreement was signed, and both 
airlines ordered ATR-42 aircraft under this agreement, which they saw as ideal for their 
relatively short sectors. Further orders for ATR-42s and the larger ATR-72 followed in 1987. 
The two airlines were finally integrated in 1994, and initially focused on internal German 
routes. In 1995, however, the airline shifted its focus onto developing cross-border, rather 
than domestic German routes, due to competition from high speed trains and the high cost of 
operations. It signed a 10 year co-operation agreement with Air France, and further cemented 
the relationship with KLM, taking over the latter's Amsterdam to Nuremberg and Hanover 
services. Discussions took place with Lufthansa in 1994 on a closer partnership with 
Lufthansa, but these broke down because of what Euro wings described as 'internal resistance 
within Lufthansa'. Subsequent talks with Delta Air Lines and British Airways on linking 
Eurowings' services with those carriers networks also ended without agreement. 
It also operated charter flights with an Airbus A310-300 on behalf of Hapag Lloyd Flug, 
principally to Mediterranean destinations. However, this is to be discontinued because of 
union objections. Eurowings' strategy is now based on three types of business: its own 
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scheduled services, increasingly on cross-border routes, and in niche markets of 20,000 to 
100,000 passengers a year; charter services with its own aircraft; and some third party work 
for Lufthansa, TNT and other carriers. 
F.5.2. Routes, air services and capacity 
Prior to the merger, RFG had a number of scheduled services out of Dortmund, and NFD out 
of Nuremberg. NFD was the second designated carrier between Germany and France, with 
international routes operated between Stuttgart and Lyon, and Nuremberg/Paris. In 1987, 
NFD added Hanover/Manchester to its network, and strengthened its sales and reservations 
effectiveness by appointing Lufthansa as its world-wide GSA. 
Between 1992 and 1995, a number of new routes were initiated, for example between 
Düsseldorf and Newcastle, and Dresden and Paris. They also started a number of summer 
only routes to Guernsey, Jersey, Olbia, Nice and Bastia. In 1994, several routes between 
Amsterdam and Germany were transferred from KLM to Eurowings under code sharing 
arrangements. The majority of these new routes could have been operated without the 
benefit of the freedom of entry allowed under the three packages. The airline's Poland 
network was also expanded in 1995, with Krakov being added to existing routes from Berlin 
to Warsaw and Frankfurt to Wroclaw. They plan also to operate between Dresden and 
Poxnan. 
International passenger services are now operated to the following cities on a year-round 
basis: 
Paris: from Munich, Dortmund, Hanover, Nuremberg, Leipzig, Dresden, Münster 
Lyon: from Munich/Dortmund 
Amsterdam: from Dresden, Leipzig, Düsseldorf, Hanover, Stuttgart, Nuremberg (and 
from Summer 1996, Paderborn and Dortmund) 
Brussels: rom Hanover and Nuremberg 
London: from Paderborn 
Newcastle: from Düsseldorf. 
Hubs are operated at Dortmund, Berlin (Templehof), Dresden, Münster, Nuremberg and 
Paderborn, with smaller hubs at Munich, Leipzig, Hanover and Düsseldorf. 
Jet aircraft operate the Nuremberg-Paris and Amsterdam-Stuttgart routes. 
The Air France agreement includes 50% block seat arrangements on: 
(a) Nuremberg-Paris; 
(b) Munich-Lyons; 
(c) Hanover-Paris; 
(d) Dresden-Leipzig-Paris. 
Euro wings moved up to jet passenger operations in 1994, with the acquisition of two BAe 
146s, in addition to the two BAe 146 freighters that they operated for TNT. A third passenger 
BAe 146 aircraft (-300 series) was acquired from Crossair, and will be used for charter flights 
in Summer 1996, operating to Mediterranean destinations from smaller German regional 
airports, such as Hof, Erfurt and Kassel, which could not support larger jets. They expect to 
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operate a total of ten jet aircraft in the future, mainly on international routes, and do not rule 
out moving up to larger jet aircraft. 
Dortmund is a key hub for Eurowings, but it has a relatively short runway of 1,050 metres. 
Proposals for extending the runway to 2,000 metres, which would allow scheduled operations 
with larger B737 or A320 jets and charters, were recently blocked by the Green Party, who 
are part of the ruling coalition in North Rhine Westfalia. Even though an extension would 
allow direct competition from Lufthansa, Eurowings are in favour of upgrading this airport 
which has a very large catchment area in the Ruhr region, and considerable potential, given 
runway constraints at Düsseldorf. 
F.5.3. Marketing, traffic and market share 
Eurowings operates at a serious disadvantage in terms of size and economies of scale and 
scope. Even before the merger it had tried to overcome this problem by linking with a larger 
carrier (NFD with Lufthansa and later Air Europe, and RFG with British Caledonian). It also 
focuses on niche markets in which it will not have direct competition with the larger carriers. 
These markets are unlikely to be operated by larger airlines like Lufthansa on an economic 
basis, because of their higher cost base. On the other hand, Eurowings needs the help of 
larger carriers on the marketing side, which could take the form of interline agreements, or 
better still the code sharing agreements that the airline has concluded with both 
KLM/Northwest and Air France. The carrier also operates the Münster-Osnabrück route 
under a joint code with Lufthansa, as well as the wet lease Frankfurt to Münster and 
Nuremberg routes for Lufthansa, although they also compete strongly with Lufthansa's 
Cityline subsidiary on one or two domestic routes. Services are offered in single class 
configuration, but they have been seriously considering adding a business class. 
The airline does not have a frequent flyer programme, and has complained to the German 
competition authorities that Lufthansa's programme is anti-competitive. With around 80% of 
passengers travelling on business, the airline negotiates rebates directly with corporate 
customers, with money returned if pre-determined targets are reached. Overrides are not 
offered to travel agents, but business agents can make use of the corporate rebate scheme. 
Eurowings is interested in ticketless travel, and has a pilot scheme operating with the large 
company, Siemens, where only boarding passes are needed and these are issued at the airport. 
Eurowings did not operates on any of the ten most dense domestic German routes in 1993, 
and competes with other German carriers to a very limited extent (for example, they 
competed with Lufthansa on eight routes in 1994, with DBA and other small regional carriers 
usually only on one or two routes). Eurowings entered three routes in competition with 
Lufthansa in 1993 (Frankfurt/Münster, Frankfurt/Hanover and Düsseldorf/Leipzig). Its 
average frequency share when competing with Lufthansa was 38%. On the Nuremberg-
Berlin route, Eurowings competes with Lufthansa and claims a 50-60% market share. This 
may be helped by the fact that it serves the more convenient Templehof Airport, whereas 
Lufthansa flies to Tegel. 
International traffic increased steadily from 1987 to 1994 in terms of passengers carried, and 
rose sharply in 1995 to reach just over half a million passengers. Domestic traffic increased 
rapidly between 1988 and 1992. with a small drop in 1993. In both 1994 and 1995, however, 
domestic passengers have grown substantially to reach just under 1 million in 1995. 
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The passenger load factor has generally been in the range of 40-50% for domestic services, 
with international services somewhat lower. Such levels are low even for this type of 
regional operation, which carry mainly business traffic at relatively high yields. 
F.5.4. Productivity and operation costs 
Labour productivity in terms of ATKs per employee increased rapidly over the period 1988-
1990, with staff numbers remaining stable and high traffic growth rates. Between 1990 and 
1994, however, labour productivity has remained constant as a result of a rise in staff 
numbers, with a large increase in 1995. 
Average aircraft utilization was just over five block hours per day per aircraft in 1994. This 
is relatively low compared to regional airlines such as the UK-based City Flyer Express, 
which operated its ATR-42s for 8.1 hours per day on average in 1994 (and ATR-72s 6.7 
hours). On the other hand, City Flyer's Shorts 360s only achieved 4.9 hours a day, over an 
average sector of 290 km (as opposed to 380 km for the ATR-42s). Eurowings' average 
sector length for both international and domestic flights was 370 km in 1994. 
F.5.5. Pricing and yields 
In 1995 Eurowings introduced a scheme of discounts for large customers: those giving the 
airline DM 50,000 or more per year would get a discount starting at 6%, and increasing in 
steps. While the threshold is based on total revenues, including both leisure and business 
fares, the discount is only applied to the business revenues. 
Its Wings fare structure was introduced in 1994, with four basic fare levels: 
(i) Full fare; 
(ii) Full fare less 20%; 
(iii) Full fare less 55%; 
(iv) Full fare less 70%. 
Availability and flexibility are reduced in line with the increased discounts offered. The 
initial result of the new fare structure was an increase in passengers carried of around 25%. 
The average yield was DM 262 per passenger in 1994, falling DM 222 in 1995, although the 
percentage of scheduled service traffic fell from 95% to 82% over the same period. 
F.5.6. Profitability and sources of finance 
Prior to the merger, NFD had generally produced small operating profits and net losses in 
some years. After merging with RFG, Eurowings made an operating loss of DM 2.85 million 
in 1993 and DM 5.8 million in 1994. These became net losses of DM 6.8 million and DM 
7.7 million respectively. Their operating ratio was 99% in 1993 and 98% in 1994. Turnover 
increased marginally from DM 305 million in 1993 to DM 316 million in 1994, but jumped 
to DM 400 million in 1995, when the airline will to go into profit. 
A subsidy is paid by the government of the Free State of Bavaria for the operation of the Hof-
Bayreuth-Frankfurt services. However, this is small in relation to total turnover, and the 
limited equipment at the two Bavarian airports results in costly diversions and delays in 
Winter. 
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NFD/RFG and Eurowings have invested over DM 500 million between 1987 and 1994. All 
their BAe 146 aircraft are leased, as well as four of the ATR-42/72 fleet. The airline has an 
aircraft maintenance subsidiary, NAYAK GmbH, based at Cologne, and a tour operator, 
Eurowings Touristik GmbH. 
F.5.7. Impact of EU measures and conclusions 
EU liberalization has not been so important for Eurowings' route expansion, since the 
German domestic market was already deregulated at the beginning of the 1990s, and 
international routes were already available under bilaterals. However, the lifting of the 
restrictions on fare filing in the third package were seen as a significant advantage for the 
carrier. They also saw opportunities for services to Austria which, with that country's entry 
into the EU, would now have no restrictions. 
Some of the features of the EU packages, on the other hand, have had a negative impact on 
Eurowings. Consecutive cabotage allows foreign carriers entry into German domestic 
markets, often on thin routes, and on routes which Eurowings were developing. Many of 
these routes which were originally initiated have now been discontinued (eg SAS), but 
British Airways' London-Hanover-Leipzig remains. While Β A do not carry many cabotage 
passengers between Hanover and Leipzig, even ten passengers a day have a serious impact on 
Eurowings' traffic on that sector. 
The airline's co-operation with Air France pre-dates the three packages, and the 
KLM/Northwest agreement was dictated more by transatlantic bilateral changes, rather than 
any EU measures. 
Progress towards the single market has also led to the easing the restrictions on leasing in 
aircraft from other EU countries, as well as hiring staff from other EU countries. However, 
they face a problem of attracting and keeping skilled staff, such as pilots, who often move to 
jobs with better pay and prospects at Lufthansa. Future harmonization of pilot hours might 
actually have a negative effect on the airline's productivity, since their levels are higher than, 
for example Lufthansa or Air France. 
The airline would like to see more stronger EU measures aimed at airports (slots) and air 
traffic control (delays and costs). They also consider that they are at a disadvatage when 
official travel or public contracts are awarded, since, in Germany, Lufthansa tends to be the 
automatic choice. Corporate and indirect taxation and social legislation heavily penalize air 
transport operations in Germany and by German based carriers, and further harmonization in 
these areas can only benefit the airline. 
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Table F.4. Eurowings data 
Passengers 1994 1995 
Scheduled domestic 
Scheduled International 
Operated for other airlines 
Own charters 
Hapag Lloyd charters 
TOTAL 
843 107 
307 334 
9 152 
48 336 
-
1 207 929 
963 141 
504 017 
48 757 
91 102 
192 983 
1 800 000 
Fleet(1996) Number Seats 
ATR-42 
ATR-72-200 
ATR-72-210 
BAe 146-200 (Scheduledpassengers) 
BAe 146-300 (Charter passengers) 
BAe 146-200QT (Charterfreight) 
Total 
17 
6 
5 
2 
1 
2 
32 
46/48 
68 
68 
84/92 
n/a 
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APPENDIX G 
Community legislation, etc. 
G.I. Regulations 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the procedure for 
the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector (OJ L 
374, 31.12.1987, p. 1). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air 
transport sector (OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p. 9). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2299/89 of 24 July 1989 on a code of conduct for computerized 
reservation systems (OJ L 220, 29.7.1989, p. 1). 
Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 1) 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for scheduled air services 
(OJL217, 11.8.1990, p. 8). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2343/90 of 24 July 1990 on access for air carriers to scheduled 
intra-Community air service routes and on the sharing of passenger capacity between air 
carriers on scheduled air services between Member States (OJ L 217, 11.8.1990, p. 8). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2344/90 of 24 July 1990 amending Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3976/87 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector (OJ L 217, 11.8.1990, p. 15). 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/91 of 5 December 1990 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
concerning joint planning and coordination of capacity, consultations on passenger and cargo 
tariff rates on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports (OJ L 10, 15.1.1991, p. 14). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 294/91 of 4 February 1991 on the operation of air cargo 
services between Member States (OJ L 36, 8.2.1991, p. 1). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 of 4 February 1991 establishing common rules for a 
demied-boarding compensation system in scheduled air transport (OJ L 36, 8.2.1991, p. 5). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers (OJ L 240, 
24.8.1992, p. 1). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers 
to intra-Community air routes (OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, p. 8). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air services 
(OJL 240, 24.8.1992, p. 15). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at Community airports (OJ L 14, 22.1.1993, p. 1). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3089/93 of 29 October 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2299/89 on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems (OJ L 278, 11.11.1993, 
p. 1). 
G.2. Directives 
83/416/EEC: Council Directive of 25 July 1983 concerning the authorization of scheduled 
inter-regional air services for the transport of passengers, mail and cargo between Member 
States (OJ L 237. 26.8.1983, p. 19). 
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87/601/EEC: Council Directive of 14 December 1987 on fares for scheduled air services 
between Member States (OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p. 12). 
87/602/EEC: Council Directive of 14 December 1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity 
between air carriers on scheduled air services between Member States and on access for air 
carriers to scheduled air­service routes between Member States (OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p. 19). 
90/314/EEC: Council Directive of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and 
package tours (OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 59). 
93/13/EEC: Council Directive of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 
95, 21.4.1993, p. 29). 
96/67/EC: Council Directive of 15 October 1996 on access to the groundhandling market at 
Community airports (OJ L 272, 25.10.1996, p. 36). 
G.3. Case law 
Case 167/73 Commission ν France [1974] ECR 359. 
Case 209/84 French Republic (Public Prosecutor) ν Asjes [1986] ECR 1425. 
Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and others ν Zentrale zar Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs [1989] ECR 103, [1990] 4 CMLR 102. 
Case C­364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft ν Eurocontrol [1994] ECR 1­43. 
G.4. Other 
The contribution of the European Communities to the development of a Community air 
transport policy (COM(79) 311 final). 
Civil Aviation Memorandum No 2: Progress towards the development of a Community air 
transport policy (COM(84) 72 final). 
Report on the first year (1988) of implementation of the aviation policy approved in December 
1987 (COM(89) 476 final, 2.10.1989). 
Commission Recommendation 87/598/EEC of 8 December 1987 on a European Code of 
Conduct relating to electronic payment (OJ L 365, 24.12.1987, p. 72). 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of consumers in respect of 
contracts negotiated at a distance (COM(93) 396 final, 7.10.1993). 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on air carrier liability in case of accidents (COM(95) 
724 final, 20.12.1995). 
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Data sources and bibliography 
1. Legal and administrative measures 
European Commission. The Community Internal Market, annual reports on the operation of 
the single market, 1993 and 1995; and The Single Market in 1995, COM(96) 51 final 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EC. 
European Commission. Series of six booklets on the Internal Market, latest update 1st July 
1994, Vols 1^1, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EC. 
European Commission. 23rd and 24th Annual Reports on Competition Policy, 1993 and 1994, 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EC. 
Other reports and studies supplied by the Commission to the Coordinating Consultant, in 
particular cross-section studies on Customs and fiscal formalities at frontiers, Public 
procurement, Social and labour policy and Economies of scale. 
(1) Official reports and studies of the Commission and Member States. For instance, 
Commission Decisions concerning the granting of state aids as reported in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities. 
European Commission. Report on the first year (1988) of implementation of the aviation 
policy approved in December 1987, COM(89) 476, Luxembourg, Office for Official 
Publications of the EC. 
European Commission (DGIV). Report on Frequent Flyer Programmes, December 1992. 
Avmark. The Competitiveness of the European Community's Air Transport Industry, 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1992. 
Coopers & Lybrand. The Application and Possible Modification of Council Regulation 95/93 
on Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Community Airports, Final Report, 17th 
October 1995. 
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